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Abstract. This paper presents estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 199 
countries and territories for four time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. These 
indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of 
governance, drawn from 25 separate data sources constructed by 18 different 
organizations. We assign these individual measures of governance to categories 
capturing key dimensions of governance, and use an unobserved components model to 
construct six aggregate governance indicators in each of the four periods. We present 
the point estimates of the dimensions of governance as well as the margins of errors for 
each country for the four periods. The governance indicators reported here are an 
update and expansion of our previous work, part of a research project on indicators 
initiated in 1998 (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 1999a,b and 2002). We also 
address various methodological issues, including the interpretation and use of the data 
given the estimated margins of errors. The data, as well as a web-based graphical 
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1. Introduction 
 
  This paper presents a set of estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 
199 countries and territories for four time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. These 
indicators are based on several hundred variables measuring perceptions of 
governance, drawn from 25 separate data sources constructed by 18 different 
organizations. We assign the individual measures of governance perceptions to six 
categories capturing key dimensions of governance, and use an unobserved 
components model to construct six aggregate governance indicators in each of the four 
periods. The governance indicators reported here are an update and expansion of our 
previous work (Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (KKZ) 1999a,b and 2002 and 
Kaufmann and Kraay 2002). The data, as well as a web-based graphical interface, are 
available at www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002. 
 
In this paper we first describe the data we draw on for this round of the 
governance indicators. As discussed in more detail below, we have obtained several 
new data sources, and we have updated our existing data sources forward and 
backward in time to 2002 and 1996 respectively. The indicators for 1998 and 2000 
reported in this paper are based on the indicators for 1997/98 and 2000/01 that we have 
constructed in previous work. However, in light of the availability of several new data 
sources, we have decided to revise these indicators to reflect the new data that we have 
obtained, resulting in indicators for 1998 and 2000 that are intended to replace our 
previous measures.  
 
We next briefly review the aggregation procedure and describe the resulting 
governance indicators. As we have emphasized in our previous work, an attractive 
feature of the aggregation method we use is that it provides us with not only estimates of 
governance for each country, but also with measures of the precision or reliability of 
these estimates, for every country, indicator, and year. While the addition of data has 
improved the precision of our governance indicators relative to previous years, the 
margins of error associated with estimates of governance remain large relative to the 
units in which governance is measured. This implies that cross-country comparisons of 
levels of governance based on this type of data should be made with due caution. This is   2 
particularly the case for changes over time, which in the vast majority of cases are small 
relative to the margins of error associated with our estimates of governance. 
 
In the final section of the paper we discuss in more detail several issues related 
to the construction and use of our governance indicators. We first discuss the usefulness 
of subjective measures of governance relative to alternatives. We also empirically 
investigate the importance of ideological biases in expert assessments of corruption, and 
find little evidence that they are present. We then discuss in more detail the 
consequences of the substantial margins of error associated with the governance 
indicators, using the aid allocation rules proposed for the U.S. Government’s Millennium 
Challenge Account as an illustration. We also note that margins of error are not unique 
to subjective indicators of governance, and show how to infer corresponding margins of 
error for more quantitative or objective indicators that have been proposed in recent 
years. We also provide some description of the limited available information on global 
trends in governance over the past six years covered by our indicators.  Finally, we 
conclude with a comparison of our Control of Corruption indicator with the Corruption 
Perceptions Index produced by Transparency International. 
 
2. Measuring Governance 
 
2.1 Governance Clusters 
 
We construct six aggregate governance indicators, motivated by a broad 
definition of governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country 
is exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions 
that govern economic and social interactions among them. This classification of 
indicators into clusters corresponding to this definition of governance is not intended to 
be definitive. Rather, drawing on existing definitions of governance, we unbundled it 
reflecting our views of what constitutes a consistent and useful organization of the data 
that is concordant with prevailing notions of governance. 
   3 
The first two governance clusters are intended to capture the first part of our 
definition of governance: the process by which those in authority are selected and 
replaced. We refer to the first of these as “Voice and Accountability”, and include in it a 
number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties 
and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country 
are able to participate in the selection of governments. We also include in this category 
indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in 
holding monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions. The 
second governance cluster is labeled “Political Stability and Absence of Violence”. In this 
index we combine several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional 
and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. This index captures the 
idea that the quality of governance in a country is compromised by the likelihood of 
wrenching changes in government, which not only has a direct effect on the continuity of 
policies, but also at a deeper level undermines the ability of all citizens to peacefully 
select and replace those in power.
1  
 
The next two clusters summarize various indicators of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies. In “Government Effectiveness” 
we combine into a single grouping responses on the quality of public service provision, 
the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the 
civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment 
to policies. The main focus of this index is on “inputs” required for the government to be 
able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods. The second 
cluster, which we refer to as “Regulatory Quality”, is more focused on the policies 
themselves. It includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as 
price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens 
imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business 
development.  
 
                                                 
1 It is worth noting that there is some ambiguity regarding the normative direction of a few of the 
subcomponents this indicator. For example, a few of our sources rank countries such as Cuba 
and North Korea highly in terms of their political stability, which simply reflects the longevity of the 
governments in power in these countries.    4 
The last two clusters summarize in broad terms the respect of citizens and the 
state for the institutions which govern their interactions. In “Rule of Law” we include 
several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. 
Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an 
environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social 
interactions, and importantly, the extent to which property rights are protected. The final 
cluster, which we refer to as Control of Corruption, measures perceptions of corruption, 
conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. Despite this 
straightforward focus, the particular aspect of corruption measured by the various 
sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of “additional payments to get 
things done,” to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring 
“grand corruption” in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in 
“state capture”. The presence of corruption is often a manifestation of a lack of respect 
of both the corrupter (typically a private citizen or firm) and the corrupted (typically a 
public official or politician) for the rules which govern their interactions, and hence 
represents a failure of governance according to our definition. 
 
2.2 Sources of Governance Data 
 
In this section we provide a brief overview of the sources of governance data 
underlying our composite indicators. Table 1 provides a list of all of the sources that we 
have used to construct our governance indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002.
2 
Details on each of these sources are provided in Appendix A. Details on how we have 
assigned individual questions from each of these sources to our six governance clusters 
are provided in Appendix B.  
 
For the 2002 indicators we use 250 individual measures, taken from 25 different 
sources, produced by 18 different organizations. These organizations include 
international organizations, political and business risk-rating agencies, think-tanks, and 
                                                 
2 Note we refer to the previously available periods, namely, 1997/98, as 1998, and 2000/01, as 
2000, for convenience. As discussed in this paper, the estimates for these two previously 
available periods have also been updated and revised, given the additional data that became 
available.   5 
non-governmental organizations. In 2002, we have included six new data sources 
relative to our previous work: Afrobarometer (a survey of individuals in 12 African 
countries), Reporters Without Borders (an assessment of press freedoms compiled by 
an international journalists’ organization), Human Rights (a numerical coding of the 
assessments of certain dimensions of human rights as reported by U.S. State 
Department and Amnesty International, as first reported in Cingranelli and Richards 
(2001) and subsequently updated and expanded by Craig Webster, World Markets 
Online (a commercial risk-rating agency), Voice of the People (a citizen survey 
sponsored by Gallup International), and the World Bank’s Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (known as CPIA), an internal assessment of country 
performance constructed by World Bank country economists.
3 
 
  Two of the new sources that we have added in 2002 are also available for earlier 
years (Human Rights and CPIA). In order to make full use of this additional data, as well 
as to improve the comparability of the governance indicators over time, we have revised 
our previous indicators for 1997/98 and 2000/01 to incorporate these sources. In 
particular, we begin with the same underlying sources that we used in the past for these 
two periods. We then add the data from Human Rights and CPIA, and we discard two 
minor sources that we have used in the past but are no longer available.
4 We then re-
compute the aggregate indicators based on this revised dataset. For notational 
convenience, we refer to these revised indicators as the indicators for 1998 and 2000, 
even though both of these measures are based on data from a two-year period. Finally, 
a subset of our indicators are available in 1996. Based on these sources, we also 
construct aggregate governance indicators for this period. 
 
  As in our previous work, we continue to distinguish sources according to (1) 
whether they are polls of experts, or surveys of businesspeople or citizens in general, 
                                                 
3 It is worth noting that we do not use the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) as a component of our aggregate corruption indicator. This is because the CPI is 
itself an aggregate of a number of individual sources, all of which we have already included in our 
corruption indicator. 
 
4 These are the Central European Economic Review which rated a sample of transition 
economies and ceased publication after our only use of this source in the 1997/98 indicators, and 
the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, which has also discontinued its rating of a small 
number of Asian economies. Dropping these sources does not affect our country coverage, and 
makes the aggregate indicators more comparable over time.   6 
and (2) the extent to which the sample of countries included in the sources is 
representative of the world as a whole. The advantages and disadvantages of polls of 
experts relative to surveys of market participants are well-known, and are discussed in 
our previous papers (KKZ 1999b, 2002 and Kaufmann and Kraay 2002). Briefly, the 
choice among these two types of governance data involves tradeoffs in terms of cross-
country comparability versus first-hand knowledge of local conditions. Polls of experts in 
general are explicitly designed to provide comparable results across countries, through 
elaborate benchmarking procedures. However, their reliability depends greatly on the 
ability of the small group of experts involved to provide objective and accurate 
assessments of the governance dimensions being measured.
5 In contrast, surveys 
typically draw on the responses of large numbers of local respondents with direct first-
hand knowledge of local conditions. However, to the extent that ostensibly identical 
survey questions are interpreted differently by respondents with different cultural and/or 
socioeconomic backgrounds, it can be difficult to make cross-country comparisons using 
survey responses.
6 For example, it is easy to see how responses to a question on the 
prevalence of “improper practices” can be affected by country-specific perceptions of 
what such practices might be. 
Sources of governance data also vary with respect to the sample of countries 
they cover. A number of sources cover a very large sample of developed and developing 
countries, while others cover very narrowly-focused samples of countries. Also, many of 
the poorest and/or smallest countries in the world tend not to be covered by many 
commercially-oriented polls because they are relatively unattractive to foreign investors. 
                                                 
5 Most of the polls of experts we rely on are based on the views of a large group of raters. For 
example, the Economist Intelligence Unit is based in London and prepares its assessments 
based on the views of a worldwide network of correspondents. Similarly, Freedom House is 
based in New York but bases its assessments on a global network of correspondents and human 
rights monitors, and Reporters Without Borders, based in France, constructs its assessments 
based on a global network of reporters. Other polls of experts have a narrower institutional 
affiliation for their respondents. For example the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) Transition Report ratings are primarily based on the assessments of EBRD 
staff based in London and the State Department component of our Human Rights measure 
reflects the views of U.S. State Department employees. Below we discuss in more detail 
evidence regarding potential ideological biases in the assessments of polls of experts. 
 
6 It is important to note that our three main sources of firm-level survey data (the Geneva-based 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, the Lausanne-based Institute for 
Management Development’s World Competitiveness Yearbook, and the Washington-based 
World Bank’s business environment surveys) primarily interview domestic as opposed to foreign-
owned firms in the countries they cover.   7 
Since there is a strong positive association across countries between governance and 
per capita incomes, this difference between sources makes it difficult a priori to compare 
indicators from sources which cover sets of countries with very different income levels. 
Similarly, there may be regional differences in governance which hamper simple 
comparisons across sources. For example, it is difficult to compare a governance rating 
based only on transition economies with one based on a broad set of countries. As 
discussed in a previous paper (KKZ 1999a), the methodology we use to construct 
aggregate governance indicators takes these differences in country coverage into 
account as the data from individual sources are transformed into common units for 
aggregation across sources. Table 1 also contains a column indicating which sources 
we treat as representative and non-representative. 
2.3 Aggregation Methodology 
 
Implicit in our organization of the data is the view that, within each cluster, each 
of these indicators measures a similar underlying basic concept of governance. Given 
this view, there are considerable benefits from combining these related indicators into an 
aggregate governance indicator for each cluster. First, the aggregate indicators span a 
much larger set of countries than any individual source, permitting comparisons of 
governance across a broader set of countries than would be possible using any single 
source. Second, aggregate indicators can provide more precise measures of 
governance than individual indicators. Third, it is possible to construct quantitative 
measures of the precision (and thus margins of error) of both the aggregate governance 
estimates for each country, as well as their components.  
 
We now present in some detail the statistical methodology used to construct our 
aggregate governance indicators. Readers who are already familiar with our approach, 
or who are not interested in the technical details, can skip the remainder of this 
subsection. For each of the governance clusters, we combine the component indicators 
into an aggregate governance indicator using the same methodology used to calculate 
our first set of indicators, as documented in detail in KKZ (1999a). We use an extension 
of the standard unobserved components model which expresses the observed data in 
each cluster as a linear function of the unobserved common component of governance, 
plus a disturbance term capturing perception errors and/or sampling variation in each   8 
indicator.
7 In particular, we assume that we can write the observed score of country j on 
indicator k, y(j,k), as a linear function of unobserved governance, g(j), and a disturbance 
term, e(j,k), as follows: 
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where a(k) and b(k) are unknown parameters which map unobserved governance g(j) 
into the observed data y(j,k). As a choice of units, we assume that g(j) is a random 
variable with mean zero and variance one. We assume that the error term has zero 
mean and a variance is the same across countries, but differs across indicators, i.e. 
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assumption that the only reason why two sources might be correlated with each other is 




The disturbance term e(j,k) captures two sources of uncertainty in the relationship 
between true governance and the observed indicators. First, the particular aspect of 
governance covered by indicator k is imperfectly measured in each country, reflecting 
either perception errors on the part of experts (in the case of polls of experts), or 
sampling variation (in the case of surveys of citizens or entrepreneurs). Second, the 
relationship between the particular concept measured by indicator k and the 
corresponding broader aspect of governance may be imperfect. For example, even if the 
particular aspect of corruption covered by some indicator k, (such as the prevalence of 
“improper practices”) is perfectly measured, it may nevertheless be a noisy indicator of 
corruption if there are differences across countries in what “improper practices” are 
                                                 
7 Unobserved components models were pioneered in economics by Goldberger (1972), and the 
closely-related hierarchical and empirical Bayes models in statistics by Efron and Morris (1971, 
1972). 
8 For some pairs of sources, this assumption may not be literally true. For example, it will be 
violated if different risk rating agencies base their own assessments on the assessments of other 
agencies included in our sample. We have to the best of our knowledge excluded any source of 
governance data where we found that it was explicitly based on another one of our sources. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of correlated errors remains. The main consequence of this is that 
our standard errors will be biased downwards -- see Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 
(1999a) for an example. This underscores the importance of caution in comparing governance 
estimates across countries and over time, that we emphasize throughout.   9 
considered to be. Both of these sources of uncertainty are reflected in the indicator-
specific variance of the error term,  ) k (
2
e s . 
 
Given estimates of the parameters of the model, a(k), b(k), and s(k), we can 
compute estimates of governance for each country, as well as measures of the precision 
of these estimates. Formally, the estimate of governance for a country produced by the 
unobserved components model is the mean of the distribution of unobserved 
governance conditional on the K(j) observed data points for that country. This conditional 
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proportional to the variance of the error term of that source. As we discuss in more detail 
in the final section of the paper, we find that the efficiency gains from precision-weighting 
are substantial relative to the alternative of simply averaging re-scaled scores from each 
source for each country.  We also report the standard deviation of this conditional 
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This standard deviation is declining in the number of individual indicators in which a 
particular country appears, and is increasing in the variance of the disturbance term on 
each of these indicators.  
 
The assumptions of the unobserved components model ensure that the 
distribution of unobserved governance in each country is normal, conditional on the data 
for that country. Therefore, these conditional means and standard deviations for each 
country have a natural interpretation. For example, a useful interpretation of the reported   10
estimates and standard deviations for each country is to note that there is a 90% 
probability that the “true” level of governance in a country is in an interval of plus or 
minus 1.64 times the reported standard deviation centered on the point estimate itself. 
We refer to such a range as a 90% confidence interval around the estimate of 
governance for a country.
9  
 
  In order to implement this approach, we require estimates of all of the unknown 
survey-specific parameters, a(k), b(k), and  ) k (
2
e s . We do this in a two-stage procedure. 
First, we assume that governance and the error terms in Equation (2.1) are jointly 
normally distributed, and then apply maximum likelihood methods using only the 
representative sources to retrieve the parameters of interest for each governance 
cluster. This is nothing more than a standard application of the unobserved components 
model. We cannot however include our many non-representative sources in the first 
stage of the estimation procedure. This is because the distribution of unobserved 
governance in the subset of countries covered by these surveys is not the same as that 
in the world as a whole. As a result, for these sources we cannot make the assumption 
that unobserved governance in the countries covered by these surveys follows a 
standard normal distribution, as is required by the maximum likelihood procedure.  
 
We instead obtain the parameters of the non-representative sources in a two-
stage procedure. First, we estimate the parameters of the model only for the 
representative sources, and construct preliminary estimates of governance based only 
on these sources. In the second stage, we treat these preliminary estimates as an 
observable proxy for governance, and obtain the parameters of interest for the non-
representative sources by regressing these indicators on observable governance, i.e. by 
directly estimating Equation (2.1).
10 We then use all the estimated parameters of the 
unobserved components model to construct a final set of estimates of governance. 
 
                                                 
9 This is a slight abuse of terminology, as these are not confidence intervals in the usual 
frequentist sense of a stochastically varying interval centered around a fixed unknown parameter. 
Rather, we treat governance as a random variable, and the 90% confidence interval is simply the 
5
th and 95
th percentiles of the conditional distribution of governance given the observed data. 
 
10 In order to get consistent estimates of the parameters of the non-representative sources, we 
need to adjust for attenuation bias caused by the fact that our observable proxy for governance is 
a noisy indicator of true governance. Fortunately, we can use the information on the standard 
errors associated with the governance estimates obtained in the first stage to do this.   11
  The resulting estimates of governance have an expected value (across 
countries) of zero, and a standard deviation (across countries) of one. Due to sampling 
variability, this will not be exactly true for any one of our governance indicators in any 
period. To avoid any confusion regarding the units of the governance indicators, we 
rescale the estimates of governance by subtracting the mean (across countries) and 
dividing by the standard deviation (across countries) for each indicator, so that each 
indicator has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in each period.  
 
  It is also important to note that we have assumed that the distribution of 
unobserved governance is the same in every period. In particular, this imposes the 
restriction that the mean or world average of governance is the same in each period. As 
a result, our indicators are not informative about global trends in governance, although 
they are potentially informative about changes in countries’ relative positions over time. 
In the final section of this paper we discuss the limited available information on global 
trends in governance, based on some of our underlying sources.  
 
3. Governance Indicators 1996-2002 
 
3.1 Levels of Governance Worldwide 
The aggregate governance indicators resulting from our methodology, for all 
countries, for each of the six indicators and for all four periods, are reported in Appendix 
C, Tables C1-C6. The governance estimates are normally distributed with a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one in each period. This implies that virtually all scores 
lie between -2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. As 
discussed in the previous section, this also implies that our estimates convey no 
information about global trends in governance. They are however informative about 
changes in countries’ relative positions over time. Later in the paper we will discuss the 
limited available evidence on trends over time in global averages of governance. 
 
  Table 2 summarizes some of the key features of our governance indicators. In 
the top panel we show the number of countries included in each of the six indicators and 
four periods. The Voice and Accountability indicator covers the largest set of 199   12
countries.
 11 With the exception of Political Stability which covers 186 countries, all the 
other indicators cover 195 countries. Over time, there has been a steady increase in the 
number of countries covered in each of our indicators. This increase in the number of 
data sources is reflected in an increase in the median number of sources available per 
country, which, depending on the governance component, ranges from four to six in 
1996, and from six to eight in 2002. The proportion of countries in our sample for which 
our governance estimates are based on only one source has also declined considerably, 
to an average of only 10 percent of the sample in 2002. In the 2002 indicators we now 
cover virtually all countries in the world, and thus we do not expect major future 
improvements in country coverage.  
 
An important consequence of this expanded data availability is that the margins 
of error for the governance indicators have declined, as shown in the final panel of Table 
2. Depending on the governance component, in 1996 the average (for all countries) of 
the margins of error ranged from 0.26 to 0.40, while in 2002 the corresponding range is 
from 0.19 to 0.27. Moreover, the average margins of error for the revised 1998 and 2000 
indicators are also lower than the previously available estimates, again reflecting the 
incorporation of more data for more countries. These declines in margins of error 
illustrate the benefits in terms of precision of constructing composite indicators based on 
as much information as possible. 
 
Despite this increase in precision and the benefits of aggregation, the margins of 
error associated with estimates of governance remain substantial relative to the units in 
which governance is measured. We illustrate this point in Figure 1. In each panel of 
Figure 1, we order countries in ascending order according to their point estimates of 
governance in 2002 on the horizontal axis, and on the vertical axis we plot the estimate 
of governance and the associated 90% confidence interval described above. The size of 
these confidence intervals varies across countries, as different countries appear in 
different numbers of sources with different levels of precision. The resulting confidence 
intervals are large relative to the units in which governance is measured. To emphasize 
this point, the horizontal lines in Figure 1 delineate the quartiles of the distribution of 
                                                 
11 A few of the entities covered by our indicators are not independent states (Puerto Rico, Hong 
Kong, West Bank/Gaza, Martinique, and French Guyana). A handful of very small independent 
principalities (Monaco, San Marino, and Andorra) are also included. For stylistic convenience we 
will refer to all 199 entities as “countries”.   13
governance estimates. Even though the differences between countries in the bottom and 
top quartiles are substantial, the number of countries that have 90% confidence intervals 
that lie entirely within a given quartile is not large.  
 
  From Figure 1 it should also be evident that many of the small differences in 
estimates of governance across countries are not likely to be statistically significant. For 
many applications, instead of merely observing the point estimates, it is therefore more 
useful to focus on the range of possible governance values for each country (as 
summarized in the 90% confidence intervals shown in Figure 1). For two countries at 
opposite ends of the scale of governance, whose 90% confidence intervals do not 
overlap, it is clear that there are in fact significant differences in governance between 
these two countries. For pairs of countries that are closer together and whose 90% 
confidence intervals overlap (which can also be seen in Figure 1), one should be much 
more circumspect about the significance of estimated differences in governance 
between two such countries.  
 
Finally we consider the reasons for the differences across countries in the 
margins of error associated with governance estimates. As noted above, these 
differences are due to two factors: (i) cross-country differences in the number of sources 
in which a country appears, and (ii) differences in the precision of the sources in which 
each country appears. These two sources of variation can be seen from Equation (2.3), 
which shows that the precision of our estimates of governance increases as the number 
of sources increases, and as each underlying source becomes more precise. Figure 2 
illustrates how, across countries, the standard error of the governance estimate for a 
country declines with the number of sources in which that country appears, using the 
Rule of Law indicator in 2002 as an example. The corresponding figures for other 
indicators and periods are similar. In all cases, the standard error of the governance 
indicator declines at the rate of the inverse of the square root of the number of sources, 
consistent with our assumption that errors are uncorrelated across sources. What this 
means in practice is that a 90% confidence interval for a country with only one source 
will be roughly twice as large as the 90% confidence interval for a country appearing in 
the median number of seven sources. 
   14
The second reason why margins of error differ across countries is because our 
sources differ in their estimated precision, and different countries appear in different sets 
of sources. Recall that for each source, we estimate the variance of the error with which 
it measures the unobserved “true” level of governance across countries. We then use 
the inverse of these estimated variances to weight sources when constructing the 
aggregate score for each country. This means that more precise sources (in the sense 
of providing less noisy signals of governance) receive more weight in the aggregate 
indicators. This procedure minimizes the variance of our estimates of governance for 
each country. Table 3 summarizes, for all sources, indicators, and periods, the weights 
applied to each source in constructing the corresponding aggregate indicator. In 
particular, the entries in each column report the weights that would be assigned to each 
source, for a hypothetical country appearing in all sources. If a country appears in a 
subset of sources, the weights applied would be proportionate to the ones reported for 
those sources. Looking across sources, we see that there is a great deal of variation in 
the weights assigned to different sources, reflecting substantial differences in our 
estimated precision of each individual source.
12 These differences are in turn reflected in 
differences in margins of error associated with governance scores for each country. 
 
3.2 Changes over Time in Estimates of Governance 
 
  We now briefly discuss the changes over time in the governance indicators we 
have constructed. Before discussing specific countries and indicators, it is useful to 
distinguish between several potential reasons for changes in observed estimates of 
governance over time. Mechanically, the observed change in governance for a given 
country between two points in time can be attributed to four distinct factors: (1) changes 
in the perceptions of governance recorded in the underlying sources available in both 
periods for that country; (2) changes in the weights the aggregation procedure applies to 
different sources in each period; (3) additions to or deletions from the set of sources in 
which a country appears; and (4) the addition of new countries to the aggregate indicator 
                                                 
12 When we estimate the unobserved components model, the estimated precision of each source 
reflects the extent to which that source is correlated with other sources. In our empirical 
framework, we are assuming that errors are uncorrelated across sources. As a result, sources 
that tend to be highly correlated with other sources are more informative, and hence have lower 
error variances, than sources that tend to be only weakly correlated with other sources.   15
which systematically rate better or worse than the country in question (since as 
discussed above our indicators measure only countries’ relative positions). 
 
  Changes in scores assigned to countries by underlying sources is the most direct 
and straightforward measure of how governance in a country changes over time. 
Interpreting changes over time in the aggregate indicators due to the remaining three 
reasons is somewhat more difficult, and involves tradeoffs. Consider first the re-
weighting of sources that occurs from year to year as the observed correlations among 
sources change. The advantage of this re-weighting is that it ensures that in each year 
we have the most precise possible estimates of the level of governance. On the other 
hand, the disadvantage is that some of the changes over time in governance estimates 
for a given country will reflect this re-weighting rather than changes in the underlying 
indicators. However, in a previous paper (KKZ 2002) we showed that these changes in 
weights on average account for only a small fraction of the variance of changes in 
governance estimates.  
 
  There are also tradeoffs in interpreting the changes in governance estimates due 
to the addition of new sources for that country. Adding new data sources improves the 
precision of our estimates of the level of governance in a country at a single point in 
time. However, if the new source or sources rate a country significantly differently from 
existing sources, this can result in changes in estimates of governance which need not 
reflect actual changes in governance, but rather simply reflect the inclusion of new 
information relative to the previous period. In order to reduce the importance of this 
source of variation in governance estimates, as well as to improve the precision of our 
estimates of the level of governance in past years, we have recalculated our previous 
indicators incorporating all of the data we now have at our disposal. Nevertheless, the 
2002 indicators also reflect the information embodied in a few new sources relative to 
2000 and previous periods, and this provides a further reason why changes over time 
should be interpreted with some caution.
13  
  
  Since our indicators measure only countries’ governance performance relative to 
each other, changes over time in relative performance may also reflect the addition of 
                                                 
13 On the website displaying the data (www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002/) we 
have made available an option for users to identify the sources of governance data used for each 
country, indicator, and period.    16
new countries to the aggregate indicator. If for example we add a country with a 
governance rating that is high relative to those countries already in the index, then by 
construction all the countries which rank lower than this country will receive lower 
scores. It is easy however to remove this source of bias from comparisons of 
governance estimates over time. For example, if comparisons over time are based on 
changes in countries’ percentile ranks within the set of countries common to both 
periods, then this source of variation is removed. We therefore recommend this 
procedure as a robustness check when considering changes over time in a specific 
country or set of countries. In practice, however, we find that this source of bias is 
relatively small, especially when comparing 2002 with 2000, since following the revisions 
for the 2000 estimates due to the increased availability of sources there are now only 
small changes in the number of countries covered between these two periods. 
 
A final issue concerns the statistical significance of observed changes in the 
aggregate indicators. The first thing to note is that changes in the estimates of 
governance tend to be small relative to the levels of governance. This can be seen from 
Table 4 which shows, for each of the six indicators, the standard deviation (across 
countries) of changes in governance over the periods 2002-2000, 2000-1998, 1998-
1996, and 2002-1996. Recall that the standard deviation of the level of governance is 
equal to one by construction. The standard deviation of changes in governance is 
substantially smaller than one for all subperiods and all indicators. This suggests that the 
margins of error for the levels of governance are even larger relative to the observed 
changes in governance than they are relative to the observed levels of governance. 
 
It is difficult to be more precise about the statistical significance of changes in 
governance, for the following reason. Recall that for each period, our aggregation 
procedure allows us to summarize our knowledge about governance in a given country 
in terms of the distribution of unobserved governance conditional on the data that we 
see for that country. As discussed above, we use the mean of this conditional 
distribution as our best estimate of the level of governance in a country, and the 
standard deviation of this distribution to summarize the precision of our knowledge about 
governance for that country. However, when we repeat our aggregation procedure in 
successive periods, we do not produce any information about the joint distribution of   17
governance in successive periods. Without this joint distribution, we cannot make 
precise probabilistic statements about changes over time in governance.
14 
 
Instead, we adopt the simple rule of thumb of focusing only on changes in 
governance for those countries in which the 90% confidence intervals in the two periods 
do not overlap. Figure 3 illustrates the use of this rule of thumb to highlight large 
changes in governance between 2002 and 2000. In each of the six panels, we plot the 
2002 score on the horizontal axis, and the 2000 score on the vertical axis. We also plot 
the 45-degree line in red, so that countries above this line correspond to declines in the 
quality of governance, while countries below the line correspond to improvements in 
governance. The countries with changes in governance that are large relative to their 
margins of error in each period are highlighted in red, and the 90% confidence intervals 
in both periods are indicated by vertical and horizontal lines. Finally, for each country 
which appears in the 2002 indicator but not in the 2000 indicator, we plot its score along 
the 45-degree line. This gives a visual summary of the distribution of governance among 
those countries that we have added to the sample in 2002. 
 
The first striking feature to note from Figure 3 is that the number of countries with 
large changes in governance over this brief period is quite small, ranging from just one in 
the case of Voice and Accountability, to a maximum of 11 in the case of Regulatory 
Quality. This should not be surprising given the relatively short time period under 
consideration and the reality that in most countries, changes in governance tend to be 
quite gradual. Many of these changes are understandable in light of developments over 
the past two years. For example Argentina’s recent financial crisis is reflected in strong 
declines in perceptions of governance across the board. Similarly, the recent turmoil in 
Zimbabwe is associated with a sharp decline in perceptions of Rule of Law. An 
interesting case is the United States, which registers a decline in Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence, reflecting heightened concerns about terrorism in the aftermath of 
September 11, 2001. On the other hand, reductions in sectarian violence in Sri Lanka 
drive an improved score in this category. 
 
                                                 
14 Extensions of our aggregation procedure along the lines of dynamic unobserved component 
models could in principle provide information about the joint distribution of governance over time. 
We have not yet attempted to implement this idea with our data.   18
The reasons for changes in some of the other countries highlighted in Figure 3 
are less obvious. We examine these in more detail in Table 5. The first two columns of 
this table report the governance scores in 2000 and 2002. The next four columns 
summarize the importance of changes in a country’s scores on the underlying indicators 
in which it appears. In the column labeled “Agree” we report the number of sources 
available in both periods which move in the same direction as the aggregate indicator. 
The columns labeled “No Change” and “Disagree” report the number of sources on 
which that country’s score does not change or moves in the opposite direction to the 
aggregate indicator. For each country we also summarize the extent to which changes in 
the individual sources agree with the direction of change in the aggregate indicator by 
calculating the “Agreement Ratio”, or “Agree” / (“Agree” + “Disagree”). Finally, the last 
two columns summarize the changes in the set of sources on which each country’s 
score is based, reporting the number of sources dropped and added between the two 
periods. 
 
Table 5 shows that the agreement ratio is quite high for countries with large 
changes in governance. Averaging across all countries and indicators, we find an 
average agreement ratio of 0.79. This provides some confidence that for countries with 
large changes in our governance estimates, these changes are being driven primarily by 
changes in underlying sources. In fact, there are only four countries where the 
agreement ratio is less than one-half – Belarus and Iraq for Regulatory Quality, and 
Madagascar and West Bank/Gaza for Control of Corruption. Noting that they are 
exceptions to the more generalized finding of broad agreement across sources, it is 
nonetheless useful to address transparently these anomalous cases. In the case of 
Belarus, the surprisingly high score in 2002 is driven primarily by its very strong 
responses from firms in BPS. Iraq on the other hand illustrates an unusual case in which 
the re-weighting of sources has a substantial effect on changes over time. In both 
periods, Iraq has one of the very worst scores in the world, so clearly the large change in 
Iraq’s score does not reflect any real improvement during the period under 
consideration. Instead, it reflects the fact than the source which rated Iraq highest in 
2002 received much less weight in the 2000 aggregate. For Control of Corruption, the 
large improvement observed in Madagascar and the large decline in West Bank/Gaza 
are both driven entirely by changes in the set of sources in which these countries 
appear. Madagascar appears in one new source which rates it quite highly (WMO), while   19
it does not appear in the 2002 version of CDU which gave it a poor score in 2000. 
Conversely for West Bank/Gaza, it fared quite well on WBS in 2000, but this source is 
not available in 2002 and it scores poorly on the only source we have available for 2002, 
WMO. 
 
In summary, Table 5 suggests that at least for large changes in governance, we 
can have some confidence that these are primarily being driven by changes in these 
countries’ scores on the indicators we have available for both periods. It is important to 
note however that the majority of smaller changes in governance reflect a combination of 
all four sources of variation discussed above. This can be seen from Table 6 which 
repeats the information in Table 5, but instead reports averages across all countries for 
the typically much smaller changes in the six governance indicators, between 2002 and 
2000. Looking at all changes, rather than only at large changes as in the previous table, 
we see that the agreement ratio varies from 0.57 to 0.64, and for all six indicators is 
substantially lower than the agreement ratio for large changes in Table 5. This suggests 
that a greater degree of caution is in order when interpreting the typical small changes in 
governance estimates that we see from one period to the next. In principle we would 
expect changes over longer periods of time, such as 1996-2002, to be more informative. 
However, this is in part offset by the fact that there are larger changes in the composition 
of the sources comprising the aggregate indicators between these two periods.  
 
4. Uses and Limitations of Governance Indicators 
 
4.1 Perceptions Matter 
 
  In this subsection we briefly discuss why we rely exclusively on subjective or 
perceptions-based measures of governance when constructing our aggregate 
governance indicators. The primary reason for this choice is that for many of the key 
dimensions of governance, such as corruption or the confidence that property rights are 
protected, relevant objective data are almost by definition impossible to obtain, and so 
there are few alternatives to the subjective data on which we rely.  
 
Consider for example corruption. Since corruption is by nature an illegal activity, 
direct measures of its prevalence do not exist. A variety of indirect measures are   20
possible, but none are without difficulty. For example, relying on the frequency of 
references to corruption in the media will reflect not only the prevalence of corruption, 
but also the extent to which the press are free and objective in their coverage of events. 
Similarly, relying on prosecutions or conviction rates in corruption trials will to no small 
extent reflect the competence and independence of the police and judicial system, and 
thus will not exclusively reflect the prevalence of corruption itself. Finally, in recent years 
a handful of papers have attempted to measure corruption by looking for patterns in 
objective data that can only be consistent with corruption. For example, DiTella and 
Shargrodsky (2003) document variation in the procurement prices paid for very 
homogenous medical inputs such as syringes across hospitals in Buenos Aires as an 
indicator of corruption in procurement. Along similar lines, Golden and Picci (2003) 
carefully document variation in the differences between existing stocks of public 
infrastructure and past flows of infrastructure spending across Italian regions, 
interpreting this gap as a measure of procurement corruption. While these last two 
papers represent important and interesting developments in measurement, cross-
country measures of corruption based on this idea are not available – nor are they likely 
to be, given the major data requirements for this kind of exercise.  
 
For some other dimensions of governance, objective measures may be available, 
but nevertheless suffer from two related weaknesses. For Voice and Accountability, it is 
possible to use objective data on the presence of elections to measure democratic 
participation. However, as is well known there is a great deal of variation across 
countries in the extent to which the outcome of elections actually reflect the will of the 
voters. Measuring the extent to which elections are subverted, either through 
intimidation, manipulation, or sheer fabrication of results, brings us quickly back to the 
realm of more subjective or perceptions-based data. This is just one example of the 
important distinction between de jure and de facto situations regarding governance 
across countries. Countries may have extensive formal protections of property rights 
codified in their legal system, that are honored only in the breach. For example, most 
countries in the world now have formal independent anti-corruption commissions, but 
their effectiveness varies greatly.  
 
More generally, subjective perceptions of governance often matter as much as 
the legal reality. For example, on the basis of firm's perceptions on the undue influence   21
on the political decision-making process exerted by powerful firms, influencing laws, 
policies and regulations, Hellman and Kaufmann (2003) develop a measure for 'crony 
bias' or unequal influence across firms. The authors find a consistent pattern in which 
perceived unequal influence has strongly negative impact on the firm's assessment of 
public institutions, which in turn affects the behavior of the firm towards those 
institutions. Crony bias at both the firm and the country level is associated with lesser 
use of the courts by the firms to resolve business disputes, with lower enforceability of 
court decisions, lower levels of tax compliance, and higher levels of bribery. Thus, the 
evidence suggests that the inequality of influence not only damages the credibility of 
institutions among less (politically) powerful firms, but affects the likelihood that they will 
use and provide tax resources to support such institutions, thereby perpetuating the 
weakness of such institutions and likelihood of capture by the influential.  
 
Finally, in recent years the economics and comparative political economy 
literature has generated a profusion of results linking a variety of objective measures of 
the structure of institutions to a range of governance outcomes. A non-exhaustive list of 
examples includes the links between decentralization and corruption; the effects of the 
structure of the legal system on financial market development; the effect of checks and 
balances in the political system on regulatory and fiscal performance; the effects of 
democratic institutions on a wide range of socioeconomic outcomes; and many others. 
While this literature has served to greatly expand our understanding of the deep 
institutional determinants of development, the objective measures of institutional quality 
and/or their historical determinants on which they rely do not lend themselves well to the 
construction of aggregate governance indicators like ours. The basic reason is that these 
indicators typically do not have normative content on their own, but only do so in the 
context of a particular empirical analysis linking these variables with a particular 
outcome. For example, while measures of decentralization may be correlated with the 
incidence of corruption across countries, generally the explanatory power of this variable 
is not sufficiently strong that decentralization could be considered to be a reasonable 
proxy for corruption.  
 
None of this is to suggest that the subjective data on which we rely are problem-
free. We have already discussed the relative strengths and weaknesses of polls of 
experts and stakeholder surveys in measuring governance. Beyond this, a generic   22
problem with many perceptions-based questions about governance is that they can be 
vague and open to interpretation. For example, a well crafted question to enterprises on 
corruption asks them for the estimated share of bribes in revenues expended annually 
by firms like theirs, and similarly another focused ‘experiential’ question probes into the 
percentage of the firm’s management time spent dealing with government officials on 
red tape. By contrast, generalized opinion questions such as a citizen’s perception of the 
overall tolerance of the population to corruption are less informative for our purposes. 
Nowadays we can increasingly rely on more specific, better crafted, and to an extent 
experiential questions, thanks to improvements that have taken place over time. For 
instance, in contrast with the mid-nineties, the GCS survey of firms contains much more 
specific questions to the firm about corruption and governance, and some are of a 
quantitative and experiential nature (such as percentage of senior management time 
spent with public officials); similarly BPS includes many detailed questions unbundling 
governance to very specific components, and quantifying phenomena such as the 
percentage of bribes paid yearly as a share of the firm’s revenues.  
 
4.2 Potential Ideological Biases 
 
A potential drawback of subjective data from polls of experts is that this kind of 
data may reflect the ideological tendencies of the institutions compiling the performance 
ratings. Our prior has been that this is not a major concern for the sources on which we 
rely. This is because we find a very high degree of correlation among virtually all of our 
sources, which is difficult to reconcile with a systematic ideological bias among certain 
sources. Nevertheless, it is useful to investigate the extent to which the differences in 
assessments across sources are related to observable measures of the ideology of the 
government in power in each country.  
 
We do this as follows. Our identifying assumption is that surveys of firms or 
individuals are not tainted by ideology, since they reflect the views of a large number of 
respondents in each country. In contrast, it is possible that the views of a smaller 
number of raters affiliated with a particular institution may reflect the ideology of that 
group. We can therefore identify the effects of ideology by looking at the correlation 
across countries between the ideology of the government in power, and the difference in 
the percentile ranks assigned to countries by a poll of experts and a survey of individuals   23
and firms. We implement this idea using the World Bank’s Business Environment Survey 
(WBS) for 2000, and an independently available indicator variable that takes on the 
value 1 if the government in power is left-of-center, 2 if it is center, and 3 if it is right-of-
center, taken from the database of political institutions constructed by Beck et. al. 
(2001). The coefficient on the ideology variable will therefore capture the extent to which 
a given poll of experts rates countries with left- or right-wing governments systematically 
differently from a survey. 
 
The results are summarized in Table 7. The columns of Table 7 correspond to 
each of our polls of experts. In each of the six panels, we show the results of a 
regression of the difference between the percentile rank of a country on that poll and its 
rank on WBS on the indicator variable measuring the ideology of the government in that 
country. All variables are measured in 2000, which is the most recent year for which the 
ideology variable is available.
15 A positive coefficient indicates that the poll in question 
tends to rate right-of-center governments more highly relative to a survey, while a 
negative coefficient indicates a bias towards left-of-center governments. Looking across 
the columns of Table 7, we find only one source which appears to have a consistent 
ideological bias, with the Heritage Foundation assigning relatively higher scores to 
countries with right-of-center governments than the corresponding surveys. However, it 
is worth emphasizing that this “ideology bias” is fairly modest in magnitude. The 
coefficient estimates indicate that a country with a right-of-center government would get 
between 7 and 10 percentile points higher than a center government. Moreover, in all 
cases, the ideology variable in a statistical sense explains only a trivial fraction of the 
difference in assessments between polls and surveys, suggesting that the importance of 
ideological biases in polls is quite small overall. 
 
4.3 Margins of Error and Classifying Countries According to Governance 
Performance 
 
                                                 
15 For Voice and Accountability, we use GMS instead of WBS as the comparator survey. This is 
because the WBS questions used in VA are a bit special, capturing the extent to which firms have 
voice in the policymaking process, which is considerably narrower than most other polls. In 
contrast, GMS asks questions that more broadly correspond to the concepts covered by the polls 
of experts. 
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In this subsection we illustrate the importance of taking margins of error into 
account when assigning countries into groups according to their level of governance. 
Our discussion here is motivated by the recently-announced allocation rules for the new 
aid program of the United States Government, the Millennium Challenge Account 
(MCA). On November 25, 2002 the U.S. Government released details of how it plans to 
allocate MCA funds towards countries that “govern justly”, “invest in people”, and 
“promote economic freedom”.
16 This represents a major policy shift by a donor in moving 
to an allocation criteria which places governance issues center stage, and which relies 
on a highly transparent and objective empirical allocation criteria. The proposed criteria 
for country eligibility draw heavily on a number of cross-country measures of the quality 
of governance, including the five of the six governance indicators presented here. 
However, the MCA is of course not the only organization to make explicit use of 
governance indicators. For example the World Bank uses its internal assessments of 
countries policy performance, the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, to 
allocate concessional lending from its IDA facility. 
 
The proposed MCA allocation rule is designed to ensure that MCA funds will be 
allocated to low-income countries with relatively sound policies and institutions. A group 
of 74 countries that are eligible for concessional IDA lending from the World Bank, and 
which have per capita incomes less than US$1,435 in 2001, will potentially be eligible for 
MCA funds in its first year.
17 According to the MCA eligibility rules, this set of countries 
will be rated according to 16 performance criteria covering three dimensions of 
performance: “governing justly” (6 criteria), “investing in people” (4 criteria), and 
“promoting economic freedom” (6 criteria). Four of the governance research indicators 
we have constructed (voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, 
and corruption) have been proposed as performance indicators under the MCA’s 
“governing justly” performance dimension, with the remaining two for this dimension 
                                                 
16 See Radelet (2003) for a detailed discussion of the MCA.  
17 A number of countries with per capita income greater than US$1,435 are currently eligible for 
IDA under the small island economies exception, but these will not be eligible for the MCA during 
the first year. The group of 74 countries is based on data on IDA eligibility available at 
www.worldbank.org/ida and per capita gross national income in U.S. dollars in 2001 using Atlas 
exchange rates available in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. There will likely be 
differences between this list and the official list compiled by the MCA administration due to 
differences in data sources and updates, etc. In the second year, eligibility will expand to all 
countries with per capita incomes less than US$1,435, and in the third year to all countries with 
per capita incomes less than US$2,975.   25
being measures of civil liberties and political rights constructed by Freedom House. In 
addition, a fifth governance indicator, Regulatory Quality, is included under “promoting 
economic freedom”. 
 
In order to qualify for MCA assistance, countries must (a) be in the top half of all 
potentially eligible countries according to the corruption rating from the governance 
indicators, and (b) must be in the top half of all potentially eligible countries on at least 
half of each of the performance criteria under each of the three dimensions of 
performance. This rule is designed to ensure that resources are channeled towards 
countries that are performing well in a variety of dimensions of governance, and in which 
corruption especially is relatively low. Given the abundant evidence of the importance of 
good institutions and policies for growth, development, and aid effectiveness, this type of 
allocation rule is certainly warranted. Moreover, an objective and monitorable set of 
criteria for determining MCA eligibility is highly desirable, both in terms of the process of 
aid allocation, and also in terms of creating clear incentives among potential recipients of 
this aid.  
 
However, it is important to note that the substantial margins of error associated 
with governance estimates mean that it is difficult to assign many countries to a definitive 
performance category according to their estimated level of governance. This point 
applies to any of the MCA criteria, or any other indicator for that matter. Recognizing 
these margins of error, the MCA criteria appropriately do not require countries to pass 
the median hurdle on all indicators. However, the proposed MCA allocation rule in 
principle required countries to score in the top half of all relevant countries on the 
corruption indicator, which would constitute a “hard hurdle” for eligibility. While it is 
reasonable to subscribe to the notion that corruption should be an important factor in 
allocating aid, it is important to emphasize that a simple “in-or-out” rule runs the risk of 
misclassifying some countries precisely because margins of error are not trivial. This 
possibility is recognized in the MCA fact sheet, which provides for some flexibility to de 
facto ‘soften’ somewhat the “hard hurdle”. 
 
Since we have explicit margins of error for our corruption indicator, it is possible 
to be explicit about the risks of misclassifying countries with a single hard hurdle such as 
this. This is done in Figure 4. We rank the 74 potential MCA countries according to their   26
scores on the governance indicator in 2002 on the horizontal axis, and for each country, 
we show the estimated corruption rating as a black diamond and the 90% confidence 
intervals for each country as a vertical line, on the vertical axis. The first point to note 
from Figure 4 is that the 90% confidence intervals for a substantial fraction of countries 
include the median score (indicated as a heavy black horizontal line on the graph). In 
particular, of the 37 countries in the bottom half of the sample, only 11 have 90% 
confidence intervals that are fully below the median score, while for the remaining 
countries the confidence intervals include the median, indicating that there is at least a 
10% probability that these countries’ scores are actually in the top half of the sample. 
Similarly, only 17 out of 37 countries in the top half of the sample have confidence 
intervals that are fully above the median score for all countries, while for the remaining 
20 countries there is a non-trivial probability that these countries’ scores are in fact in the 
bottom half of the sample. 
 
For the majority of countries there is a non-trivial probability that they could be 
mistakenly classified in the bottom half of the sample. To illustrate this more precisely, for 
each country our methodology allows us to calculate the probability that a country’s true 
unobserved level of governance falls in the top half of the sample. These probabilities are 
indicated as squares, triangles and circles in Figure 4. Not surprisingly for the worst-rated 
countries, the probability they could fall in the top half of the sample is close to zero. 
Similarly, the best rated countries almost certainly belong in the top half. However, there is 
a large intermediate range of countries where there is a non-trivial probability that they 
belong in either the top or bottom half of the sample, for example ranging from around 
0.25 to 0.75. Borrowing colors from a traffic light, we have color-coded the first group of 
squares as red (less than 25% chance that they are mistakenly classified in the bottom 
half), the second group of circles as green (more than 75% chance that they actually 
belong in the top half), and the intermediate group of triangles as yellow.  
 
This “traffic light” approach highlights the challenge of assigning countries to 
performance categories – particularly the substantial number that fall in the “yellow light” 
category. While the 27 “green light countries” most likely belong in the top half, and the 
22 “red light” countries in the bottom half, the 25 intermediate “yellow light” countries are 
a more difficult case. These countries are difficult to assign to categories simply because 
the available cross-country data is not sufficiently informative and/or there is   27
disagreement between the underlying sources. The difficulty of assigning the “yellow 
light” countries to either the “green” or “red” categories points to the importance of 
relying on additional sources of information on which to base MCA eligibility decisions for 
this group. This also underscores the need for a certain degree of flexibility in the MCA 
allocation rule, and importantly, that this flexibility should be symmetric. Not only should 
countries that “barely miss the list of better performers” be given special consideration as 
currently proposed in the MCA fact sheet, but in addition countries that barely make the 
list of better performers should also merit further scrutiny.  
 
In summary, the discussion of this section emphasizes the importance of caution 
when using governance indicators to classify countries into groups. Classifications 
based on individual indicators, or even on a single aggregate indicator, inevitably run the 
risk of misclassifying countries due to the margins of error inherent in all indicators. To 
reduce the risk of misclassification, it is important to look at a variety of indicators and 
additional sources of data, especially for borderline cases. 
 
4.4 Margins of Error Are Not Unique to Subjective Data 
 
  We have argued that one of the strengths of the governance indicators reported 
in this paper is that we are able to construct explicit margins of error associated with our 
estimates of governance for each country. However it is worth emphasizing that these 
margins of error are not unique to subjective or perceptions-based measures of 
governance, but are also present -- if not explicitly noted -- in most other measures of 
institutional quality, or any other socioeconomic indicator for that matter. One need only 
consider the range of “preliminary” estimates of basic objective variables such as real 
GDP growth produced in industrial countries with high-quality statistical systems to 




Consider for example the recent interest in constructing objective measures of 
governance that do not exclusively rely on perceptions-based data sources as we do, 
                                                 
18 For example, in mid-2002, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis had produced three 
estimates of GDP growth for the fourth quarter of 2001, ranging from 0.2% to 1.7% (Wirtz 2002). 
Explicit consideration of margins of error in national accounts data dates back at least to Kuznets 
(1941).   28
but rather on objective and quantifiable data. Several of these are described in Knack 
and Kugler (2002). They argue that variables such as the waiting time required to obtain 
a telephone line, and the number of telephone faults can serve as proxies for public 
administrative capacity. The reliance of the government on trade taxes can serve as a 
proxy for the (in)ability of the government to broaden its tax base. The volatility in 
budgetary expenditure shares, and similarly, the volatility of revenue shares, are 
indicative of a volatile and unpredictable policy environment. They also draw on a 
number of other measures of institutional quality pre-existing in the literature. Clague, 
Keefer, Knack and Olson (1996) argue that the fraction of currency in circulation that is 
held in the banking system is a good proxy of the extent to which individuals in a country 
can be confident that their property rights are protected. Finally, in a series of papers, 
Djankov et al. (2002, 2003) compile cross-country data on the number of administrative 
procedures required to start a business, and the number of legal procedures required to 
collect an unpaid debt. These measures capture the complexity of the regulatory and 
legal environment. 
 
While most of these measures can in principle provide an accurate measure of 
the specific underlying concept to which they refer, their usefulness as a measure of 
broader notions of governance depends on the extent to which the specific concept they 
are measuring corresponds to these broader ideas of governance. For example, the 
number of procedures required to start a business may not be a good indicator of the 
complexity or burden of regulation in other areas. Similarly, the willingness of individuals 
to hold currency in banks reflect their confidence in a very particular set of property 
rights (vis-à-vis banks, and banks vis-à-vis the government), but may not necessarily 
capture other dimensions of property rights protection, such as confidence in the police 
and judicial system to uphold private property rights.  
 
This is of course not surprising, nor should it be considered a drawback of such 
measures -- all of which necessarily are imperfect proxies for broader notions of 
governance. However, it does mean that one should consider seriously the margins of 
error for objective indicators as well, to the extent that these are used as proxies for 
broad concepts of governance such as the ones we measure using subjective data in   29
this paper.
19 While these margins of error are generally not made explicit for objective 
indicators, a simple calculation can give a sense of their order of magnitude. Suppose 
that we have two noisy indicators y on a common unobserved concept of governance, g, 
i.e.:  i i g y e + = , i=1,2. Then if we normalize the variance of the unobserved measure of 
governance to be one, the correlation between the two observed indicators will be 
( ) ( ) ( )





s + ￿ s + = r . Suppose that indicator 1 is one of our subjective governance 
indicators, for which the variance of the measurement error, 
2
1 s , is known, and that 
indicator 2 is one of the objective indicators described above. Then from the observed 
correlation between the two indicators, we can infer the variance of measurement error 
in the objective indicator, 
2
2 s . 
 
The results of this calculation can be found in Table 8. The rows of Table 8 
correspond to the various objective governance indicators discussed above. In the first 
two columns, we identify the objective indicator, and the subjective aggregate 
governance indicator which best corresponds to it. In the third column we report the 
correlation between the subjective and the objective indicator, using our 2002 
governance indicators. The next three columns report the implied standard deviation of 
measurement error in the objective indicator, under three assumptions: (A) that our 
estimate of the standard deviation of measurement error in the subjective indicator is 
correct, (B) that the subjective and objective indicators have the same standard 
deviation of measurement error, and (C) that the standard deviation of measurement 
error in the subjective indicator is twice as large as that in the objective indicator. Finally 
in the last column we report the actual standard deviation of measurement error, 
computed as the average across all countries of the country-specific standard errors in 
our governance indicators. 
 
  The results in Table 8 are quite striking. For all indicators, and for all three sets of 
assumptions, the implied standard deviation of measurement error in the objective 
indicators is very high relative to the corresponding standard deviation of the subjective 
governance indicators. Under the benchmark assumption (A) which takes seriously the 
                                                 
19 These margins of error should of course also reflect measurement error in the raw data on 
which they are based -- for example, the non-trivial measurement error in macroeconomic 
variables such as the money supply or the composition of public expenditures.   30
margins of error we have computed for our governance indicators, we find that the 
implied margin of error for the objective indicators is between seven and 15 times larger 
than that of the subjective indicators. This clearly exaggerates the difference in the 
precision of subjective and objective indicators because we are comparing a single 
objective indicator with an aggregate of several subjective measures, and as discussed 
we should expect aggregation to improve precision. But this is only part of the story. For 
the GE and RQ indicators, we have a median of six sources per country, while for RL we 
have a median of eight sources. This can explain why the standard deviation of 
measurement error of the objective sources might be  4 . 2 6 =  to  8 . 2 8 =  times higher 
than that of the corresponding subjective indicators, but still cannot explain all of the 
difference in the precision of the indicators that we see. Similarly, the last row in Table 6 
reports the correlation of GE with an aggregate of all the objective indicators. In this 
case, the benefits of aggregation would be roughly comparable for the two indicators, 
with a median of 5 sources per country for the objective indicator and a median of 6 
sources per country for GE. Nevertheless, we find that the implied standard deviation of 
measurement error is still four times as large for the objective indicator as it is for the 
subjective one.  
 
  Assumptions (B) and (C) are designed to be more favorable to the precision of 
the objective indicators. Assumption (B) discards the information in the margins of error 
that we have constructed for the subjective indicator, and simply makes the neutral 
assumption that the subjective and the objective indicators have the same standard 
deviation of measurement error. This reduces the implied standard deviation of 
measurement error for the objective indicator relative to the benchmark assumption (A), 
but it remains large at 0.6 for the composite objective indicator, and higher for the 
individual indicators. Assumption (C) weights things even further in favor of the objective 
indicators, assuming that the objective indicator is twice as precise as the subjective 
indicator. In this case, we continue to find very substantial estimates of the standard 
deviation of measurement error, on the order of 0.4 and higher for individual objective 
indicators.  
 
  This simple calculation underscores and helps to quantify the intuitive notion that 
all governance indicators, not just the subjective ones we have constructed, are subject 
to non-trivial margins of error, and that care should be taken in making governance   31
comparisons based on any such measures. In addition, wherever possible, it is desirable 
to construct explicit margins of error to aid in these comparisons. 
  
4.5 Global Trends in Governance 
 
  In this subsection we present the limited available evidence we have on trends in 
global averages of governance. This exercise is of interest because, as noted above, we 
have rescaled the mean of our governance indicators to be equal to zero in each period. 
As a result, our aggregate indicators are by construction uninformative about trends in 
global averages of governance, but are informative about countries’ relative positions 
around the average. If we want to make statements about trends in governance 
worldwide, we need to go back to our underlying sources of governance data. 
 
  Table 9 summarizes the information we have available on trends in world 
averages of the various dimensions of governance. The panels of Table 9 correspond to 
our six dimensions of governance. Within each panel, we report data from up to four 
major underlying sources that we have available to us in each of the four periods 1996, 
1998, 2000, and 2002: EIU, DRI, PRS, and GCS. The first three are polls of experts that 
cover a large set of countries with a consistent methodology from year to year, and can 
therefore be expected to be informative about overall trends. GCS covers only a smaller 
set of countries, but it is the only survey of individuals we have that is available in all four 
periods, and so we also present it here. To maximize comparability across sources and 
over time, for the first three sources we focus on the set of countries common to these 
three for all periods. For GCS alone we consider only the smaller set of countries 
available in each period, focusing on a small number of individual survey questions that 
have been consistently available over time. 
 
  The first four columns present the average across all countries of each of the 
sources in each of the years. The underlying data have been rescaled to run from zero 
to one, and for each source and governance component, we report the score on the 
same question or average of questions that we use in the aggregate indicator. The next 
four columns report the standard deviation across countries for each source. The final 
column reports the t-statistic associated with a test of the null hypothesis that the world 
average score is the same in the first and in the last periods. Interestingly, a number of   32
sources report quite substantial declines in the world averages of the six dimensions of 
governance. DRI in particular shows statistically significant declines in all five indicators 
in which it appears. PRS reports significant declines in world averages for Political 
stability, Rule of Law and Corruption, but an improvement in Regulatory Quality and 
Government Effectiveness. Among polls, EIU alone consistently does not report any 
significant trend. Finally the one survey in this table, GCS, reports significant 
deterioration in Political Stability and Government Effectiveness, and declines in Rule of 
Law. 
 
  It is not clear how much importance ought to be ascribed to these trends in world 
averages. On the one hand, these statistics represent the only information we have on 
trends over time, and so they should be taken seriously. On the other hand, it is striking 
from Table 9 the extent of disagreement among sources as to the direction of global 
trends – overall we see 8 averages that improve or remain the same, and 11 that decline 
– so we cannot infer from Table 9 that there is full agreement that governance is getting 
worse worldwide. However, looking only at statistically significant changes, declines in 
governance averages outnumber increases by ten to two (and both of the statistically 
significant increases are in regulatory quality; none for any of the other five governance 
components). For now we cautiously conclude that we certainly do not have any 
evidence of any significant improvement in governance worldwide, and if anything the 
evidence is suggestive of a deterioration, at the very least in key dimensions such as 
control of corruption, rule of law, political stability and government effectiveness. It can 
therefore be safely concluded that our (relative) governance estimates for a country do 
not underestimate absolute trends for such country, since there is no evidence of a 
worldwide improvement. 
 
4.6  Comparisons with the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index 
 
  In this section we briefly contrast the methodology and results used here with 
those used by Transparency International in the construction of its pioneering Corruption 
Perceptions Index.  Like the indicators presented here, the TI index is an average of 
ratings reported by a number of perceptions-based sources.  In terms of content, the 
primary difference is that the TI index relies on a subset of the sources we use here, and   33
in addition the TI index treats multiple years of data from the same source as separate 
sources in the aggregation procedure.  In particular, the TI index is based on 10 distinct 
data sources, but uses between two and three years of data from some of them and 
treats them as separate sources, to arrive at a total of 15 components for the TI index.  
In contrast the control of corruption index here is based on 14 distinct sources, using 
only data from 2002, and without taking multiple years from the same source.  
 
The TI index also differs in its approach to aggregation.  We rely on an 
unobserved components model to: (i) transform individual sources into common units 
(this is the role of the a’s and b’s), (ii) construct an appropriately-weighted average of 
sources to use as the aggregate score, and (iii) produce margins of error to summarize 
the precision of the estimates of governance.  In contrast, TI uses: (i) a percentile-
matching approach to put data in common units; (ii) a simple average of rescaled scores 
as the estimate of corruption for each country, and (iii) a non-parametric bootstrapping 
procedure, discussed in more detail below, to generate measures of precision for the 
aggregate indicator.  Details on the TI approach can be found in Lambsdorff (2002).   
 
In terms of results, the estimates of corruption based on the two indicators are 
very similar, with a correlation above 0.9.  However, the TI index covers only 102 
countries, since it discards countries with fewer than three data sources.  In contrast the 
control of corruption indicator covers 195 countries, or nearly twice as many.  In addition, 
the margins of error generated by the two approaches are quite similar as well.  For the 
TI index, the average width of a 90% confidence interval is 0.94, or 9.4% percent of their 
range of units from zero to 10.  The average width of a 90% confidence interval of the 
Control of Corruption indicator constructed here 0.71, or 14% of the range from –2.5 to 
2.5 of this measure.  However, these figures are not comparable, since our Control of 
Corruption indicator covers many more countries, many of which have only one or two 
sources of data and hence should be expected to have somewhat larger margins of 
error.  If we focus only on the set of 102 countries appearing in the TI index, the average 
width of a 90% confidence interval for the Control of Corruption indicator is 0.52, or 10% 
of the range of this index.  This is almost identical to the margins of error in the TI index, 
relative to its scale of units. 
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However, as we discuss in the remainder of this section, this apparent similarity 
in the precision of the two indicators is the result of two offsetting biases in the TI 
methodology.    On the one hand, the bootstrapping approach to calculation margins of 
error in the TI approach understates the margins of error, i.e. overstates the precision of 
estimates of corruption, for countries with relatively few sources.  This would suggest 
that the TI margins of error should spuriously be smaller than those we report.  On the 
other hand, the estimates of corruption produced by the unobserved components model 
(UCM) used in this paper are a precision-weighted average of individual sources, while 
the TI approach is based on a simple average.  Since precision-weighting improves the 
accuracy of the estimates of corruption, we should expect that the TI margins of error 
should correctly be larger than the ones we report.  
 
We make these points with the help of some simple examples.  In order to 
provide a concrete framework in which to discuss these issues, we begin by assuming 
that after rescaling to common units, each source of governance data k provides a noisy 
signal about the true underlying level of governance in country j: 
 
(4.1)  ) k , j ( ) j ( g ) k , j ( y e + =  
 
This is identical to Equation (2.1), except that we have assumed that all sources have 
already been transformed to common units, i.e. a(k)=1 and b(k)=1 for all sources k.  As 
discussed above, the UCM approach treats g(j) as a random variable, and estimates 
governance for each country as the mean of this variable conditional on the data 
observed for that country.  We have seen that this conditional mean is simply a weighted 
average of the observed governance data for each country, with weights proportional to 
the precision of each source.  
 
The TI approach takes the somewhat different interpretation that g(j) is a fixed 
parameter to be estimated for each country.  It then constructs a simple average across 
sources of the y(j,k) for each country as its estimate of corruption.  The precision of this 
estimate is summarized by a bootstrapping procedure.  This bootstrapping procedure is 
based on the idea that one can approximate the range of likely values of governance for 
a country by looking at averages based on all possible combinations of the observed 
data for each country.  In practice, this means taking a large number of random draws   35
from the K data sources for each country, and constructing the average corruption score 
for each draw.  Then the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution of these many 
sample means provides a likely range of governance estimates that is comparable to the 
90% confidence intervals based on the UCM. 
 
  We can now illustrate our two main points: 
 
1)  If the number of sources available for a country is small, the TI approach of 
bootstrapping will tend to produce spuriously small margins of error and hence will tend 
to exaggerate precision.  The reason for this downward bias in margins of error is quite 
intuitive.  Consider the extreme case where there is only one data source available for a 
country.  Then, it simply is not possible to construct bootstrapped margins of error, 
because there is only one possible combination of sources for that country.  Less 
trivially, suppose there are only two sources for a country.  This means that there are 
three possible values for the sample average based on different combinations of this 
data.  The key issue is whether the range of these three averages accurately captures 
the true variation in the data.  As long as the number of observations is small, the range 
of averages based on bootstrapping will tend to be smaller than the true range of 
variation, and so bootstrapping will tend to understate precision.   
 
The easiest way to see this is with a simple numerical example.  Suppose that 
the “true” governance data is generated by Equation (4.1), with s=0.5 for all sources 
(roughly corresponding to a typical value that we estimate using the UCM).  We then 
generate random data from Equation (4.1) assuming normally-distributed errors, and 
then calculate bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals analogous to those constructed by 
TI.  The top panel of Figure 5 reports these as a bold line, for a range of values of the 
number of sources per country from 2 to 10.  Superimposed on the same graph are 
“true” the 90% confidence intervals as well, with widths equal to  K / 28 . 3 s ￿ .  The main 
point of this example is that the downward bias in bootstrapped standard errors is 
substantial when the number of sources is small.  For countries with three sources (the 
minimum number in order to qualify for inclusion in the TI index), bootstrapped margins 
of error understate the “true” margins of error by about 40% (0.59 as opposed to a “true” 
value of 0.96).  This downward bias is smaller the more sources are available for a given 
country.  Overall however, this example highlights one potential drawback of   36
bootstrapping, which is that it assigns spuriously high precision to countries with 
relatively few data sources.
20 
 
2)  If there are large differences across sources in the precision with which they 
measure governance, a governance estimate based on a simple average of scores such 
as the TI index will be unnecessarily imprecise.  In contrast, weighting sources by their 
reliability can improve the precision of the overall estimates.  Again, a simple example 
best illustrates this general point.  As is well understood, if the variances of the error 
terms are different, a weighted average of sources will have a smaller variance than a 
simple average, if the weights are proportional to the precision of the sources.  Suppose 
that the standard deviation of measurement error of source k is s(k).  Then the minimum 
variance estimator of the mean level of governance for country j,  ) j ( * y , will be: 
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Note that this weighted average is very similar to the weighted average of scores 
constructed by the UCM (recall Equation (2.2)). 
 
  How big are the efficiency gains of a weighted average, as opposed to the simple 
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) j ( y ,  as constructed by TI?.  The answer to this 
question will depend on how different are the variances across sources.  Some simple 
arithmetic shows that the ratio of the standard deviation of these two alternative 
estimators of governance is: 
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20 This is not to say that bootstrapping without merit.  In principle, an important advantage of 
bootstrapping is that it will give more reliable measures of precision when the underlying data are 
not normally distributed.  However, it is difficult to say a priori the extent to which deviations from  
normality will impart systematic biases into the margins of error generated by the UCM.   37
 
In order to get a sense for the magnitude of this quantity, we take the estimates of s(k) 
obtained from the UCM, for each of our sources in 2002.  For each indicator we then 
calculate what the ratio of the standard deviation of the unweighted mean (calculated by 
TI) would be relative to the optimal weighted mean, for a hypothetical country appearing 
in all sources for a given indicator.  The results of this are summarized in Table 10, and 
show that the benefits of precision-weighting are large for the set of sources we use.  
The variance of the simple average of scores is between 19% higher than the weighted 
averages (in the case of Political Instability and Violence), and 121% higher (in the case 
of Rule of Law).  On average, constructing a precision-weighted average results in 
margins of error that are 75% smaller than those of a simple unweighted average.  
These large benefits of weighting simply reflect the fact that there are very substantial 
differences in the precision of the individual sources we use, and that it is optimal to 
assign greater weight to sources with relatively higher precision. 
 
  In summary, we have seen that there are two offsetting forces in the comparison 
of the margins of error generated by TI, and those from the UCM that we use here. First, 
bootstrapped standard errors as constructed by TI will be spuriously small when the 
number of sources is small.  Second, simple averaging as is done by TI will correctly 
lead to higher standard errors because the simple average is not as efficient as the 
weighted average constructed by the UCM.    
 
We can now quantify the relative importance of these two factors.  In order to do 
so, we first apply the UCM methodology to the data used by TI to construct its 2002 
index for 102 countries.  When we compute the average confidence range based on the 
UCM for these countries using the TI data and sample of 102 countries, we find an 
average value of 0.64, which is 37% larger than that reported by TI.  It is important to 
note that these margins of error are also substantially larger than the margins of error of 
our 2002 Control of Corruption index for these countries.  This is because the Control of 
Corruption indicator is based on a greater number of independent data sources than the 
TI index (14 independent sources, versus 10 for TI). 
 
When we apply the UCM methodology to the TI set of sources, we find that the 
standard deviation of measurement error is quite similar across sources, ranging from   38
0.4 to 0.6.  Calculating the efficiency loss attributable to not precision-weighting using 
Equation (4.3), we find that since the sources used by the TI index have such similar 
error variance, the unweighted average will have a standard deviation that is only 4% 
higher than the optimally-weighted average.  This means that, for the limited sample of 
sources used by TI (and unlike the larger sample we use), the benefits of precision-
weighting are small, and we should not expect to see sizeable differences in margins of 
error between the two approaches due to this factor. 
 
  In light of this, the most plausible explanation for the smaller average margins of 
error reported by TI is the downward bias due to bootstrapping when the number of 
observations is small.  To illustrate this point, the bottom panel of Figure 5 compares the 
average width of a 90% confidence interval based on the TI methodology with that of the 
UCM, using the same data underlying the 2002 Corruption Perceptions Index.  On the 
horizontal axis we show the number of data sources per country, while on the vertical 
axis we show the width of a 90% confidence interval, averaging across all countries with 
the same number of sources.  For countries with very few sources, the TI method gives 
a much smaller standard error than the UCM.   In particular, for countries with only three 
sources, the UCM gives an average confidence interval that is almost 40% large than 
that reported by TI.However, as the number of sources increases, this discrepancy 
gradually declines, and for a country with 12 sources the 90% confidence intervals 
generated by the two methodologies are almost identical.   
 
This pattern is exactly what one would expect from the downward bias inherent in 
bootstrapped standard errors when the number of sources is small.  In fact, comparing 
the top and bottom panels of Figure 5, it is striking how similar the two graphs are.  With 
the UCM, the margins of error decline smoothly with the number of sources.  In contrast, 
with bootstrapping the margins of error are smaller initially (reflecting the downward bias 
in small samples), then increase, and finally decrease again until they approach the 
“true” margins of error.  This leads us to the conclusion that the smaller average margins 
of error in the TI indicator primarily reflect the downward bias due to bootstrapping for 
countries where the number of sources is small.   
 
  In summary, therefore, the TI Corruption Perceptions Index and the Control of 
Corruption indicator reported here lead to quite similar conclusions about relative levels   39
of corruption, for the relatively small sample of 102 countries covered by the TI index.  
However, applying our UCM methodology to the TI data, we find margins of error that 
are on average 37% larger than those reported by TI.  Most of this discrepancy likely 
reflects a downward bias in the TI margins of error for countries with relatively few data 






  In this paper we have presented substantially expanded and updated indicators 
of six dimensions of governance. These are based on several hundred individual 
measures of governance perceptions drawn from 25 sources from 18 different 
organizations, covering the period 1996-2002. The governance indicators for 2002 cover 
up to 199 countries and territories. By aggregating large numbers of individual sources, 
we have both expanded country coverage and also improved the precision of the 
aggregate indicators. Nevertheless, as we have emphasized throughout, margins of 
error remain substantial relative to the units in which governance is measured, and these 
margins of error need to be taken seriously when comparing countries with each other 
and over time. This is especially the case when attempting to classify countries into 
groups according to their levels of governance, as for example has been proposed for 
the Millennium Challenge Account eligibility criteria. In these situations, it is important to 
recognize the significant risks of misclassifying countries given the inherent imprecision 
in these indicators. 
 
  We have also discussed a number of important methodological issues relating to 
the construction and use of these governance indicators. We have argued that, for the 
purposes of measuring governance, there are few alternatives to the subjective, 
experiential data on which we rely. Moreover, in cases where objective indicators of 
governance are available, we have noted that these too have implicit margins of error, 
and we have provided indicative calculations indicating that these margins of error are 
on the same order of magnitude as those associated with our subjective aggregates. We 
have also empirically investigated, and for the most part discounted, the importance of 
ideological biases in the perceptions data from polls of experts on which we rely. Finally, 
while our aggregate indicators measure countries’ relative performance in each period,   40
we have also examined the limited available evidence on trends over time in governance 
worldwide. Interpreting these trends is difficult, but we can state with some confidence 
that there is little if any evidence of improvements in global governance over the period 
we consider. 
 
  We intend to continue this research project on measuring cross-country 
differences in governance. We hope that in the future the availability of additional data 
will enable further improvements in precision. The broader objective of this research 
project is to provide individual countries with a set of monitorable indicators of 
governance they can use to benchmark themselves against other countries and over 
time. We recognize however that there are limitations to what can be achieved with this 
kind of cross-country, highly-aggregated data. This type of data cannot substitute for in-
depth, country-specific governance diagnostics as a basis for policy advice to improve 
governance in a particular country.  
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Table 1: Sources of Governance Data 
 
Country Repre-
Source Publication Code Type 1/ Coverage 2/ sentative 1996 1998 2000 2002
Afrobarometer Afrobarometer Survey AFR S 12 x
Business Environment Risk Intelligence Business Risk Service BRI P 50 x x x x
Business Environment Risk Intelligence Qualitative Risk Measure in Foreign Lending QLM P 115 x x x x x
Columbia University State Capacity Project CDU P 98 x x x
Economist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Service EIU P 115 x x x x x
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Transition Report EBR P 26 x x x x
Freedom House Nations in Transition FHT P 27 x x x x
Freedom House Freedom in the World FRH P 192 x x x x x
Gallup International Gallup Millennium Survey GMS S 60 x
Gallup International 50th Anniversary Survey GALLUP S 44 x
Gallup International Voice of the People Survey GAL S 46 x
Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal Economic Freedom Index HER P 161 x x x x x
Institute for Management and Development World Competitiveness Yearbook WCY S 49 x x x x
Latinobarometro Latinobarometro Surveys LBO S 17 x x x
Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide PRS P 140 x x x x x
PriceWaterhouseCoopers Opacity Index PWC S 35 x
Reporters Without Borders Reporters Without Borders RSF P 138 x x
Global Insight's DRI McGraw-Hill Country Risk Review DRI P 111 x x x x x
State Department / Amnesty International Human Rights Report HUM P 159 x x x x x
World Bank Business Enterprise Environment Survey BPS S 18 x x
World Bank World Business Environment Survey WBS S 81 x x x
World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments CPIA P 136 x x x x
World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report GCS S 75 x x x x
World Economic Forum Africa Competitiveness Report GCSA S 23 x
World Markets Research Center World Markets Online WMO P 186 x x
 
1/ P=Poll, S=Survey
2/ Countries included most recently available version of source  
   44
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics on Governance Indicators 
 
 
Voice and Political Government Regulatory Rule of Control of 
Accountability Stabiity Effectiveness Quality Law Corruption Overall
Number of Countries
1996 192 165 180 182 167 151 173
1998 192 166 184 185 186 184 183
2000 192 166 185 186 186 185 183
2002 199 186 195 195 195 195 194
Median Number of Sources Per Country
1996 4 4 4 4 6 4 4
1998 4 4 4 4 7 5 5
2000 5 6 5 4 8 6 6
2002 7 6 6 6 8 7 7
Proportion of Countries with Only One Data Source
1996 0.15 0.13 0.21 0.15 0.07 0.18 0.15
1998 0.14 0.10 0.19 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.14
2000 0.14 0.06 0.18 0.13 0.10 0.17 0.13
2002 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Average Standard Error
1996 0.26 0.39 0.28 0.34 0.26 0.29 0.30
1998 0.25 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.25 0.25 0.28
2000 0.25 0.33 0.27 0.35 0.22 0.26 0.28
2002 0.21 0.27 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.21 0.22
 
Notes: This table reports the indicated summary statistics for the six governance indicators in each of the four periods. 
“Overall” refers to a simple average of the corresponding row of the table. 
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Table 3: Weights Used to Aggregate Governance Indicators 
 
Voice and Accountability Political Stability Government Effectiveness
1996 1998 2000 2002 1996 1998 2000 2002 1996 1998 2000 2002
Representative Sources
cdu .. .. 0.03 0.04 .. .. 0.07 0.09 .. .. 0.07 0.05
dri .. .. .. .. 0.25 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.07
eiu 0.31 0.12 0.09 0.18 0.13 0.14 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.21
frh 0.14 0.22 0.14 0.12 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
her .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
hum 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.04 .. .. .. ..
prs 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.09 0.25 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.05
rsf .. .. .. 0.02 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
wbs .. 0.01 0.00 .. .. 0.07 0.01 .. .. 0.06 0.03 ..
wmo .. .. .. 0.06 .. .. .. 0.17 .. .. .. 0.13
Non-Representative Sources
afr .. .. .. 0.01 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.01
bps .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.01
bri .. .. .. .. 0.22 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.06
ebr .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
fht 0.30 0.37 0.49 0.39 .. .. .. .. 0.31 0.15 0.12 0.24
gal .. .. .. 0.01 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
gcs .. .. .. 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.06
gcsa .. .. .. .. .. 0.04 .. .. .. 0.15 .. ..
gms .. .. 0.02 .. .. .. 0.01 .. .. .. 0.00 ..
lob 0.08 .. .. 0.01 .. .. .. 0.03 0.00 .. .. 0.01
opf .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
pia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.06
qlm .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
wcy 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 .. .. 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04  
Regulatory Quality Rule of Law Control of Corruption
1996 1998 2000 2002 1996 1998 2000 2002 1996 1998 2000 2002
.. .. .. .. .. .. 0.03 0.03 .. .. 0.08 0.06
0.09 0.08 0.23 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.06
0.23 .. .. 0.21 0.34 0.08 0.06 0.20 0.24 0.07 0.11 0.12
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
0.10 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.08 .. .. .. ..
.. .. .. .. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 .. .. .. ..
0.03 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.03
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
.. 0.00 0.01 .. .. 0.05 0.02 .. .. 0.05 0.07 ..
.. .. .. 0.26 .. .. .. 0.11 .. .. .. 0.09
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.02
.. .. .. 0.00 .. .. .. 0.00 .. .. 0.08 0.01
.. .. .. .. 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.07 0.23 0.06 0.11 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
.. .. .. .. 0.16 0.17 0.27 0.13 .. 0.18 0.23 0.22
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.01 .. .. .. ..
0.14 0.19 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.06
.. 0.15 .. .. .. 0.00 .. .. .. 0.17 .. ..
.. .. .. .. .. .. 0.00 .. .. 0.04 0.02 ..
.. .. .. .. 0.00 .. 0.00 .. .. .. .. 0.06
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
0.08 0.08 0.21 0.07 .. 0.11 0.10 0.04 .. 0.11 0.08 0.04
.. .. .. .. 0.11 0.12 .. 0.07 0.10 0.10 .. 0.11
0.21 0.16 0.20 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.36 0.07 0.09 0.08  
 
Notes: This table reports the weights applied to each source in constructing the aggregate governance indicators. The weights correspond to those that would be 
applied for a hypothetical country appearing in all of the available sources for that indicator. The weights are proportional to the inverse of the variance of the estimate 
of measurement error for each source, and the exact formula for these weights is given in the text in Section 3.2. For a country appearing in fewer sources, the relative 
weights applied to each source will be the same as the relative weights implicit in this table. 
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Table 4: Standard Deviation of Changes over Time in Aggregate Governance Indicators  
 
 
Voice and Political  Government Regulatory Rule of Control of
Accountability Stability Effectiveness Quality Law Corruption
2002-2000 0.22 0.46 0.31 0.48 0.29 0.32
2000-1998 0.26 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.25 0.3
1998-1996 0.22 0.43 0.37 0.48 0.31 0.38
2002-1996 0.33 0.62 0.35 0.48 0.38 0.43
 
Notes: This table reports the standard deviation across countries of changes over time in each of the aggregate 
governance indicators, for the time periods indicated in the rows. Note for reference that the standard deviation across 
countries of the level of each indicator is one by construction in each period. 
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Table 5: Large Changes in Governance Estimates, 2000-2002  
 
 
Governance Score Sources Available in Both Periods Changes in Sources
2002 2000 Agree No Change Disagree Agree/(Agree+Disagree) Added Dropped
Voice and Accountability
Sierra Leone -0.57 -1.36 2 2 0 1.00 2 0
Political Stability
Sri Lanka -0.90 -1.80 3 0 3 0.50 1 0
Namibia 0.46 -0.72 3 0 1 0.75 3 1
Argentina -0.74 0.46 7 0 1 0.88 2 1
Cote d'Ivoire -2.04 -0.88 3 0 1 0.75 2 1
Georgia -1.90 -0.85 3 0 0 1.00 1 2
Israel -1.35 -0.47 4 0 3 0.57 1 0
Kirghizstan -1.21 -0.03 1 1 0 1.00 1 1
United States 0.34 1.26 5 1 1 0.83 1 2
Venezuela -1.20 -0.48 4 1 2 0.67 3 1
Government Effectiveness
Dominica 0.32 -0.86 1 0 0 1.00 1 0
Argentina -0.49 0.30 7 1 0 1.00 1 1
Egypt -0.32 0.35 4 2 1 0.80 1 1
Gambia -0.81 0.25 1 0 1 0.50 2 0
Tunisia 0.65 1.32 4 0 1 0.80 1 1
Regulatory Quality
Afghanistan -1.82 -3.57 1 0 0 1.00 1 0
Belarus -1.67 -2.65 1 1 2 0.33 3 1
Iraq -2.31 -3.36 0 0 3 0.00 2 0
Moldova 0.80 0.14 5 0 0 1.00 3 1
Russia -0.30 -1.55 6 0 1 0.86 3 1
Zaire -1.77 -2.87 3 0 0 1.00 1 1
Argentina -0.84 0.44 5 0 1 0.83 2 1
Bangladesh -1.05 -0.02 2 2 0 1.00 3 1
Cameroon -0.88 0.12 3 1 0 1.00 2 1
El Salvador 0.04 1.12 2 1 1 0.67 2 1
Zambia -0.60 0.43 3 0 1 0.75 2 1
Rule of Law
Samoa 0.94 -0.14 1 0 0 1.00 1 0
Argentina -0.73 0.18 8 1 2 0.80 2 4
Cote d'Ivoire -1.21 -0.53 2 3 1 0.67 2 1
Georgia -1.17 -0.56 4 3 0 1.00 2 2
Namibia 0.45 1.21 2 3 1 0.67 2 1
Zimbabwe -1.33 -0.73 6 2 0 1.00 1 0
Control of Corruption
Madagascar 0.14 -0.80 0 1 1 0.00 1 2
Belarus -0.78 -0.07 4 1 0 1.00 1 2
Malawi -0.91 -0.22 2 2 0 1.00 2 2
Namibia 0.21 1.16 3 0 1 0.75 4 1
West Bank/Gaza -0.99 0.76 0 0 0 .. 1 1
All Countries
Average 3.11 0.78 0.81 0.79 1.78 1.00  
 
Notes: This table summarizes the sources of changes in estimates of governance between 2000 and 2002, for each 
country where the 90% confidence intervals for the level of governance in the two periods do not overlap. The first two 
columns report the governance scores in 2000 and 2002. The next three columns report the number of individual sources 
which agree/disagree with the direction of change of the aggregate indicator, and the number of sources registering no 
change. The final two columns report the number of sources added and dropped for each country between the two 
periods. 
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Table 6: Agreement Among Sources over Direction of Change 
 in Governance Estimates 2000-2002, All Countries 
 
Agree No Change Disagree Agree/(Agree+Disagree)
Voice and Accountability 2.10 0.59 1.27 0.64
Political Stability 2.83 0.30 1.58 0.66
Government Effectiveness 2.26 0.42 1.55 0.62
Regulatory Quality 2.00 0.22 1.47 0.57
Rule of Law 2.58 2.30 1.63 0.62
Control of Corruption 1.96 1.75 1.32 0.62
Average 2.29 0.93 1.47 0.62  
 
Notes: This table summarizes the sources of changes in estimates of governance between 2000 and 2002, for all 
countries with data in both periods The first three columns report the number of individual sources which agree/disagree 
with the direction of change of the aggregate indicator, and the number of sources registering no change.  
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Table 7: Ideology Regressions 
 
PRS PIA EIU DRI CDU BRI QLM HUM EBR HER FRH
Voice and Accountability
ideology -2.78 -1.64 -1.72 3.67 -0.83
0.59 0.46 0.27 0.68 0.23
Observations 44 43 28 46 46
Adjusted R-Sq -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02
Political Stability
ideology 12.37 8.86 8.54 4.97 3.15 12.11
2.68** 1.80* 1.87* 0.93 0.61 2.52**
Observations 52 51 46 42 25 56
Adjusted R-Sq 0.1 0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.09
Government Effectiveness
ideology -1.84 -0.66 -2.38 1.86 -7.12 1.64
0.64 0.16 0.68 0.48 1.90* 0.25
Observations 52 47 51 46 42 25
Adjusted R-Sq -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.04
Regulatory Quality
ideology 8.05 13.3 3.22 6.55 10.24
1.57 2.08** 0.45 0.88 1.77*
Observations 52 47 46 15 56
Adjusted R-Sq 0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.04
Rule of Law
ideology 1.52 3.39 5.61 5.67 4.68 7.32 6.47 5.32 7.42
0.41 0.73 1.65 1.46 1.21 1.65 1.63 1.19 1.91*
Observations 52 47 51 46 42 25 49 56 56
Adjusted R-Sq -0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.05
Control of Corruption
ideology 3.05 1.4 0.31 0.57 -2.21 2.83 1.84
0.63 0.34 0.1 0.18 0.68 0.46 0.58
Observations 52 47 51 46 42 25 49
Adjusted R-Sq -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01  
 
Notes: This table reports the results of a series of cross-country regressions of the difference in percentile rank between 
each poll of experts and the corresponding question from the World Business Environment Survey, on an indicator 
variable taking the value 1 if the government of a country is left-of-center, 2 if it is center, and 3 if it is right-of-center. For 
Voice and Accountability we use a question from the Gallup Millennium Survey instead of WBS. Percentile ranks are on 
a scale from 0 to 100 and are based on the sample of countries common to each pair of sources. All data refer to 2000. 
The table reports the slope coefficient, t-statistic, number of observations, and adjusted R-squared. Intercepts are not 
reported. 
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Table 8: Imputed Margins of Error for Objective Governance Indicators 
 
Corresponding Absolute Actual Margin of 
Objective Subjective Value of Implied Margin of Error for Objective Indicator Error for Subjective
Indicator Indicator Correlation (A) (B) (C) Indicator
Telephone Wait Time GE 0.56 1.43 0.88 0.58 0.21
Phone Faults GE 0.32 2.92 1.47 1.00 0.21
Trade Tax Revenue GE 0.50 1.68 1.00 0.67 0.21
Budgetary Volatility GE 0.50 1.68 1.00 0.67 0.21
Revenue Source Volatility GE 0.49 1.71 1.01 0.67 0.21
Contract Intensive Money RL 0.57 1.39 0.86 0.57 0.19
Contract Enforcement RL 0.40 2.25 1.22 0.82 0.19
Regulation of Entry RQ 0.50 1.67 1.00 0.66 0.22
Aggregate Objective Indicator GE 0.73 0.88 0.60 0.39 0.21  
 
Notes: This table reports the margins of error for objective indicators implied by the observed correlation between objective and subjective indicators, as 
discussed in Section 4.3 in the text.  
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Table 9: Global Trends in Governance, Selected Sources 
 
   World Average    Std. Dev. Across Countries t-statistic
# Countries 1996 1998 2000 2002 1996 1998 2000 2002 for mean difference
last year - first year
Voice and Accountability
DRI 112 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
EIU 112 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.28 1.3
PRS 112 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.25 -0.3
GCS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
DRI 102 0.82 0.81 0.74 0.70 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.27 -4.1
EIU 102 0.55 0.53 0.58 0.55 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.1
PRS 102 0.80 0.75 0.74 0.76 0.14 0.19 0.17 0.13 -2.0
GCS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Government  Effectiveness
DRI 102 0.59 0.58 0.50 0.48 0.27 0.26 0.30 0.30 -2.9
EIU 102 0.41 0.47 0.46 0.41 0.30 0.24 0.24 0.30 0.0
PRS 102 0.63 0.67 0.59 0.67 0.24 0.12 0.10 0.15 1.5
GCS 51 0.45 0.48 0.42 0.31 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.13 -5.2
Regulatory Quality
DRI 106 0.83 0.84 0.79 0.76 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.20 -3.0
EIU 106 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
PRS 106 .. 0.63 0.60 0.76 .. 0.20 0.22 0.21 4.6
GCS 51 0.51 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 2.5
Rule of Law
DRI 102 0.73 0.73 0.67 0.65 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.24 -2.6
EIU 102 0.50 0.53 0.51 0.54 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.27 1.1
PRS 102 0.77 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.23 -3.8
GCS 51 0.67 0.64 0.59 0.21 0.23 0.24 -1.7
Control of Corruption
DRI 102 0.61 0.60 0.54 0.53 0.25 0.26 0.30 0.31 -1.8
EIU 102 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.38 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.2
PRS 102 0.62 0.52 0.48 0.42 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.20 -7.2
GCS 51 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.57 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.3  
 
Notes: This table reports trends in cross-country averages of selected components of our governance 
indicators. For EIU, DRI and PRS, we restrict the sample of countries to those that appear in all three 
sources in all four periods, in order to ensure comparability over time and across indicators. For GCS we 
report the average across countries of selected individual questions that are available in all four rounds of 
the GCS we use, and again restrict attention to those countries available in all four periods to ensure 
comparability over time. Columns 2-5 contain the averages across countries, and columns 6-9 contain the 
corresponding standard deviations. The final column reports the t-statistic associated with a simple test for 
equality of global averages in the first and last available periods. 
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Table 10 – Efficiency Gain of Precision-Weighting 
 
Ratio of Standard Deviation of
Unweighted Mean to
Precision-Weighted Mean
Voice and Accountability 1.92
Political Instability and Violence 1.19
Government Effectiveness 1.69
Regulatory Quality 2.02
Rule of Law 2.21
Control of Corruption 1.45
Average 1.75  
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Figure 1: Estimates of Governance, 2002 
 



































































Note: This graph shows estimates of the indicated dimension of governance (on the vertical axis) for all countries graphed 
against each country’s percentile rank (on the horizontal axis) for 2002. The vertical bars show the statistically-likely range 
of values of governance for each country, with the midpoint of each bar corresponding to the best single estimate. Selected 
countries are labeled. As emphasized in the text, the ranking of countries along the horizontal axis is subject to significant 
margins of error, and this ordering in no way reflects the official view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the 
countries they represent.   54
 





































































Note: This graph shows estimates of the indicated dimension of governance (on the vertical axis) for all countries 
graphed against each country’s percentile rank (on the horizontal axis) for 2002. The vertical bars show the statistically-
likely range of values of governance for each country, with the midpoint of each bar corresponding to the best single 
estimate. Selected countries are labeled. As emphasized in the text, the ranking of countries along the horizontal axis is 
subject to significant margins of error, and this ordering in no way reflects the official view of the World Bank, its 
Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.   55
 
Figure 1, cont’d: Estimates of Governance, 2002 
 



































































Note: This graph shows estimates of the indicated dimension of governance (on the vertical axis) for all countries 
graphed against each country’s percentile rank (on the horizontal axis) for 2002. The vertical bars show the statistically-
likely range of values of governance for each country, with the midpoint of each bar corresponding to the best single 
estimate. Selected countries are labeled. As emphasized in the text, the ranking of countries along the horizontal axis is 
subject to significant margins of error, and this ordering in no way reflects the official view of the World Bank, its 
Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. 
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Note: This graph plots the standard error of the Rule of Law aggregate indicator for each country against 
the number of sources in which that country appears. There are fewer data points visible than countries 
because some countries appear in exactly the same set of sources and hence have identical standard 
errors for their governance estimates. 
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Figure 3: Changes Over Time in Governance Estimates, 2000-2002 
 







































Note: This graph plots estimates of the indicated dimension of governance in 2000 (on the vertical axis) against its 
value in 2002 (on the horizontal axis). Countries where the 90% confidence intervals in the two periods do not 
overlap are highlighted, and the corresponding confidence intervals in the 2000 and 2002 are indicated as vertical 
and horizontal bars. As emphasized in the text, levels and changes over time in estimates of governance are 
subject to significant margins of error, and in no way reflect the official view of the World Bank, its Executive 
Directors, or the countries they represent. 
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Note: This graph plots estimates of the indicated dimension of governance in 2000 (on the vertical axis) against its value 
in 2002 (on the horizontal axis). Countries where the 90% confidence intervals in the two periods do not overlap are 
highlighted, and the corresponding confidence intervals in the 2000 and 2002 are indicated as vertical and horizontal 
bars. As emphasized in the text, levels and changes over time in estimates of governance are subject to significant 
margins of error, and in no way reflect the official view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they 
represent. 
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Figure 3, cont’d: Changes Over Time in Governance Estimates, 2000-2002 
 








































Note: This graph plots estimates of the indicated dimension of governance in 2000 (on the vertical axis) against its 
value in 2002 (on the horizontal axis). Countries where the 90% confidence intervals in the two periods do not 
overlap are highlighted, and the corresponding confidence intervals in the 2000 and 2002 are indicated as vertical 
and horizontal bars. As emphasized in the text, levels and changes over time in estimates of governance are 
subject to significant margins of error, and in no way reflect the official view of the World Bank, its Executive 
Directors, or the countries they represent. 
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Probability Country is in 




Note: This graph plots estimates of Control of Corruption in 2002 for all 74 countries potentially eligible for the first round of the MCA. Countries are ranked 
according to their corruption rating on the horizontal axis, and corruption scores are shown on the vertical axis. The vertical lines for each country report the 90% 
confidence intervals for corruption, and the midpoint of each interval indicates the corruption score. The red squares (yellow triangles) (green circles) report the 
probability that each country has a corruption score above the median. The colors correspond to three groups of countries for which this probability is less than 
25%, between 25% and 75%, and above 75%. As emphasized in the text, the ranking of countries along the horizontal axis is subject to significant margins of error, 
and this ordering in no way reflects the official view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.   61
 
 
Figure 5 – Comparing TI and UCM Margins of Error 
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The Afrobarometer Series, launched in October 1999, reports the results of national sample surveys on the
attitudes of citizens in selected African countries towards democracy, markets and other aspects of development.
The Afrobarometer is a joint enterprise of Michigan State University (MSU), the Institute for Democracy in South
Africa (IDASA) and the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD, Ghana). Afrobarometer papers are
simultaneously copublished by these partner institutions. The objective of the Afrobarometer is to collect, analyze
and disseminate cross-national, time-series attitudinal data for up to a dozen new democracies on the African
continent.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from the 2002 
Report  
 
2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
In general are you satisfied with the way democracy works in your country? X .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Trust in Police X .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Corruption:  How common is corruption among public officials? X .. .. ..
Table A1: Afrobarometer (12 African countries)
 
 





















































TABLE A2.  Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)  
 
A2: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/beeps2002/
The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) was developed jointly by the World Bank and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  In its first round conducted in 1999-2000, it surveyed over 4,000 firms 
in 22 transition countries  that examined a wide range of interactions between firms and the state. In its second round 
conducted in 2002, the survey covered over  2,100 firms in 27 countries.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from the 2002 and 2000 
surveys.  
 
2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. ..
Political Stability and Lack of Violence
NA .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
How problematic are telecommunications for the growth of your business  X .. .. ..
How problematic is electricity for the growth of your business. X .. .. ..
How problematic is transportation for the growth of your business. X .. .. ..
 
Regulatory Quality
Information on the laws and regulations is easy to obtain X .. .. ..
Interpretations of the laws and regulations are consistent and predictable X .. .. ..
Unpredictability of changes of regulations X .. .. ..
How problematic are labor regulations for the growth of your business. X .. .. ..
How problematic are tax regulations for the growth of your business. X .. .. ..
How problematic are custom and trade regulations for the growth of your business. X .. .. ..
Rule of Law
How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: Fair X .. .. ..
How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: affordable X .. .. ..
How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: enforceable X .. .. ..
How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: Honesty X .. .. ..
How often is following characteristic associated with the court system: Quickness X .. .. ..
Are property rights adequately protected X .. .. ..
How problematic is organized crime for the growth of your business. X .. .. ..
How problematic is judiciary for the growth of your business. X .. .. ..
How problematic is street crime for the growth of your business. X .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
How common is for firms to have to pay irregular additional payments to get things done X .. .. ..
Percentage of total annual sales do firms pay in unofficial payments to public officials X .. .. ..
How often do firms make extra payments to influence the content of new legislation X .. .. ..
Extent to which firms' payments to public officials impose costs on other firms X X .. ..
How problematic is corruption for the growth of your business. X .. .. ..
Table A2: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (27 Transition Economies)
 





















































TABLE A3:  Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BRI, QLM) 
 
A3: Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BRI)
http://www.beri.com
BERI S.A. is a private source of analysis and forecasts of the business environment in developed and developing
countries. The firm was founded in 1966 and is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland.  
BERI has two services that include variables of interest for the purpose of this paper: The Business Risk Service,
and the FORELEND or Lender Risk Rating. Both services are supervised by Dr. F.T. Haner, founder and senior
editor. A number of analysts review various data sources and produce initial draft reports, relying on an
international network of sources for intelligence in the field. BERI convenes two permanent panels of about 105
experts from all over the world. These panels provide country ratings and qualitative observations on the basis of
these initial reports. One panel assesses political conditions, and the other offers perspectives on the business
operating environment. These ratings are constructed using the Delphi method, in which panelists are also
supplied with the ratings they produced in previous assessments as well as the panel average score for each
measure.
BRS monitors 50 countries three times per year, assessing 57 criteria separated into three indices. The Political
Risk Index (PRI) focuses on sociopolitical conditions in a country. Diplomats and political scientists rate the
present condition of eight causes and two symptoms of political risk, using a scale from 7 (no problem) to 0
(prohibitive problem). The Operation Risk Index (ORI) identifies major bottlenecks for business development,
rating 15 criteria on a scale of 0 (unacceptable conditions) to 4 (superior conditions). The R factor assesses a
country’s willingness to allow foreign companies to convert and repatriate profits and to import components,
equipment and raw materials. It is composed of 4 sub-indices, one of which assesses the quality of legal
framework in terms of statutory laws and actual practice.  
BRS also introduced a new set of indicators, the Quantitative Risk Measure in Foreign Lending (QLM), which
measures the qualitative risk factors in credit exposure in 115 countries using a scale from 0 (high risk) to 100
(low risk). In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. We use BERI's
data for the last quarters of 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002.
 























































2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. ..
 
Political Stability
Political Risk Index: External Causes of Political Risk: Dependence 
on/Importance to a Hostile Major Power X X X X
Political Risk Index: External Causes of Political Risk: Negative Influences of 
Regional Political Forces X X X X
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Social Conditions: Wealth 
Distribution, Population X X X X
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Fractionalization of political 
spectrum and the power of these factions. X X X X
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Fractionalization by 
language, ethnic and/or religious groups and the power of these factions. X X X X
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Restrictive (coercive) 
measures required to retain power. X X X X
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Organization and strength 
of forces for a radical government. X X X X
 
Political Risk Index: Symptoms of Political Risk: Societal conflict involving 
demonstrations, strikes, and street violence.
X X X X
Political Risk Index: Symptoms of Political Risk: Instability as perceived by non-
constitutional changes, assassinations, and guerilla wars.
X X X X
Government Effectiveness
Operation Risk Index: Bureaucratic delays X X X X
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. ..
 
Rule of Law
Operation Risk Index: Enforceability of contracts X X X X
Direct Financial Fraud, Money Laundering and Organized Crime (QLM) * X X X X
Control of Corruption
Political Risk Index: Internal Causes of Political Risk: Mentality, including 
xenophobia, nationalism, corruption, nepotism, willingness to compromise.
X X X X
Indirect Diversion of Funds (QLM) * X X X X
* country coverage:  115 countries
Table A3: Business Environment Risk Intelligence (50 developed and developing countries)
 





















































TABLE A4:  Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
 
A4: Country Policy & Institutional Assessment (CPIA)
http://www.worldbank.org
The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) annually assesses the quality of World Bank borrowers’
policy and institutional performance in areas relevant to economic growth and poverty reduction. Country
assessments began in the World Bank in the late 1970s to help guide the allocation of lending resources. The
methodology has evolved over time, reflecting lessons learned and mirroring the evolution of the development
paradigm. While in earlier years assessments focused mainly on macroeconomic policies, they now include other
factors relevant to poverty reduction, such as social inclusion, equity and governance.  
The CPIA consists of 20 equally weighted criteria representing the policy dimensions of an effective poverty
reduction and growth strategy. The criteria are grouped in four clusters. Cluster A, Economic Management,
covers economic policies. Cluster B, Structural Policies, covers a broad range of structural policies: trade policies,
financial depth, market competition, and environmental sustainability. Cluster C, Policies for Social Inclusion and
Equity, focuses on social equity and broad-based growth, and aims to capture the extent to which a country's
policies and institutions ensure that the benefits of growth are widespread, contribute to the accumulation of social 
capital, and direct public programs to poor people and reduce their vulnerability to various kinds of shocks.
Cluster D, Public Sector Management and Institutions, aims to capture key aspects of good governance, a vital
element in both sustained growth and poverty alleviation.
For each of the 20 criteria, countries are assessed on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high). The ratings are prepared by
the World Bank's country economists and focus on the quality of the country's current policies and institutions,
which are the main determinants of the present prospects for aid effectiveness. The rating assigned for each
criterion reflects a variety of indicators, observations, and judgments: ratings are based on country knowledge
obtained from country dialogue and the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) process, the available body of
economic and sector work (ESW), project preparation and supervision, and project and CAS monitoring and
evaluation. 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. We use data for 1996, 1998, 
2000 and 2002.  
 
2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. ..
Political Stability and Lack of Violence
NA .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Management of external debt X X X X
Management of development programs X X X ..
Quality public Administration / Public expenditure management X X X X
Regulatory Quality
Competitive environment X X X X
Factor and products markets X X X X
Trade policy X X X X
 
Rule of Law
Property rights X X X ..
Control of Corruption
Transparency, accountability and corruption in public sector X X X ..
Table A4: Country Policy & Institutional Assessment (136 developing countries)
 





















































TABLE A5: State Failure Task Force State Capacity Survey (CUD) 
 
A5: State Failure Task Force State Capacity Survey (CUD)
http://www.columbia.edu
In 1999 the State Failure Task Force decided to experiment with a new way to measure state capacity that relied
on a survey of country experts. Under the direction of Marc Levy of the CIESIN at Columbia University, a survey
instrument was developed and tested, resulting in a set of 31 multiple-choice questions and three open-ended
questions. The survey asks questions in five broad categories: political context, state legitimacy, human
resources and organizations, institutions, and overall capacity. Data were obtained on 108 and 98 countries from
assessments completed by 164 experts during 2000 and 2002, respectively.
In the table below we list the questions included in each of the governance indicators. We use data from the 2000 
and 2002 Surveys.  
2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
To what extent does the state and/or its allied groups engage in repression of its citizens? X X .. ..
In carrying out internal security tasks, to what extent does the state rely on tactics commonly 
considered illegitimate in the international community? X X .. ..
Political Stability
Assess the degree to which the decline or collapse of central political authority posed a threat to 
political stability in this country. X X .. ..
Assess the degree to which political protest posed a threat to political stability in this country. X X .. ..
Assess the degree to which ethno-cultural and/or religious conflict posed a threat to political 
stability in this country.
X X .. ..
Assess the degree to which external military intervention posed a threat to political stability in this 
country. X X .. ..
 
Government Effectiveness
Rate the administrative and technical skills of the country’s civil service (occupying middle and 
higher management roles). X X .. ..
Rate the efficiency of the country’s national bureaucracies overall. X X .. ..
Rate the efficiency of the country’s local-level government bureaucracies overall. X X .. ..
Rate the effectiveness of coordination between the central government and local-level government 
organizations. X X .. ..
Rate the state’s ability to formulate and implement national policy initiatives.
Rate the state’s effectiveness at collecting taxes or other forms of government revenue. X X .. ..
Does the central government produce a national budget in a timely manner? X X .. ..
Do local governments produce budgets in a timely manner? X X .. ..
Rate the state’s ability to monitor socioeconomic trends, activities, and conditions within its borders X X .. ..
Rate the state’s ability to create, deliver, and maintain vital national infrastructure. X X .. ..
Rate the state’s ability to respond effectively to domestic economic problems. X X .. ..
Rate the state’s ability to respond effectively to natural disasters. X X .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
For the most part, is the state seen as legitimately representing its citizens? X X .. ..
Rate the state’s adherence to the rule of law, considering the country as a whole. X X .. ..
Control of Corruption
Rate the severity of corruption within the state X X .. ..
To what extent do the country's primary political decision makers engage in patterns of nepotism, 
cronyism and patronage? X X .. ..
To what extent do the country's civil service (occupying middle and higher management roles) 
engage in patterns of nepotism, cronyism and patronage? X X .. ..
To what extent do patterns of nepotism, cronyism and patronage undermine the state's ability to 
exercise the basic functions of government effectively? X X .. ..
To what extent do patterns of nepotism, cronyism and patronage distort broad patterns of economic 
development? X X .. ..
Country coverage 98 108
Table A5: State Capacity Survey (developed and developing countries)
 





















































TABLE A6:  Global Insight’s DRI/McGraw-Hill (DRI) 
 
A6: Global Insight's DRI/McGraw-Hill
http://www.globalinsight.com
DRI is an economic consulting and information company which provides data, analysis, forecasts and expert
advice to strategic planners, business and financial analysts, and policy makers. It was founded in 1973 and is
based in the United States. 
In 1996, DRI launched the Country Risk Review (CRR), a quarterly publication providing country risk
assessments to international investors. A first draft of the risk ratings in this publication are produced by country
analysts, who then submit their preliminary assessment to regional review committees charged with analyzing and
challenging these assessment. The global risk service committee evaluates the reviewed assessments to ensure
quality and cross-country consistency.  The country analysts then produce the final country risk review.
The CRR assesses the relationship between country risk and its effects on the profitability of investments. For
each country, DRI identifies a number of “potential sources of risk”, specifies measurable “risk events”, measures
how probable those risk events are, and assesses the severity of impact that each outcome would have. Based
on these considerations, DRI produces a risk score for each country.
The CRR identifies a total of 33 “immediate risk events” and 18 “secondary risk events” for 117 developed and
developing countries. Immediate risk events are classified into policy risks (tax, and non-tax), and outcome risks
(price, and non-price). Secondary risk events are classified into domestic political risks, external political risks,
and economic risks.  These risk events are described in below.
For each risk event, DRI produces a short run and a long run risk rating. These ratings provide subjective
estimates of the likelihood that a particular risk event will occur within one and five years respectively. DRI follows
a methodology to ensure that the five year forecasts are consistent with the short-term forecasts. Although these
indicators nominally measure the likelihood of future changes in governance concepts, in practice the long-run
ratings provide good measures of the current levels of governance.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. Variable definitions consist 
of risk events. The actual ratings provide an estimated probability of these events happening.  In this paper, we 
use data for the fourth quarters of 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002.  
 
2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
Domestic Political Risks: Military Coup Risk: A military coup d’etat (or a series of such events) 
that reduces the GDP growth rate by 2% during any 12-month period. X X X X
Domestic Political Risks: Major Insurgency/Rebellion: An increase in scope or intensity of one 
or more insurgencies/rebellions that reduces the GDP growth rate by 3% during any 12-month 
period.
X X X X
Domestic Political Risks: Political Terrorism: An increase in scope or intensity of terrorism that 
reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period. X X X X
Domestic Political Risks: Political Assassination: A political assassination (or a series of such 
events) that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period. X X X X
Domestic Political Risks: Civil War: An increase in scope or intensity of one or more civil wars 
that reduces the GDP growth rate by 4% during any 12-month period.
X X X X
Domestic Political Risks: Major Urban Riot: An increase in scope, intensity, or frequency of 
rioting that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period. X X X X






















































2002 2000 1998 1996
Government Effectiveness
Domestic Political Risk: Government Instability: An increase in government personnel 
turnover rate at senior levels that reduces the GDP growth rate by 2% during any 12-month 
period.
X X X X
Domestic Political Risk: Government Ineffectiveness: A decline in government personnel 
quality at any level that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period. X X X X
Domestic Political Risk: Institutional Failure: A deterioration of government capacity to cope 
with national problems as a result of institutional rigidity or gridlock that reduces the GDP 
growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period.
X X X X
Regulatory Quality
Policies Non-Tax: Regulations -- Exports: A 2% reduction in export volume as a result of a 
worsening in export regulations or restrictions (such as export limits) during any 12-month 
period, with respect to the level at the time of the assessment.
X X X X
Policies Non-Tax: Regulations -- Imports: A 2% reduction in import volume as a result of a 
worsening in import regulations or restrictions (such as import quotas) during any 12-month 
period, with respect to the level at the time of the assessment.
X X X X
Policies Non-Tax: Regulations -- Other Business: An increase in other regulatory burdens, 
with respect to the level at the time of the assessment, that reduces total aggregate 
investment in real LCU terms by 10%
X X X X
Policies Non-Tax: Ownership of Business by Non-Residents: A 1-point increase on a scale 
from "0" to "10" in legal restrictions on ownership of business by non-residents during any 
12-month period.
X X X X
Policies Non-Tax: Ownership of Equities by Non-Residents: A 1-point increase on a scale 
from "0" to "10" in legal restrictions on ownership of equities by non-residents during any 
12-month period.
X X X X
Rule of Law
Outcomes Non-Price: Losses and Costs of Crime: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to 
"10" in crime during any 12-month period. X X X X
Domestic Political Risk: Kidnapping of Foreigners: An increase in scope, intensity, or 
frequency of kidnapping of foreigners that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 
12-month period.
X X X X
Policies Non-Tax: Enforceability of Government Contracts: A 1 point decline on a scale 
from "0" to "10" in the enforceability of contracts during any 12-month period. X X X X
Policies Non-Tax: Enforceability of Private Contracts: A 1-point decline on a scale from "0" 
to "10" in the legal enforceability of contracts during any 12-month period. X X X X
Control of Corruption
Risk Event Outcome non-price: Losses and Costs of Corruption: A 1-point increase on a 
scale from "0" to "10" in corruption during any 12-month period. X X X X
Table A6: DRI/McGraw-Hill (131 developed and developing countries)  cont.





















































TABLE A7:  European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
 
A7: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBR)
http://www.ebrd.org
The EBRD is an international organization which supports the transition towards open market-oriented economies
and promotes private and entrepreneurial initiative in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  The EBRD is based in London.  
The EBRD publishes an annual Transition Report, which includes a number of governance variables in its
Transition Indicators and Survey of Legal Reforms. The Transition Report presents eight “Transition Indicators”
representing "cumulative progress in the movement from a centrally planned economy to a market economy” for
26 transition economies. The subjective indicators are based on a checklist of various objective measures and
reflect the views of EBRD staff. 
Beginning in 1996, the EBRD has conducted a survey of local public officials, private firms, academics, lawyers,
and other experts, in order to assess the progress made in financial legal reform in transition economies. The
survey considered two areas of financial legal reform: banking and securities activities. For each area, two
indices describing the extensiveness and effectiveness of the financial legal framework were developed, for a
total of four ratings. The “extensiveness” ratings measure how closely legal rules affecting investment follow
international standards. “Effectiveness” reflects how clear, accessible and adequately-supported the legal rules
are. Both are intended to provide a measure of how conducive the laws of these countries are to fostering
investment.  This survey covered 26 countries. 
In this paper we use data from the 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002 Transition Reports.  In the table below we list the 
variables included in each of the governance indicators.  
 
2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Price liberalisation  X X X X
Trade & foreign exchange system  X X X X
Competition policy  X X X X
Commercial Law Extensiveness X X X ..
Commercial Law Effectiveness X X X ..
Financial Regulations: extensiveness X X X ..
Financial regulations: effectiveness X X X ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. ..
Table A7: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (27 transition economies)
 





















































TABLE A8:  The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
 
A8: The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
http://www.eiu.com
The Economist Intelligence Unit is a for-profit organization producing analysis and forecasts of the political,
economic and business environment in more than 180 countries. The EIU was founded in 1949 and is based in
London. In 1997, the EIU launched two quarterly publications which contain some governance measures: The
Country Risk Service, and the Country Forecasts. The assessments in these publications are based on regular
contributions from a global network of more than 500 information-gatherers. A panel of regional experts checks
the accuracy, consistency and impartiality of these assessments. Our databases utilize data about the individual
subcomponents of these country risk ratings, that were made available to us by EIU.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  In this paper, we use data 
from January 1997, 1998, 2000 and November 2002.  
 
2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Orderly transfers X X X X
Vested interests X .. .. X
Accountablity of Public Officials X .. .. X
Human Rights X .. .. X
Freedom of association X .. .. X
Political Stability
Armed conflict X X X X
Violent demonstrations X .. .. X
Social Unrest X X X X
International tensions / terrorist threat X X X X
Government Effectiveness
Quality of bureaucracy / institutional effectiveness X X X X
Excessive bureacucracy / red tape X X X X
Government policy (pro business stance) .. X X ..
Regulatory Quality
Unfair competitive practices X .. .. X
Price controls X .. .. X
Discriminatory tariffs X .. .. X
Excessive protections X .. .. X
Discriminatory taxes X .. .. X
Rule of Law
Violent crime X X X X
Organized crime X X X X
Fairness of judicial process X X X X
Enforceability of contracts X .. .. X
Speediness of judicial process X .. .. X
Confiscation/expropriation X .. .. X
Intellectual property rights protection X .. .. X
Private property protection X .. .. X
Control of Corruption
Corruption among public officials X X X X
Table A8: Economist Intelligence Unit (115 developed and developing countries)
 





















































TABLE A9:  Freedom House (FRH, FHT) 
 
A9: Freedom House (FRH, FNT)
http://www.freedomhouse.org. 
Freedom House is a non-governmental organization which promotes democratic values around the world.
Freedom House was established in 1941 and is headquartered in New York City.   
We rely on data from two Freedom House publications. "Freedom in the World was launched in 1955", and
became an annual publication in 1978, and covers 192 countries and 17 related and disputed territories. "Nations
in Transit" was launched in 1995 and covers 28 post-communist countries. Freedom House develops its
assessments using a team of academic advisors, in-house experts, published resources, and local
correspondents including human rights activists, journalists, editors and political figures. Freedom House staff
also conduct regular fact-finding missions to countries being assessed. An academic advisory board provides
input to the project in general.
Freedom in the World (FRH). This publication evaluates political rights and civil liberties around the world.
Freedom House defines political rights as those freedoms that enable people to participate freely in the political
process, and civil liberties as the freedom to develop views, institutions and personal autonomy apart from the
state. For all countries, the subjective assessments are based on checklists of rights and freedoms. A Freedom
House team assigns a rating to each item on the checklist and produces an initial assessment for each country.
The team then assess whether the checklists might have missed an important factor for a particular country. The
scores are then reviewed to ensure quality and consistency across countries, and a final rating is produced. 
Freedom House Nations in Transit (FNT). This publication evaluates the progress in democratic and
economic reform in post-communist countries. Country surveys are written by Freedom House staff or
consultants and are reviewed by academics and senior Freedom House staff. Each report is divided into nine
sections, ranging from the political process to progress in price liberalization. For each section, a preliminary
rating is based on a checklist of issues. The academic oversight board establishes the final ratings by
consensus following extensive discussions and debate, which are reviewed by the Freedom House rating
committee. 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.   In this paper we use data 
from the 1995-1996, 1997-98, 2000-2001 and 2002-2003 editions of Freedom in the World and the 1996, 1998, 
2000 and 2002 editions of Nations in Transit.   
 























































2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Political Rights  X X X X
Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through 
free and fair elections?
Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
Are there fair electoral laws?
Are the voters able to endow their freely elected representatives with real power?
Do the people have the right to freely organize in different political parties or other 
competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and 
fall of these competing parties or groupings?
Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic 
possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?
Are the people free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, 
religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies or any other powerful groups? 
Do cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority groups have reasonable self-
determination, self-government, autonomy or participation through informal consensus 
in the decision-making process? 
Civil Liberties  X X X X
Are there free and independent media, literature and other cultural expressions? 
Is there open public discussion and free private discussion?
Is there freedom of assembly and demonstration?
Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization?
Are citizens equal under the law, with access to an independent, nondiscriminatory 
judiciary, and are they respected by the security forces?
Is there protection from political terror, and from unjustified imprisonment, exile or 
torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system, and freedom from war or 
insurgency situations?
Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there 
effective collective bargaining?
Are there free professional and other private organizations?
Are there free businesses or cooperatives?
Are there free religious institutions and free private and public religious expressions?
Are there personal social freedoms, which include such aspects as gender equality, 
property rights, freedom of movement, choice of residence, and choice of marriage and 
size of family?
Is there equality of opportunity, which includes freedom from exploitation by or 
dependency on landlords, employers, union leaders, bureaucrats or any other type of 
denigrating obstacle to a share of legitimate economic gains?
Is there freedom from extreme government indifference and corruption
Table A9: Freedom in the World: 193 developed and developing countries























































2002 2000 1998 1996
Freedom of the Press X X X X
Laws and Practice:  Assess whether or not dissent is allowed, if private media are 
permitted alongside governmental broadcasting, if independent media, in practice, 
are permitted to express diverse views
Political Influence over Media Content: This category reflects political pressure on the 
content of both privately owned and government media, and takes into account the 
day-to-day conditions in which journalists work, threats from organized crime, or from 
religious extremists, for example, often generate self-censorship and so negatively 
affect the media environment
Economic influence over Media Content: Influence may come from the government 
or from private entrepreneurs.  This reflects competitive pressures in the private 
sector that distort reportage as well as economic favoritism or reprisals by 
government for unwanted press coverage
Actual Incident of Violations of Press Freedom: Murders, arrests, suspension and 
other violations create a sense of fear which may discourage objective reporting
Nations in Transit
Political Process: Deals with elections, referenda, party configuration, conditions for 
political competition, and popular participation in elections. X X X X
Civil Society: Highlights the degree to which volunteerism, trade unionism, and 
professional associations exist, and whether civic organizations are influential X X X X
Independent Media: Press freedom, public access to a variety of information 
sources, and  independence of those sources from undue government or other 
influences.
X X X X
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Nations in Transit: Government and Administration: Government decentralization, 
independent and responsibilities or local and regional governments, and legislative and 
executive transparency are discussed.
X X X X
Regulatory Quality
N/A .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Nations in Transit: Considers judicial and constitutional matters as well as the legal 
and de facto status of ethnic minorities. X X X X
Control of Corruption
Nations in Transit: corruption X X X ..
Table A9: Freedom in the World / Nations in Transit (27 transition economies), cont.
 
 

























































Gallup International was founded in May 1947, is registered in Zurich, Switzerland, and has 55 members around 
the world governed by the same Code of Statutes to ensure technical competence and quality standards.  
The Gallup International Millennium Survey polled 57,000 adults in 60 different countries of the world between 
August and October, 1999. The survey covered a wide range of topics of an ethical, political and religious nature, 
focusing specifically on issues related to democracy, the United Nations, human rights, women's rights, 
environment, religion, crime and basic values.  This source asks several questions which also appeared in the 
Gallup 50th Anniversary Survey which we use for 1998.
In 2002, Gallup International initiated a worldwide survey (on an annual basis) called The Voice of the People. 
The survey interviews citizens all around the world and helps understand the opinion of today's world population 
on issues like the environment, terrorism, global issues, governance and democracy.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. In this paper, we use data 




2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Trust in National Government X .. .. ..
Trust in the Parliament X .. .. ..
Percent who believe the country is governed by the will of the people .. X .. ..
Percent who belive elections are free and fair .. X .. ..
Percent who believe the government is accountable .. X .. ..
Freedom of speech .. X .. ..
 
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Percent who believe the government is efficient .. X .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Trust in the Legal System X .. .. ..
Concern with level of crime .. X .. ..
Control of Corruption
Percent who believe the government is corrupt .. X .. ..
Frequency of corruption .. .. X ..
Country coverage: 46 60 44
Table A10: Gallup International Citizens Surveys (developed and developing countries)





















































TABLE A11:  World Economic Forum (GCS, GCSA) 
 
A11. World Economic Forum (GCS)
http://www.weforum.org
The World Economic Forum (WEF) is an independent, not-for-profit organization bringing together top leaders
from business, government, academia and the media to address key economic, social and political issues in
partnership.  The WEF was founded in 1971 and is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland.  
Since 1996, The WEF has sponsored the Global Competitiveness Report, an annual publication produced in
collaboration with the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID). As background for this report, the
WEF conducts the Global Competitiveness Survey of about 3000 enterprises in 60 countries. This survey
measures the perceptions of business executives about the country in which they operate. The survey asks top
managers to rank on a 1 to 7 scale their opinion on issues in eight broad areas: 1) Openness, 2) Government, 3)
Finance, 4) Infrastructure, 5) Technology, 6) Management, 7) Labor, and 8) Institutions.
In 1998 and 2002 the WEF sponsored separate surveys of countries in Africa and Middle East, respectively. We
incorporated them in the Global Surveys, resulting in an increase of country coverage in 1998 and 2002 of 20 and
8 countries, respectively.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. In this paper, we use data 
from the 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002 Surveys  Additional questions from the 1998 African Competitiveness 




2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Firms are usually informed clearly and transparently by the Government on changes in policies
affecting their industry X .. .. ..
Newspapers can publish stories of their choosing without fear of censorship or retaliation X .. .. ..
When deciding upon policies and contracts, Government officials favor well-connected firms X .. .. ..
Extent of direct influence of legal contributions to political parties on specific public policy
outcomes X .. .. ..
Effectiveness of national Parliament/Congress as a law making and oversight institution X .. .. ..
Political Stability
The threat of terrorism in the country imposes significant costs on business X .. .. ..
New Governments honor commitments of previous Governments .. X X X
Likelihood of dramatic changes in institutions .. X X X
The highest power is always peacefully transferred .. .. X ..
Government coups or political instability as an obstacle to development (GCSA) .. .. X ..
Tribal conflict as an obstacle for business development (GCSA) .. .. X ..
Government Effectiveness
Competence of public sector personnel X X X X
Quality of general infrastructure X .. .. X
Quality of public schools X .. .. X
Time spent by senior management dealing with government officials X X X X
Public Service vulnerability to political pressure .. X X X
Wasteful government expenditure .. X X ..
Strength and expertise of the civil service to avoid drastic interruptions in government services in
times of political instability (GCSA) .. .. X ..
Government economic policies are independent of pressure from special interest groups.
.. X .. ..
Table A11: Global Competitiveness Survey (developed and developing countries)






















































2002 2000 1998 1996
Regulatory Quality
Administrative regulations are burdensome X X X X
Tax system is distortionary X X X X
Import barriers as obstacle to growth X .. X X
Competition in local market is limited X .. X ..
It is easy to start company X .. X ..
Anti monopoly policy is lax and ineffective X .. X X
Clusters are frequent X .. .. ..
Environmental regulations hurt competitiveness X .. .. ..
Cost of tariffs imposed on business X .. X X
Government subsidies keep uncompetitive industries alive artificially X .. .. X
Domestic banks are protected from foreign competition .. .. X ..
Barriers to entry in banking sector are very high .. .. X ..
Interest rates are heavily regulated .. .. X ..
Private sector participation in infrastructure projects is not permitted .. .. X ..
Costs of uncertain rules, laws, or government policies (GCSA) .. .. X ..
Tranfer costs associated with exporting capital as an obstacle to business (GCSA) .. .. X ..
General uncertainty on costs of regulations as an obstacle to business (GCSA) .. .. X ..
Openness of public sector contracts to foreign investors (GCSA) .. .. X ..
Policies for dividend remittances as obstacles to development (GCSA) .. .. X ..
Dominance of state owned or state controlled enterpriese (GCSA) .. .. X ..
State interference in private business (GCSA) .. .. X ..
Regulatory discretionality (GCSA) .. .. X ..
Price controls as an obstacle to business develpoment (GCSA) .. .. X ..
Regulations on foreign trade as an obstacle to business develpoment (GCSA) .. .. X ..
Foreign currency regulations as an obstacle to business develpoment (GCSA) .. .. X ..
Rule of Law
Common crime imposes costs on business X .. .. ..
Organized crime imposes costs on business X X X X
Money laundering through banks is pervasive X .. .. ..
Money laundering through non-banks is pervasive X .. .. ..
Quality of Police X X X X
Insider trading is pervasive X .. .. X
The judiciary is independent from political influences of government, citizens, or firms
X X X ..
Legal framework to challenge the legality of government actions is inefficient X X X X
Intellectual Property protection is weak  X .. X X
Protection of financial assets is weak X X .. ..
Illegal donation to parties are frequent X .. .. ..
Private businesses are morel likely to settle disputes outside courts. .. X .. ..
Compliance with court rulings and /or arbitration awards (GCSA) .. .. X ..
Legal system effectiveness at enforcing commercial contracts (GCSA) .. .. X ..
Citizens’ willingness to accept legal means to adjudicate disputes rather than depending
on physical force or illegal means (GCSA)
.. .. X ..
Percentage of firms which are unofficial or unregistered / Tax evasion X X X X
Control of Corruption
Public trust in financial honesty of politicians X .. .. ..
Extent to which legal contributions to political parties are misused by politicians X .. .. ..
Diversion of public funds due to corruption is common X .. .. ..
Frequency of bribery in the economy X .. X ..
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: public utilities, tax payments,
loan applications, awarding of public contracts, influencing laws, policies regulations,
decrees, getting favourable judicial decisions
X X X X
Extent to which firms' illegal payments to influence government poliicies impose costs on
other firms
X .. .. ..
Country Coverage: 88 80 74 58
Table A11: Global Competitiveness Survey (cont.)





















































TABLE A12:  Heritage Foundation / Wall Street Journal  (HER) 
 
A12: Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal
http://www.heritage.org
The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institute whose mission is to formulate and promote
conservative public policies.  The Heritage Foundation was established in 1973.
In 1995 the Heritage Foundation, in partnership with the Wall street Journal, launched its annual Index of
Economic Freedom. This index covers 161 countries and measures economic freedoms and prospects for
growth in the global economy. The index is designed for cross country research and is intended to assist
international investors and aid donors in the allocation of their resources. This index is based on a detailed
assessment of 10 different factors, including foreign investment codes, taxes, tariffs, banking regulations,
monetary policy, and the black market. For some of these, assessments are mechanically based on objective
data, while others are generated as subjective ratings based on a pre-specified checklist.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. In this paper, we use 
Heritage data for 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002.  
 
2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA X X X X
Government Effectiveness
NA X X X X
Regulatory Quality
Regulation X X X X
Government Intervention X X X X
Wage/Prices X X X X
Trade X X X X
Foreign investment X X X X
Banking X X X X
Rule of Law
Black market X X X X
Property Rights X X X X
Control of Corruption
NA X X X X
Table A12: Heritage Foundation: Index of Economic Freedom (156 developed and developing countries)
 





















































TABLE A13:  Human Rights Database (HUM) 
 
A13: Human Rights Database
The Human Rights database was drawn from two independent sources: The State Department’s Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices 2001 and the Amnesty International’s Annual Report 2002. Data was codified by
Binghamton University students under the supervision of Prof. David Cingranelli and Prof. David Richards of the
Department of Political Science of Binghamton University. Data was then audited, edited and checked for
consistency and input errors by Craig Webster.
The State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices cover global human rights practices in the
previous calendar years. Reports are generated through data gathered by the State Department from all of its
embassies and representations throughout the world.
The Amnesty International’s Annual Reports cover global human rights conditions for the previous calendar years.
Reports are based on information collected through Amnesty activists as well as from other sources such as
media reports
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from the 
1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002 Reports  
 
2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Domestic and foreign travel is : restricted / not restricted  X X X X
Political participation is:  very limited / moderately free and open / very free and 
open
X X X X
Are there any imprisoned people because of their ethnicity, race, or their political, 
religious beliefs? : Yes and many / Yes but few / None
X X X X
Government Censorship and/or ownership of the media is : complete / some / none  X X X X
Political Stability
Political killings are : practiced frequently / practiced occasionally / have not 
occurred 
X X X X
Disappearances have : occurred frequently / occurred occasionally / have not 
occurred 
X X X X
Torture is : practiced frequently / practiced occasionally / not practiced  X X X X
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Has the judiciary been an independent institution? No, judiciary under control of 
executive or legislature / partially, judiciary separate but not completely independent 
/ generally independent
X X X X
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. ..
Table A13: Human Rights Database (159 developed and developing countries)

























































Latinobarometro is a public opinion survey representing the opinions, attitudes, behaviour and values of citizens
of the countries in which it is conducted. The survey began being applied regularly in 8 countries of the region in
1995, and in 17 countries beginning in 1996. Latinobarometro conducts an annual survey, using representative
samples and an identical questionnaire in each country. It asks questions in in the following areas: Economy and
International Trade, Integration and Regional Trading Blocks, -Democracy, Politics and Institutions, Social
Policies, Civic Culture, Social Capital and Social Fraud, The Environment, Current Issues.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from 1996, 
2000 and 2002.  
 
2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Satisfaction with democracy - In general are you satisfied with the way 
democracy works in your country?
X .. .. X
Political Stability
Country terrorist threat - Is terrorism a serious problem in your country? X .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Trust in Police X X .. X
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
Trust in judiciary .. X .. X
Control of Corruption
What percentage of public employees would you say are corrupted? X X .. ..
Table A14: Latinobarometro (17 Latin American countries)





















































TABLE A15:  Political Risk Services (PRS) 
 
A15: Political Risk Services (PRS)
http://www.prsgroup.com
The PRS group is an affiliate of Investment Business with Knowledge (IBK), a United States-based corporation
providing up-to-date country information for international business. PRS was founded in 1980 and is
headquartered in Syracuse, New York.
Since 1982, PRS has produced the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) which provides assessments of a
political, economic and financial risks in a large number of developed and developing countries. These
assessments are based on the analysis of a worldwide network of experts, and is subject to a peer review
process at subject and regional levels to ensure the coherence and comparability across countries. The ICRG
assesses three major categories of risk: political (with 12 components), financial (5 components) and economic (6
components). We use components of the Political Risk Index, which report subjective assessments of the factors
influencing the business environment in a particular country. 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.    In this paper we use data 
from 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002.   
 






















































2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Military in Politics  The military are not elected by anyone, so their participation in 
government, either direct or indirect, reduces accountability and therefore represents a 
risk.  The threat of military intervention might lead as well to an anticipated potentially 
inefficient change in policy or even in government.  It also works as an indication that 
the government is unable to function effectively and that the country has an uneasy 
environment for foreign business.
X X X X
Democratic Accountability.  Quantifies how responsive government is to its people, on 
the basis that the less response there is the more likely is that the government will fall, 
peacefully or violently.  It includes not only if free and fair elections are in place, but 
also how likely is the government to remain in power or remain popular. 
X X X X
Political Stability
Internal Conflict.  Assess political violence and its influence on governance.  Highest 
scores go to countries with no armed opposition, and where the government does not 
indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect.  Lowest ratings go to civil war torn 
countries.  Intermediate ratings are awarded on the basis of the threats to the 
government and busines. 
X X X X
External conflict: The external conflict measure is an assessment both of the risk to the 
incumbent government and to inward investment.  It ranges from trade restrictions and 
embargoes, whether imposed by a single country, a group of countries, or the 
international community as a whole, through geopolitical disputes, armed threats, 
exchanges of fire on borders, border incursions, foreign-supported insurgency, and full-
scale warfare.
X X X X
Ethnic tensions: This component measures the degree of tension within a country 
attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions.  Lower ratings are given to 
countries where racial and nationality tensions are high because opposing groups are 
intolerant and unwilling to compromise.  Higher ratings are given to countries where 
tensions are minimal, even though such differences may still exist.
X X X X
Government Effectiveness
Government Stability.  Measures the government’s ability to carry out its declared 
programs, and its ability to stay in office.  This will depend on issues as: the type of 
governance, the cohesion of the government and governing party or parties, the 
closeness of the next election, the government command of the legislature, and 
approval of government policies.
X X X X
Bureaucratic Quality.  Measures institutional strength and quality of the civil service, 
assess how much strength and expertise bureaucrats have and how able they are to 
manage political alternations without drastic interruptions in government services, or 
policy changes.  Good performers have somewhat autonomous bureaucracies, free 
from political pressures, and an established mechanism for recruitment and training. 
X X X X
Regulatory Quality
Investment Profile.  Includes the risk to operations (scored from 0 to 4, increasing in 
risk); taxation (scored from 0 to 3), repatriation (scored from 0 to 3); repatriation (scored 
from 0 to 3) and labor costs (scored from 0 to 2).  They all look at the government’s 
attitude towards investment.  
X X X X
Rule of Law
Law and Order.  The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of 
popular observance of the law.
X X X X
Control of Corruption
Corruption.  Measures corruption within the political system, which distorts the 
economic and financial environment, reduces the efficiency of government and 
business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather 
than ability, and introduces an inherently instability in the political system.  
X X X X
Table A15: Political Risk Services (140 developed and developing countries)
 





















































TABLE A16:  Reporters Without Borders (RSF) 
 
A16: Reporters Without Borders
http://www.rsf.org
Reporters Without Borders - headquartered in Paris - is an international organization dedicated to the protection 
of reporters and respect of press freedom in the world.  In 2002,  International Reporters Without Borders 
published its first worldwide press freedom index, compiled for 139 countries. The organisation's initiatives are 
being carried out on five continents through its national branches and its offices in Abidjan, Bangkok, Buenos 
Aires, Istanbul, Montreal, Nairobi, New York, Tokyo and Washington. It also works in close co-operation with local 
and regional press freedom organisations and with members of the "Reporters without Borders' Network." 
The index was drawn up by asking journalists, researchers and legal experts worldwide to answer 50 questions 
about the whole range of press freedom violations (such as murders or arrests of journalists, censorship, 
pressure, state monopolies in various fields, punishment of press law offences and regulation of the media). 
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from 2002.  
 
2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Press Freedom Index X .. .. ..
Political Stability and Lack of Violence
NA .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
NA .. .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
NA .. .. .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
NA .. .. .. ..
Table A16: Reporters Without Borders (138 developed and developing countries)





















































TABLE A17:  Institute for Management Development (WCY) 
 
A17: Institute for Management Development (WCY)
http://www.imd.ch.  
The Institute for Management Development is an research and educational organization based in Lausanne,
Switzerland. It has published the World Competitiveness Yearbook since 1987. Until 1996, this was a joint effort
with the World Economic Forum. The World Competitiveness Yearbook analyzes the competitive environment in
47 countries. It is based on both objective data and surveys of perceptions. The survey questions over 4,000
local and foreign enterprises operating in the countries under analysis. Mean scores on the survey questions are
reported in the yearbook for all countries. In the table below we list the questions included in the governance
database.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators.  We use data from the 
1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002 editions of the World Competitiveness Yearbook.  
 
2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Transparency of Government policy X X X X
Political Stability
The risk of political instability is very high X X .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Government economic policies do not adapt quickly to changes in the economy X X .. X
The public service is not independent from political interference X X X X
Government decisions are not effectively implemented X X X ..
Bureaucracy hinders business activity X X X X
The distribution infrastructure of goods and services is generally inefficient X X .. X
Political System is not adapted to todays' economic challenges .. X .. X
Regulatory Quality
The exchange rate policy of your country hinders the competitiveness of firms X .. .. ..
Protectionism in the country negatively affects the conduct of business X X X ..
Competition legislation in your country does not prevent unfair competition X X X X
Price controls affect pricing of products in most industries X X X X
Legal regulation of financial institutions is inadequate for financial stability X X X X
Foreign financial institutions do not have access to the domestic market X .. .. X
Access to local capital markets is restricted for foreign companies X .. .. ..
Access to foreign capital markets is restricted for domestic companies X .. .. ..
Financial institutions' transparency is not widely developed in your country X .. .. ..
Customs' authorities do not facilitate the efficient transit of goods X X X ..
The legal framework is detrimental to your country's competitiveness X X X ..
Foreign investors are free to acquire control in domestic companies X X X ..
Public sector contracts are sufficiently open to foreign bidders X X X X
Real personal taxes are non distortionary X X X X
Real corporate taxes are non distortionary X X X ..
Banking regulation does not hinder competitiveness X .. .. ..
Political system as obstacle to development .. X X ..
Rule of Law
Tax evasion is a common practice in your country X X X ..
Justice is not fairly administered in society X X X X
Personal security and private property are not adequately protected X X X X
Parallel economy impairs economic development in your country X X X X
Insider trading is common in the stock market X .. .. X
Patent and copyright protection is not adequately enforced in your country X .. X X
Control of Corruption
Bribing and corruption exist in the economy X X X X
Table A17: Institute for Management Development (49 developed and developing)
 





















































TABLE A18:  World Markets Online (WMO) 
 
A18: World Markets Online
http://www.worldmarketsonline.com
World Markets Online (WMO) is an online subscription service from the World Markets Research Center updated 
daily which provides analysis of the conditions and risks for businesses worldwide. Established in 1996, the World 
Markets Research Centre is based in London and employs over 190 permanent staff.
  
World Markets Online has developed a risk rating system to enable its clients to compare and contrast the
investment climate in 186 countries around the world. For WMO the principal quality their risk measures endeavor
to measure is stability, which they believe businesses need most of all to be able to make secure investments and
plan ahead. In addition to stability, WMO believes that businesses also need the right conditions in place;
governments must ensure the right policies and safeguards to allow businesses to operate effectively. A country
with a high risk rating by WMO is a country where businesses face continual threats to their operations, either
from direct physical intervention, or because of the poor conditions and stability in the country concerned. The
system rates the quality of conditions and level of stability encountered by investors in each country in terms of
political, economic, legal, tax, operational and security environment.
Drawing on a worldwide network of information gatherers and analysts, World Markets Research Centre
generates a comprehensive range of in-depth country, sector and market services. The process by which the
risks are assessed consists firstly of WMO analysts' own experience of the country’s conditions. Daily stories
highlight countries’ changing conditions and constantly inform the risk rating levels. In addition to the in-house
analysts’ own consensus, World Markets Online also draws upon the expertise and impressions of those working
in the field through a wide network of stringers and informal contacts which allows them to access information
only available locally as well as to case studies of individual investor's experience. Regular meetings of all the
analysts across the regional desks ensure that their ratings are fully comparable globally, and that the factors
used for assessment are consistent.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. In this paper, we use the
disaggregated components of the 2002 country risk ratings, prepared for us by a panel of WMO experts.  






















































2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Institutional permanence An assessment of how mature and well-established the political 
system is. It is also an assessment of how far political opposition operates within the system 
or attempts to undermine it from outside. A country with high institutional permanence would 
unquestionably survive the death or removal from power of the current leadership. A mature 
political system will conventionally have a clearly established relationship between the 
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. 
X .. .. ..
Representativeness How well the population and organised interests can make their voices 
heard in the political system. Provided representation is handled fairly and effectively, it will 
ensure greater stability and better designed policies. 
X .. .. ..
Political Stability
Civil unrest How widespread political unrest is, and how great a threat it poses to investors. 
Demonstrations in themselves may not be cause for concern, but they will cause major 
disruption if they escalate into severe violence. At the extreme, this factor would amount to 
civil war. 
X .. .. ..
Terrorism Whether the country suffers from a sustained terrorist threat, and from how many 
sources. The degree of localisation of the threat is assessed, and whether the active groups 
are likely to target or affect businesses. 
X .. .. ..
.. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Bureaucracy : An assessment of the quality of the country’s bureaucracy. The better the 
bureaucracy the quicker decisions are made and the more easily foreign investors can go 
about their business.
X .. .. ..
Policy consistency and forward planning How confident businesses can be of the continuity 
of economic policy stance - whether a change of government will entail major policy 
disruption, and whether the current government has pursued a coherent strategy. This factor 
also looks at the extent to which policy-making is far-sighted, or conversely aimed at short-
term economic advantage. 
X .. .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Tax Effectiveness How efficient the country’s tax collection system is. The rules may be clear 
and transparent, but whether they are enforced consistently. This factor looks at the relative 
effectiveness too of corporate and personal, indirect and direct taxation. 
X .. .. ..
Legislation An assessment of whether the necessary business laws are in place, and 
whether there any outstanding gaps. This includes the extent to which the country's 
legislation is compatible with, and respected by, other countries' legal systems. 
X .. .. ..
.. .. ..
Rule of Law
Judicial Independence An assessment of how far the state and other outside actors can 
influence and distort the legal system. This will determine the level of legal impartiality 
investors can expect. 
X .. .. ..
Crime How much of a threat businesses face from crime such as kidnapping, extortion, street 
violence, burglary and so on. These problems can cause major inconvenience for foreign 
investors and require them to take expensive security precautions. 
X .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Corruption : An assessment of the intrusiveness of the country’s bureaucracy. The amount of 
red tape likely to countered is assessed, as is the likelihood of encountering corrupt officials 
and other groups. 
X .. .. ..
Table A18: World Markets Online (186 developed and developing countries)
 
 

























































PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) is a U.S.-based professional services firm.  It has set up an "Endowment for 
Transparency and Sustainability" aimed at supporting research efforts world-wide that shed light on two related 
topics of global importance: transparency in business and government, and sustainable economic development. 
Using a team of economists, survey professionals, analysts, and distinguished advisors, it has constructed an 
"Opacity Index" measuring the lack of transparency in 35 countries.
Opacity is defined as "the lack of clear, accurate, formal, easily discernible, and widely accepted practices" in
the following areas: corruption in government bureaucracy, laws governing contracts or property rights,
economic policies, accounting standards, and business regulation. The index was constructed based on
responses to a survey of chief financial officers of medium- and large firms, equity analysts, bankers, and PWC
employees resident in each country surveyed. The survey was conducted in 35 industrial and major developing
countries during the second and third quarter of 2000.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. We use data from the 
2000 data.  
 
2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
NA .. .. .. ..
Political Stability
NA .. .. .. ..
Government Effectiveness
Economic .. X .. ..
Regulatory Quality
Regulation .. X .. ..
Rule of Law
NA .. .. .. ..
Control of Corruption
Corruption .. X .. ..
Table A19: Price-Waterhouse Coopers's Opacity Factor (35 developed and developing)





















































TABLE A20:  The World Business Environment Survey (WBS, WDR) 
 
A20. The World Business Environment Survey (WBS)
http://www.worldbank.org/privatesector/ic/ic_ica_resources.htm
The World Business Environment Survey (WBS) is a survey conducted by the World Bank in collaboration
with several other institutions. It is designed to provide information on the business environment facing
private enterprises. It was conducted during 1999 and 2000 in 81 countries. The respondents were
managers of firms in at least 100 firms per country. This survey asks several questions similar to those in
the 1997 World Development Report survey that we use in constructing the 1998 version of the indicators.
We therefore treat the WBS as the continuation of this source.
The component of the WBS covering transition economies is referred to as the Business Environment and
Enterprise Performance Survey (BPS), described in Table A2. The questionnaire for this region contains
more detailed questions about corruption issues, including questions on "state capture" referring to the
manipulation of the institutions of the state for private gain on a grand scale. In addition, a new round of
BPS was conducted in 2002.  For these reasons, we treat the BPS as a separate source.
In the table below we list the variables included in each of the governance indicators. We use data from
the WBES survey in 2000 and the WDR Survey in 1997.
 






















































2002 2000 1998 1996
Voice and Accountability
Business have voice to express .. X X ..
Business are informed .. X X ..
Political Stability
Political instability .. X .. ..
Likelihood of uncostitutional .. .. X ..
Threat of terrorism .. .. X ..
Government Effectiveness
Quality of customs .. X X ..
Quality of public works (roads,…) .. X X ..
Quality of power company .. X .. ..
Quality of Water .. X .. ..
Quality of public health .. X X ..
Quality of public education .. X .. ..
Quality of central government  .. X .. ..
Quality of central bank .. X .. ..
Efficiency of government in delivering services .. X X ..
Likelihood that when a government official acts against the rules, one can go to 
another official or a superior and get correct treatment
.. .. X ..
Management time spent with bureaucrats .. .. X ..
The efficiency of mail delivery .. .. X ..
Predictability of changes in rules and laws .. .. X ..
Credibility of government's commitment to policies .. .. X ..
Regulatory Quality
Regulations on starting new businesses .. X X ..
Price controls .. X X ..
Regulations on foreign trade .. X X ..
Foreign currency regulations .. X X ..
General uncertainty about regulations .. X X ..
Rule of Law
Corruption of bankers .. X .. ..
Quality of the Police .. X .. ..
Organized crime .. X .. ..
Street crime .. X X ..
Courts--  fair & impartial .. X .. ..
Courts-affordable .. X .. ..
Courts-consistent/predictable .. X X ..
Court's enforceability .. X .. ..
Confidence in judicial system today in insuring property rights .. X X ..
General constraint—functioning of the judiciary .. X .. ..
Obstacles to competition-violation of patents .. X .. ..
Quality of courts .. X .. ..
Control of Corruption
Frequency of additional payments .. X X ..
Dishonest courts .. X .. ..
Corruption as obstacle to business .. X X ..
Bribery (% of Gross revenues) .. X .. ..
State Capture (BPS) .. X .. ..
Country coverage 80 74
Table A20: World Business Enterprise Survey (developed and developing countries)
 





















































APPENDIX B:  Components of Aggregate Governance Indicators, 2002 
 
  Table B1:  Voice and Accountability
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
CUD A5 To what extent does the state and/or its allied groups engage in repression of its citizens?
In carrying out internal security tasks, to what extent does the state rely on tactics commonly considered
illegitimate in the international community?
EIU A8 Orderly transfers
Vested interests
Accountablity of Public Officials
Human Rights
Freedom of association
FRH A9 Civil liberties: Freedom of speech, of assembly and demostration, of religion, equal opportunity, of excessive
governmental intervention
Political Rights: free and fair elections, representative legislative, free vote, political parties, no dominant group,
respect for minorities
Freedom of the Press
HUM A13 Travel: domestic and foreign travel restrictions 
Freedom of political participation
Imprisonments: Are there any imprisoned people because of their ethnicity, race, or their political, religious
beliefs?
Government censorship
PRS A15 Military in Politics The military are not elected by anyone, so their participation in government, either direct or
indirect, reduces accountability and therefore represents a risk. The threat of military intervention might lead as
well to an anticipated potentially inefficient change in policy or even in government. It also works as an indication
that the government is unable to function effectively and that the country has an uneasy environment for foreign
business.
Democratic Accountability. Quantifies how responsive government is to its people, on the basis that the less
response there is the more likely is that the government will fall, peacefully or violently. It includes not only if free
and fair elections are in place, but also how likely is the government to remain in power. 
RSF A16 Press Freedom Index
WMO A18 Institutional permanence: An assessment of how mature and well-established the political system is. It is also an 
assessment of how far political opposition operates within the system or attempts to undermine it from outside. A 
country with high institutional permanence would unquestionably survive the death or removal from power of the 
current leadership. A mature political system will conventionally have a clearly established relationship between 
the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government.
Representativeness: How well the population and organised interests can make their voices heard in the political 
system. Provided representation is handled fairly and effectively, it will ensure greater stability and better 
designed policies. 
Non-representative Sources
AFR A1 Satisfaction with democracy
FHT A9 Political Process: Deals with elections, referenda, party configuration, conditions for political competition, and
popular participation in elections.
Civil Society: Highlights the degree to which volunteerism, trade unionism, and professional associations exist,
and whether civic organizations are influential
Independent Media: Press freedom, public access to a variety of information sources, and the independence of
those sources from undue government or other influences.
GAL A10   Trust in National Government
Trust in the Parliament
GCS A11 Firms are usually informed clearly and transparently by the Government on changes in policies affecting their
industry
Newspapers can publish stories of their choosing without fear of censorship or retaliation
When deciding upon policies and contracts, Government officials favor well-connected firms
Extent of direct influence of legal contributions to political parties on specific public policy outcomes
Effectiveness of national Parliament/Congress as a law making and oversight institution
LOB A14 Satisfaction with democracy
WCY A17 Transparency of Government policy  
 






















































  Table B2:  Political Stability
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
CUD A5 Assess the degree to which the decline or collapse of central political authority posed a threat to political stability 
in this country.
Assess the degree to which political protest or rebellion posed a threat to political stability in the country.
Assess the degree to which ethno-cultural and/or religious conflict posed a threat to political stability in the 
country.
Assess the degree to which external military intervention posed a threat to political stability in the country.
DRI A6 Military Coup Risk: A military coup d’etat (or a series of such events) that reduces the GDP growth rate by 2% 
during any 12-month period.
Major Insurgency/Rebellion: An increase in scope or intensity of one or more insurgencies/rebellions that 
reduces the GDP growth rate by 3% during any 12-month period.
Political Terrorism: An increase in scope or intensity of terrorism that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during 
any 12-month period.
Political Assassination: A political assassination (or a series of such events) that reduces the GDP growth rate by 
1% during any 12-month period.
Civil War: An increase in scope or intensity of one or more civil wars that reduces the GDP growth rate by 4% 
during any 12-month period.
Major Urban Riot: An increase in scope, intensity, or frequency of rioting that reduces the GDP growth rate by 
1% during any 12-month period.




HUM A13 Frequency of political killings
Frequency of disappearances
Frequency of torture
PRS A15 Internal Conflict: Assesses political violence and its influence on governance.  
External conflict: The external conflict measure is an assessment both of the risk to the incumbent government 
and to inward investment.
Ethnic tensions: This component measures the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, 
nationality, or language divisions.
WMO A18 Civil unrest How widespread political unrest is, and how great a threat it poses to investors. Demonstrations in
themselves may not be cause for concern, but they will cause major disruption if they escalate into severe
violence. At the extreme, this factor would amount to civil war.
Terrorism Whether the country suffers from a sustained terrorist threat, and from how many sources. The degree
of localisation of the threat is assessed, and whether the active groups are likely to target or affect businesses. 
Non-representative Sources
BRI A3 Fractionalization of political spectrum and the power of these factions.
Fractionalization by language, ethnic and/or religious groups and the power of these factions.
Restrictive (coercive) measures required to retain power.
Organization and strength of forces for a radical government.
    Societal conflict involving demonstrations, strikes, and street violence.
Instability as perceived by non-constitutional changes, assassinations, and guerrilla wars.
GCS A11 Country terrorist threat: Does the threat of terrorism in the country impose significant costs on firms?
LOB A14 Country terrorist threat - Is terrorism a serious problem in the country?
WCY A17 Risk of political instability  
 
 






















































  Table B3:  Government Effectiveness
  Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
CUD A5 Rate the administrative and technical skills of the country’s civil service (occupying middle and higher 
management roles).
Rate the efficiency of the country’s national bureaucracies overall.
Rate the efficiency of the country’s local-level government bureaucracies overall.
Rate the effectiveness of coordination between the central government and local-level government 
organizations.
Rate the state’s ability to formulate and implement national policy initiatives.
Rate the state’s effectiveness at collecting taxes or other forms of government revenue.
Does the central government produce a national budget in a timely manner?
Do local governments produce budgets in a timely manner?
Rate the state’s ability to monitor socioeconomic trends, activities, and conditions within its borders
Rate the state’s ability to create, deliver, and maintain vital national infrastructure.
Rate the state’s ability to respond effectively to domestic economic problems.
Rate the state’s ability to respond effectively to natural disasters.
DRI A6 Government Instability: An increase in government personnel turnover rate at senior levels that 
reduces the GDP growth rate by 2% during any 12-month period.
Government Ineffectiveness: A decline in government personnel quality at any level that reduces the 
GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period.
Institutional Failure: A deterioration of government capacity to cope with national problems as a result 
of institutional rigidity that reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period.
EIU A8 Quality of bureaucracy
Excessive bureacucracy / red tape
PRS A15 Government Stability.  Measures the government’s ability to carry out its declared programs, and its 
ability to stay in office.  This will depend on issues such as: the type of governance, the cohesion of the 
government and governing party or parties, the closeness of the next election, the government’s 
command of the legislature, and popular approval of the government policies.
Bureaucratic Quality.  Measures institutional strength and quality of the civil service, assess how much 
strength and expertise bureaucrats have and how able they are to manage political alternations without 
drastic interruptions in government services, or policy changes.  Good performers have somewhat 
WMO A18 Policy consistency and forward planning: How confident businesses can be of the continuity of
economic policy stance - whether a change of government will entail major policy disruption, and
whether the current government has pursued a coherent strategy. This factor also looks at the extent
to which policy-making is far-sighted, or conversely aimed at short-term economic (and electoral)
advantage. 
Bureaucracy : An assessment of the quality of the country’s bureaucracy. The better the bureaucracy the quicker 
decisions are made and the more easily foreign investors can go about their business.
Non-representative Sources
AFR A1 Trust in Police
BPS A2 How problematic are telecommunications for the growth of your business 
How problematic is electricity for the growth of your business.
How problematic is transportation for the growth of your business.
BRI A3   Bureaucratic delays
CPIA A4 Management of external debt
Management of development programs
Quality public Administration
FHT A9 Government and Administration: Government decentralization, independent and responsibilities or local and
regional governments, and legislative and executive transparency are discussed.
GCS A11 Competence of public sector personnel
Quality of general infrastructure
Quality of public schools
Time spent by senior management dealing with government officials
LBO A14 Trust in Police
WCY A17 Government economic policies do not adapt quickly to changes in the economy
The public service is not independent from political interference
Government decisions are not effectively implemented
Bureaucracy hinders business activity
The distribution infrastructure of goods and services is generally inefficient  























































  Table B4:  Regulatory Quality
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
DRI A6 Regulations -- Exports: A 2% reduction in export volume as a result of a worsening in export 
regulations or restrictions (such as export limits) during any 12-month period, with respect to the level 
at the time of the assessment.
Regulations -- Imports: A 2% reduction in import volume as a result of a worsening in import 
regulations or restrictions (such as import quotas) during any 12-month period, with respect to the level 
at the time of the assessment.
Regulations -- Other Business: An increase in other regulatory burdens, with respect to the level at the 
time of the assessment, that reduces total aggregate investment in real LCU terms by 10% Ownership of Business by Non-Residents: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to "10" in legal 
restrictions on ownership of business by non-residents during any 12-month period.
Ownership of Equities by Non-Residents: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to "10" in legal 
restrictions on ownership of equities by non-residents during any 12-month period.










PRS A15 Investment Profile.  Includes the risk to operations (scored from 0 to 4, increasing in risk); taxation 
(scored from 0 to 3), repatriation (scored from 0 to 3); repatriation (scored from 0 to 3) and labor costs 
(scored from 0 to 2).  They all look at the government’s attitude towards investment.  
WMO A18 Tax Effectiveness: How efficient the country’s tax collection system is. The rules may be clear and
transparent, but whether they are enforced consistently. This factor looks at the relative effectiveness
too of corporate and personal, indirect and direct taxation. 
Legislation: An assessment of whether the necessary business laws are in place, and whether there
any outstanding gaps. This includes the extent to which the country's legislation is compatible with, and
respected by, other countries' legal systems. 
 
Non-representative Sources
BPS A2 Information on the laws and regulations is easy to obtain
Interpretations of the laws and regulations are consistent and predictable
Unpredictability of changes of regulations
How problematic are labor regulations for the growth of your business.
  How problematic are tax regulations for the growth of your business.
How problematic are custom and trade regulations for the growth of your business.
CPIA A4 Competitive environment
Factor and products markets
Trade policy
EBRD A7 Price liberalisation 





Financial regulations: effectiveness  






















































  Table B4:  Regulatory Quality (cont.)
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Non-representative Sources
GCS A11 Administrative regulations are burdensome
Tax system is disrtortionary
Import barriers as obstacle to growth
Competition in local market is limited
It is easy to start company
Anti monopoly policy is lax and ineffective
Clusters are frequent
Environmental regulations hurt competitiveness
Cost of tariffs imposed on business
Government subsidies keep uncompetitive industries alive artificially
WCY A17 The exchange rate policy of your country hinders the competitiveness of enterprises
Protectionism in your country negatively affects the conduct of business in your country
Competition legislation in your country does not prevent unfair competition
Price controls affect pricing of products in most industries
Legal regulation of financial institutions is inadequate for financial stability
Foreign financial institutions do not have access to the domestic market
Access to local capital markets is restricted for foreign companies
Access to foreign capital markets is restricted for domestic companies
Financial institutions' transparency is not widely developed in your country
Customs' authorities do not facilitate the efficient transit of goods
The legal framework is detrimental to your country's competitiveness
Foreign investors are free to acquire control in domestic companies
Public sector contracts are sufficiently open to foreign bidders
Real personal taxes are non distortionary
Real corporate taxes are non distortionary
Banking regulation does not hinder competitiveness
 






















































  Table B5:  Rule of Law
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
CUD A5 For the most part, is the state seen as legitimately representing its citizens?
Rate the state’s adherence to the rule of law, considering the country as a whole.
DRI A6 Losses and Costs of Crime: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to "10" in crime during any 12-
month period.
Kidnapping of Foreigners: An increase in scope, intensity, or frequency of kidnapping of foreigners that 
reduces the GDP growth rate by 1% during any 12-month period.
  Enforceability of Government Contracts: A 1 point decline on a scale from "0" to "10" in the 
enforceability of contracts during any 12-month period.
Enforceability of Private Contracts: A 1-point decline on a scale from "0" to "10" in the legal 
enforceability of contracts during any 12-month period.
EIU A8 Violent crime
Organized crime
Fairness of judicial process
Enforceability of contracts
Speediness of judicial process
Confiscation/exprorpiation
HER A12 Black market
Property Rights
HUM A13 Independence of Judiciary
PRS A15 Law and Order.  The Law sub-component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal 
system, while the Order sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law (they are 
assessed separately).
QLM A3 Direct Financial Fraud, Money Laundering and Organized Crime
WMO A18 Judicial Independence An assessment of how far the state and other outside actors can influence and 
distort the legal system. This will determine the level of legal impartiality investors can expect. 
Crime How much of a threat businesses face from crime such as kidnapping, extortion, street 
violence, burglary and so on. These problems can cause major inconvenience for foreign investors and 
require them to take expensive security precautions. 
Non-representative Sources
BPS A2 Fairness of the court system
Affordability of the court system
Enforceability of court decisions
Honesty of courts
Quickness of court decisions
Property right protection
How problematic is organized crime for the growth of your business.
  How problematic is judiciary for the growth of your business.
How problematic is street crime for the growth of your business.
BRI A3 Enforceability of contracts
CPIA A4 Property rights
FHT A9 Rule of Law: Considers judicial and constitutional matters as well as the legal and de facto status of 
GAL A10 Trust in the Legal System
GCS A11 Common crime imposes costs on business
Organized crime imposes costs on business
Money laundering through banks is pervasive
Money laundering through non-banks is pervasive
Quality of Police
Insider trading is pervasive
The judiciary is independent from political influences of members of government, citizens or firms
Legal framework to challenge the legality of government actions is inefficient
Intellectual Property protection is weak 
Protection of financial assets is weak
Illegal donation to parties are frequent
Percentage of firms which are unofficial or unregistered
WCY A17 Tax evasion is a common practice in your country
  Justice is not fairly administered in society
Personal security and private property are not adequately protected
Parallel economy impairs economic development in your country
Insider trading is common in the stock market
Patent and copyright protection is not adequately enforced in your country  






















































  Table B6: Control of Corruption
 
Code Table Concept Measured
Representative Sources
CUD A5 Rate the severity of corruption within the state
To what extent do the country's primary political decision makers (e.g. chief executive and cabinet 
members) engage in patterns of nepotism, cronyism and patronage?
To what extent do the country's civil service (occupying middle and higher management roles) engage 
in patterns of nepotism, cronyism and patronage?
To what extent do patterns of nepotism, cronyism and patronage undermine the state's ability to 
exercise the basic functions of government effectively?
To what extent do patterns of nepotism, cronyism and patronage distort broad patterns of economic 
development?
DRI A6 Risk Event Outcome non-price: Losses and Costs of Corruption: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" 
to "10" in corruption during any 12-month period.
EIU A8 Corruption
PRS A15 Corruption.  Measures corruption within the political system, which distorts the economic and financial 
environment, reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume 
positions of power through patronage rather than ability, and introduces an inherently instability in the 
political system.  
QLM A3 Indirect Diversion of Funds
WMO A18 Corruption : This assesses the intrusiveness of the country’s bureaucracy. The amount of red tape
likely to countered is assessed, as is the likelihood of encountering corrupt officials and other groups. 
Non-representative Sources
AFR A1 How common is corruption among public officials?
BPS A2 How common is for firms to have to pay irregular additional payments to get things done
On average, what percent of total annual sales do firms pay in unofficial payments to public officials
How often do firms make epayments to influence the content of new legislation
Extent to which firms' payments to public officials to affect legislation impose costs on other firms
How problematic is corruption for the growth of your business.
BRI A3 Internal Causes of Political Risk: Mentality, including xenophobia, nationalism, corruption, nepotism,
willingness to compromise, etc.
CPIA A4   Transparency / corruption
FHT A9 Corruption
GCS A11 Public trust in financial honesty of politicians
Extent to which legal contributions to political parties are misused by politicians
Diversion of public funds due to corruption is common
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: import/export permits
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: public utilities
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to:tax payments
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: loan applications
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: awarding of public contracts
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: influencing laws, regulations, decrees
Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: getting favourable judicial decisions
Extent to which firms' illegal payments to influence government poliicies impose costs on other firms
LBO A14 What percentage of public employees would you say are corrupted?
WCY A17 Bribing and corruption exist in the economy  
 





















































APPENDIX C: Governance Indicators Over Time 
 
TABLE C1: Voice and Accountability
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -1.31 0.23 5 -1.76 0.33 2 -1.68 0.30 2 -1.45 0.35 2
ALBANIA ALB -0.04 0.15 5 -0.05 0.16 6 -0.26 0.19 5 -0.33 0.21 4
ALGERIA DZA -0.96 0.17 7 -1.31 0.22 5 -1.46 0.23 4 -1.11 0.21 4
ANDORRA ADO 1.41 0.29 2 1.39 0.38 1 1.44 0.35 1 1.23 0.40 1
ANGOLA AGO -1.39 0.17 7 -1.37 0.22 5 -1.28 0.23 4 -1.35 0.21 4
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ATG 0.17 0.29 2 -0.02 0.38 1 0.05 0.35 1 0.18 0.40 1
ARGENTINA ARG 0.12 0.17 11 0.44 0.21 8 0.35 0.23 5 0.58 0.20 6
ARMENIA ARM -0.42 0.15 5 -0.30 0.16 6 -0.31 0.19 5 -0.54 0.23 3
AUSTRALIA AUS 1.50 0.17 9 1.61 0.22 6 1.50 0.23 5 1.65 0.21 5
AUSTRIA AUT 1.32 0.17 9 1.21 0.22 6 1.27 0.23 6 1.36 0.21 5
AZERBAIJAN AZE -0.97 0.13 8 -0.81 0.16 7 -0.95 0.18 6 -1.02 0.18 4
BAHAMAS BHS 1.18 0.25 3 1.10 0.28 2 1.07 0.29 2 1.06 0.32 2
BAHRAIN BHR -0.74 0.18 7 -1.17 0.22 5 -1.23 0.23 4 -0.89 0.21 4
BANGLADESH BGD -0.57 0.17 8 -0.34 0.22 6 -0.17 0.23 4 -0.31 0.21 4
BARBADOS BRB 1.39 0.29 2 1.21 0.38 1 1.44 0.35 1 1.17 0.40 1
BELARUS BLR -1.45 0.15 7 -1.21 0.16 6 -0.98 0.19 5 -0.97 0.23 3
BELGIUM BEL 1.44 0.18 8 1.19 0.22 6 1.32 0.23 5 1.41 0.21 5
BELIZE BLZ 0.83 0.27 3 0.86 0.33 3 1.01 0.30 2 1.04 0.35 2
BENIN BEN 0.03 0.23 5 0.44 0.31 3 0.61 0.29 3 0.71 0.35 2
BERMUDA BMU 1.07 0.47 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BHUTAN BTN -1.17 0.25 4 -1.63 0.33 2 -1.56 0.30 2 -1.30 0.35 2
BOLIVIA BOL 0.01 0.18 9 0.23 0.22 6 0.35 0.23 5 0.10 0.20 5
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.25 0.15 7 -0.37 0.18 5 -1.11 0.21 3 -1.14 0.35 2
BOTSWANA BWA 0.73 0.17 8 0.78 0.22 6 0.77 0.23 4 0.71 0.21 4
BRAZIL BRA 0.28 0.17 11 0.53 0.22 7 0.60 0.23 6 0.22 0.20 6
BRUNEI BRN -0.82 0.22 5 -1.07 0.26 3 -1.14 0.26 3 -0.92 0.30 3
BULGARIA BGR 0.56 0.13 10 0.51 0.15 8 0.40 0.18 6 0.16 0.17 5
BURKINA FASO BFA -0.27 0.22 5 -0.31 0.25 4 -0.24 0.26 3 -0.44 0.30 3
BURUNDI BDI -1.16 0.25 4 -1.66 0.31 3 -1.59 0.30 2 -1.21 0.35 2
CAMBODIA KHM -0.56 0.25 4 -0.35 0.33 3 -0.87 0.30 2 -0.65 0.35 2
CAMEROON CMR -1.10 0.18 7 -0.90 0.22 6 -0.77 0.23 5 -0.99 0.21 4
CANADA CAN 1.50 0.17 10 1.27 0.21 8 1.30 0.23 6 1.37 0.21 5
CAPE VERDE CPV 0.41 0.28 3 0.86 0.38 1 0.92 0.35 1 0.86 0.40 1
CAYMAN ISLANDS CYM 1.51 0.47 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF -0.79 0.25 4 -0.52 0.33 2 0.06 0.30 2 -0.16 0.35 2
CHAD TCD -0.95 0.25 4 -0.89 0.33 2 -0.83 0.29 3 -0.72 0.35 2
CHILE CHL 1.12 0.17 10 0.56 0.21 8 0.63 0.23 5 0.89 0.20 6
CHINA CHN -1.38 0.17 9 -1.37 0.22 7 -1.51 0.23 5 -1.22 0.21 5
COLOMBIA COL -0.55 0.17 10 -0.53 0.21 8 -0.29 0.23 6 -0.06 0.20 6
COMOROS COM -0.51 0.28 3 -0.47 0.38 1 -0.04 0.35 1 -0.10 0.40 1
CONGO COG -1.10 0.21 6 -1.56 0.25 4 -1.02 0.25 4 -1.17 0.30 3
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -1.89 0.22 5 -1.91 0.25 4 -1.67 0.26 3 -1.17 0.30 3
COSTA RICA CRI 1.16 0.17 10 1.31 0.22 6 1.26 0.23 5 1.30 0.20 5
CROATIA HRV 0.46 0.13 9 0.38 0.16 7 -0.30 0.18 5 -0.47 0.18 4
CUBA CUB -1.77 0.17 7 -1.72 0.23 4 -1.68 0.23 4 -1.31 0.21 4
CYPRUS CYP 0.94 0.18 6 1.22 0.23 4 1.06 0.23 4 1.01 0.21 4
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 0.90 0.13 9 0.99 0.16 8 1.14 0.18 7 1.01 0.17 6
DENMARK DNK 1.72 0.17 10 1.51 0.21 7 1.51 0.23 5 1.65 0.21 5
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.69 0.28 3 -0.56 0.38 1 -0.73 0.35 1 -0.72 0.40 1
DOMINICA DMA 1.05 0.29 2 1.21 0.38 1 1.27 0.35 1 1.21 0.40 1
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM 0.19 0.18 7 0.43 0.22 6 -0.06 0.23 4 0.02 0.21 4
ECUADOR ECU -0.06 0.18 8 -0.14 0.22 6 0.24 0.23 5 0.07 0.20 5
EGYPT EGY -0.87 0.17 8 -0.81 0.22 6 -0.83 0.23 4 -0.70 0.21 4
EL SALVADOR SLV 0.06 0.18 8 0.24 0.22 6 0.01 0.23 4 -0.20 0.20 5
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ -1.44 0.28 3 -1.46 0.38 1 -1.55 0.35 1 -1.39 0.40 1
ERITREA ERI -2.05 0.23 5 -1.42 0.31 3 -1.07 0.30 2 -1.05 0.35 2
ESTONIA EST 1.05 0.13 9 0.89 0.15 9 0.82 0.18 6 0.74 0.18 4
ETHIOPIA ETH -1.13 0.21 6 -1.00 0.25 5 -0.69 0.26 3 -0.58 0.30 3
FIJI FJI -0.06 0.24 4 0.11 0.31 3 0.10 0.29 3 -0.08 0.35 2
FINLAND FIN 1.70 0.17 9 1.60 0.21 7 1.51 0.23 5 1.63 0.21 5
FRANCE FRA 1.29 0.17 9 1.07 0.21 8 1.09 0.23 6 1.43 0.21 5
FRENCH GUIANA GUF 0.42 0.47 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GABON GAB -0.42 0.18 6 -0.46 0.22 5 -0.26 0.23 4 -0.51 0.21 4
GAMBIA GMB -1.03 0.21 6 -0.98 0.26 3 -1.18 0.26 3 -1.27 0.30 3
GEORGIA GEO -0.30 0.16 6 -0.21 0.18 6 -0.37 0.21 4 -0.49 0.23 3
GERMANY DEU 1.51 0.17 10 1.35 0.21 8 1.36 0.23 6 1.48 0.21 5  
 






















































TABLE C1: Voice and Accountability (cont.)
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
GHANA GHA 0.01 0.17 8 0.00 0.22 6 -0.53 0.23 5 -0.33 0.21 4
GREECE GRC 1.05 0.18 8 1.01 0.23 5 0.92 0.23 5 0.93 0.21 5
GRENADA GRD 0.68 0.29 2 0.99 0.38 1 1.05 0.35 1 1.00 0.40 1
GUATEMALA GTM -0.48 0.17 10 -0.26 0.22 6 -0.39 0.23 4 -0.60 0.20 5
GUINEA GIN -1.19 0.22 5 -1.12 0.26 3 -0.99 0.25 4 -1.07 0.30 3
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -0.74 0.21 6 -0.85 0.25 4 -0.34 0.25 4 -0.52 0.30 3
GUYANA GUY 0.65 0.23 4 0.91 0.25 4 0.98 0.26 3 0.86 0.30 3
HAITI HTI -1.11 0.21 7 -0.79 0.25 5 -0.65 0.26 3 -0.44 0.30 3
HONDURAS HND -0.15 0.17 8 0.01 0.22 6 0.05 0.23 4 -0.34 0.20 5
HONG KONG HKG 0.15 0.18 8 -0.45 0.24 5 -0.16 0.25 5 0.60 0.22 4
HUNGARY HUN 1.17 0.13 10 1.14 0.15 9 1.15 0.18 7 1.01 0.17 6
ICELAND ISL 1.52 0.21 7 1.44 0.25 5 1.36 0.25 4 1.38 0.29 4
INDIA IND 0.38 0.17 10 0.45 0.22 7 0.26 0.23 6 0.27 0.21 5
INDONESIA IDN -0.49 0.17 10 -0.52 0.22 7 -1.33 0.23 5 -1.08 0.21 5
IRAN IRN -1.04 0.17 7 -0.69 0.22 5 -0.90 0.23 4 -1.03 0.21 4
IRAQ IRQ -2.12 0.18 6 -2.12 0.22 5 -1.93 0.23 4 -1.65 0.21 4
IRELAND IRL 1.40 0.17 10 1.42 0.21 7 1.34 0.23 6 1.42 0.21 5
ISRAEL ISR 0.61 0.17 10 0.94 0.22 6 1.01 0.23 5 1.02 0.21 5
ITALY ITA 1.11 0.17 9 1.06 0.21 8 1.21 0.23 6 1.05 0.21 5
IVORY COAST CIV -1.25 0.17 7 -1.31 0.23 5 -0.65 0.23 5 -0.18 0.21 4
JAMAICA JAM 0.51 0.18 6 0.70 0.23 4 0.66 0.23 5 0.53 0.21 4
JAPAN JPN 0.99 0.17 10 0.99 0.21 7 1.05 0.25 4 1.03 0.21 5
JORDAN JOR -0.41 0.18 7 -0.19 0.22 5 -0.19 0.23 5 -0.14 0.21 4
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ -1.05 0.13 8 -0.91 0.15 8 -0.73 0.18 6 -0.94 0.18 4
KENYA KEN -0.58 0.17 7 -0.84 0.22 6 -0.77 0.23 5 -0.45 0.21 4
KIRIBATI KIR 1.09 0.35 1 1.15 0.38 1 1.26 0.35 1 1.12 0.40 1
KOREA, NORTH PRK -2.32 0.21 6 -2.02 0.26 3 -1.96 0.26 3 -1.75 0.30 3
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.63 0.17 10 0.76 0.21 7 0.68 0.23 6 0.68 0.21 5
KUWAIT KWT -0.29 0.17 8 -0.22 0.23 4 -0.33 0.23 4 -0.18 0.21 4
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -0.96 0.16 6 -0.68 0.18 4 -0.46 0.21 4 -0.46 0.23 3
LAOS LAO -1.73 0.25 4 -1.43 0.31 3 -1.27 0.30 2 -1.04 0.35 2
LATVIA LVA 0.91 0.14 7 0.76 0.16 6 0.72 0.18 6 0.50 0.18 4
LEBANON LBN -0.54 0.18 7 -0.37 0.22 5 -0.51 0.23 4 -0.40 0.21 4
LESOTHO LSO -0.16 0.26 4 -0.03 0.33 2 -0.01 0.30 2 0.02 0.35 2
LIBERIA LBR -1.54 0.21 6 -1.16 0.25 4 -0.90 0.26 3 -1.32 0.30 3
LIBYA LBY -1.70 0.18 6 -1.60 0.23 4 -1.58 0.23 4 -1.38 0.21 4
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.32 0.29 2 1.39 0.38 1 1.44 0.35 1 1.23 0.40 1
LITHUANIA LTU 0.89 0.13 8 0.95 0.15 8 0.84 0.18 6 0.72 0.18 4
LUXEMBOURG LUX 1.41 0.23 6 1.33 0.25 5 1.37 0.25 4 1.43 0.29 4
MACAO MAC 0.42 0.47 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MACEDONIA MKD -0.29 0.14 6 -0.03 0.17 5 0.06 0.19 5 -0.05 0.18 4
MADAGASCAR MDG -0.05 0.22 5 0.25 0.25 5 0.40 0.25 4 0.25 0.30 3
MALAWI MWI -0.56 0.18 7 -0.28 0.22 6 -0.10 0.23 5 -0.40 0.21 4
MALAYSIA MYS -0.27 0.17 10 -0.27 0.21 8 -0.25 0.23 6 -0.05 0.21 5
MALDIVES MDV -0.74 0.29 2 -0.94 0.38 1 -1.05 0.35 1 -0.93 0.40 1
MALI MLI 0.18 0.21 7 0.28 0.25 4 0.38 0.25 4 0.29 0.30 3
MALTA MLT 1.29 0.25 3 1.39 0.28 2 1.36 0.29 2 1.05 0.32 2
MARSHALL ISLANDS MHL 1.23 0.35 1 1.30 0.38 1 1.35 0.35 1 1.17 0.40 1
MARTINIQUE MTQ 0.64 0.47 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MAURITANIA MRT -0.67 0.25 4 -0.67 0.31 3 -0.91 0.30 2 -0.80 0.35 2
MAURITIUS MUS 0.80 0.19 6 1.21 0.26 4 0.98 0.26 4 0.84 0.23 3
MEXICO MEX 0.33 0.17 11 0.09 0.21 8 -0.17 0.23 6 -0.21 0.20 6
MICRONESIA FSM 0.93 0.35 1 0.97 0.38 1 0.98 0.35 1 1.13 0.40 1
MOLDOVA MDA -0.30 0.14 6 -0.01 0.16 7 -0.03 0.18 6 -0.19 0.18 4
MONACO  MCO 0.92 0.35 1 1.11 0.38 1 1.17 0.35 1 0.98 0.40 1
MONGOLIA MNG 0.44 0.21 6 0.73 0.25 4 0.62 0.19 4 0.36 0.30 3
MOROCCO MAR -0.30 0.17 8 -0.44 0.23 4 -0.53 0.23 5 -0.60 0.21 4
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ -0.26 0.21 6 -0.28 0.25 4 -0.10 0.25 4 -0.19 0.30 3
MYANMAR MMR -2.05 0.17 7 -2.12 0.22 5 -1.92 0.23 4 -1.64 0.21 4
NAMIBIA NAM 0.33 0.17 9 0.28 0.22 6 0.42 0.23 4 0.50 0.21 4
NAURU NRU 0.85 0.35 1 0.88 0.38 1 1.02 0.35 1 0.86 0.40 1
NEPAL NPL -0.52 0.23 5 -0.12 0.31 3 -0.01 0.30 2 0.13 0.35 2
NETHERLANDS NLD 1.63 0.17 9 1.53 0.21 7 1.51 0.23 5 1.62 0.21 5
NEW ZEALAND NZL 1.60 0.18 7 1.51 0.22 6 1.37 0.23 5 1.58 0.21 5
NICARAGUA NIC 0.09 0.17 8 -0.08 0.22 6 0.07 0.23 4 -0.21 0.20 5
NIGER NER -0.18 0.22 5 -0.07 0.25 4 -0.99 0.26 3 -0.39 0.30 3  
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TABLE C1: Voice and Accountability (cont.)
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
NIGERIA NGA -0.70 0.17 10 -0.68 0.22 7 -1.48 0.23 5 -1.41 0.21 4
NORWAY NOR 1.64 0.17 9 1.50 0.22 6 1.55 0.23 5 1.67 0.21 5
OMAN OMN -0.55 0.17 7 -0.68 0.23 4 -0.74 0.23 4 -0.58 0.21 4
PAKISTAN PAK -1.10 0.18 7 -1.53 0.22 6 -0.62 0.23 4 -0.93 0.21 4
PANAMA PAN 0.50 0.17 10 0.69 0.22 6 0.59 0.23 4 0.32 0.20 5
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -0.15 0.18 6 0.03 0.22 5 0.20 0.23 4 0.16 0.21 4
PARAGUAY PRY -0.53 0.17 9 -0.59 0.22 5 -0.27 0.23 5 -0.37 0.20 5
PERU PER 0.22 0.17 10 -0.01 0.22 7 -0.75 0.23 5 -0.69 0.20 5
PHILIPPINES PHL 0.17 0.17 9 0.40 0.21 8 0.46 0.23 5 0.16 0.21 5
POLAND POL 1.11 0.13 11 1.12 0.15 9 1.01 0.18 7 0.95 0.17 6
PORTUGAL PRT 1.31 0.17 9 1.35 0.23 6 1.38 0.23 6 1.25 0.21 5
PUERTO RICO PRI 0.64 0.47 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
QATAR QAT -0.52 0.19 5 -0.66 0.24 3 -0.91 0.25 3 -0.79 0.22 3
ROMANIA ROM 0.38 0.13 10 0.43 0.15 8 0.24 0.18 5 0.03 0.17 5
RUSSIA RUS -0.52 0.13 11 -0.44 0.15 9 -0.26 0.18 7 -0.34 0.17 6
RWANDA RWA -1.41 0.23 5 -1.46 0.31 3 -1.50 0.30 2 -1.35 0.35 2
SAMOA SAM 0.67 0.29 2 0.62 0.38 1 0.60 0.35 1 0.74 0.40 1
SAN MARINO SMR 1.17 0.35 1 1.39 0.38 1 1.44 0.35 1 1.23 0.40 1
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP 0.48 0.29 2 0.93 0.38 1 0.75 0.35 1 0.84 0.40 1
SAUDI ARABIA SAU -1.40 0.17 8 -1.27 0.22 5 -1.37 0.23 4 -1.16 0.21 4
SENEGAL SEN 0.15 0.17 7 -0.11 0.22 6 -0.49 0.23 5 -0.16 0.21 4
SEYCHELLES SYC 0.19 0.28 3 0.11 0.38 1 0.19 0.35 1 0.10 0.40 1
SIERRA LEONE SLE -0.57 0.21 6 -1.36 0.25 4 -1.72 0.26 3 -1.30 0.30 3
SINGAPORE SGP 0.51 0.18 7 -0.05 0.22 7 0.01 0.23 6 0.38 0.21 5
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 0.92 0.14 8 0.90 0.16 8 0.45 0.18 6 0.36 0.17 5
SLOVENIA SVN 1.10 0.13 10 0.98 0.16 8 0.92 0.18 5 0.95 0.18 4
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB 0.37 0.35 1 0.06 0.38 1 1.11 0.35 1 1.02 0.40 1
SOMALIA SOM -1.51 0.22 5 -1.37 0.25 4 -1.46 0.26 3 -1.81 0.30 3
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0.73 0.17 11 1.05 0.21 8 0.87 0.23 6 0.65 0.21 5
SPAIN ESP 1.24 0.17 10 1.10 0.21 8 1.27 0.23 6 1.10 0.21 5
SRI LANKA LKA -0.06 0.17 8 -0.37 0.22 5 -0.29 0.23 4 -0.19 0.21 4
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS KNA 0.96 0.35 1 1.01 0.38 1 1.07 0.35 1 1.01 0.40 1
ST. LUCIA LCA 1.04 0.35 1 1.06 0.38 1 1.12 0.35 1 1.08 0.40 1
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES VCT 0.98 0.35 1 1.03 0.38 1 1.09 0.35 1 1.09 0.40 1
SUDAN SDN -1.71 0.17 7 -1.75 0.22 5 -1.71 0.23 4 -1.57 0.21 4
SURINAME SUR 0.29 0.25 3 0.55 0.28 2 0.19 0.29 2 -0.05 0.32 2
SWAZILAND SWZ -1.18 0.25 4 -1.22 0.33 2 -0.92 0.30 2 -1.22 0.35 2
SWEDEN SWE 1.65 0.17 10 1.56 0.21 8 1.48 0.23 5 1.62 0.21 5
SWITZERLAND CHE 1.63 0.17 9 1.64 0.21 7 1.55 0.23 6 1.63 0.21 5
SYRIA SYR -1.56 0.17 7 -1.64 0.23 4 -1.59 0.23 4 -1.30 0.21 4
TAIWAN TWN 0.89 0.17 9 0.81 0.21 7 0.71 0.23 5 0.53 0.21 5
TAJIKISTAN TJK -0.95 0.16 6 -0.93 0.18 4 -1.37 0.21 3 -1.35 0.23 3
TANZANIA TZA -0.41 0.17 8 -0.15 0.22 6 -0.40 0.23 5 -0.73 0.21 4
THAILAND THA 0.20 0.17 9 0.25 0.22 7 0.11 0.23 6 0.01 0.21 5
TIMOR, EAST TMP 0.19 0.29 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TOGO TGO -1.20 0.22 5 -1.09 0.26 3 -1.14 0.25 4 -1.01 0.30 3
TONGA TON -0.12 0.35 1 -0.09 0.38 1 -0.05 0.35 1 0.00 0.40 1
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO 0.56 0.18 6 0.61 0.23 5 0.92 0.23 4 0.73 0.21 4
TUNISIA TUN -0.83 0.17 8 -0.71 0.23 5 -0.92 0.23 4 -0.50 0.21 4
TURKEY TUR -0.47 0.17 10 -0.65 0.21 8 -0.92 0.23 6 -0.39 0.21 5
TURKMENISTAN TKM -1.85 0.16 5 -1.59 0.18 3 -1.59 0.21 3 -1.60 0.23 3
TUVALU TUV 1.17 0.35 1 1.39 0.38 1 1.44 0.35 1 1.23 0.40 1
UGANDA UGA -0.77 0.17 8 -0.94 0.22 6 -0.61 0.23 5 -0.60 0.21 4
UKRAINE UKR -0.59 0.13 9 -0.39 0.16 7 -0.14 0.18 6 -0.37 0.18 4
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE -0.47 0.18 6 -0.62 0.23 4 -0.71 0.23 4 -0.64 0.21 4
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 1.47 0.17 10 1.39 0.21 8 1.40 0.23 6 1.32 0.21 5
UNITED STATES USA 1.32 0.17 9 1.18 0.22 7 1.41 0.23 6 1.46 0.21 5
URUGUAY URY 0.95 0.18 8 1.04 0.22 6 0.68 0.23 4 0.74 0.20 5
UZBEKISTAN UZB -1.66 0.14 7 -1.39 0.17 6 -1.50 0.19 5 -1.32 0.18 4
VANUATU VUT 0.89 0.35 1 0.62 0.38 1 0.63 0.35 1 0.45 0.40 1
VENEZUELA VEN -0.41 0.17 10 -0.33 0.23 6 0.14 0.23 6 0.06 0.20 6
VIETNAM VNM -1.36 0.17 8 -1.53 0.22 5 -1.64 0.23 4 -1.24 0.21 4
WEST BANK WBG -1.08 0.28 3 -0.89 0.38 2 -0.65 0.35 2 -1.48 0.40 1
YEMEN YEM -0.88 0.17 7 -0.72 0.22 5 -0.60 0.23 4 -0.86 0.21 4
YUGOSLAVIA YUG -0.20 0.14 7 -0.32 0.16 5 -0.96 0.18 5 -1.30 0.21 4
ZAMBIA ZMB -0.40 0.17 8 -0.24 0.22 6 -0.11 0.23 5 -0.15 0.21 4
ZIMBABWE ZWE -1.50 0.18 8 -0.97 0.23 5 -0.74 0.23 5 -0.28 0.21 4  
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TABLE C2: Political Stability
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -2.21 0.28 4 -2.44 0.40 2 -1.84 0.60 1 -1.51 0.65 1
ALBANIA ALB -0.47 0.29 4 -0.68 0.33 5 -0.72 0.29 4 0.22 0.38 3
ALGERIA DZA -1.54 0.22 6 -1.70 0.27 5 -2.65 0.28 4 -2.48 0.34 4
ANDORRA ADO 1.31 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ANGOLA AGO -1.60 0.22 6 -2.33 0.27 5 -2.04 0.27 5 -1.98 0.34 4
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ATG 0.81 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ARGENTINA ARG -0.74 0.19 10 0.46 0.23 10 0.50 0.25 6 0.50 0.27 6
ARMENIA ARM -0.53 0.29 4 -0.73 0.35 5 -0.46 0.29 4 0.39 0.41 2
AUSTRALIA AUS 1.18 0.20 9 1.32 0.23 8 1.21 0.25 6 1.08 0.27 6
AUSTRIA AUT 1.29 0.21 8 1.35 0.23 8 1.47 0.24 7 1.24 0.27 6
AZERBAIJAN AZE -1.13 0.22 6 -0.67 0.27 6 -0.53 0.27 5 -0.41 0.36 3
BAHAMAS BHS 0.99 0.37 2 0.71 0.66 1 0.40 0.43 1 0.51 0.67 1
BAHRAIN BHR 0.31 0.24 5 0.05 0.27 5 0.03 0.28 4 -0.51 0.34 4
BANGLADESH BGD -0.61 0.22 7 -0.56 0.27 6 -0.44 0.28 4 -0.41 0.34 4
BARBADOS BRB 0.81 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BELARUS BLR 0.19 0.26 5 0.02 0.33 6 -0.19 0.29 4 -0.04 0.41 2
BELGIUM BEL 0.97 0.21 8 0.92 0.23 8 0.95 0.25 6 0.83 0.27 6
BELIZE BLZ 0.64 0.39 2 0.70 0.59 2 0.51 0.60 1 0.55 0.65 1
BENIN BEN 0.63 0.34 3 0.27 0.51 2 0.14 0.50 2 0.96 0.65 1
BERMUDA BMU 0.81 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BHUTAN BTN 0.77 0.39 2 0.60 0.62 1 0.51 0.60 1 0.96 0.65 1
BOLIVIA BOL -0.20 0.22 7 -0.42 0.27 7 0.00 0.27 5 -0.28 0.34 4
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.83 0.28 4 -0.26 0.57 3 -0.43 0.60 1 -0.28 0.65 1
BOTSWANA BWA 0.75 0.22 7 0.82 0.27 6 0.79 0.27 5 0.72 0.34 4
BRAZIL BRA 0.17 0.19 10 0.27 0.23 9 -0.43 0.24 7 -0.01 0.27 6
BRUNEI BRN 1.10 0.35 3 1.26 0.51 2 1.43 0.37 2 0.86 0.53 2
BULGARIA BGR 0.56 0.22 7 0.30 0.26 8 0.39 0.27 5 0.20 0.34 4
BURKINA FASO BFA -0.10 0.35 3 -0.33 0.44 3 -0.10 0.36 3 -0.50 0.53 2
BURUNDI BDI -2.00 0.39 2 -1.77 0.46 3 -1.84 0.60 1 -1.10 0.65 1
CAMBODIA KHM -0.25 0.39 2 -1.22 0.59 2 -1.37 0.60 1 -1.10 0.65 1
CAMEROON CMR -0.50 0.24 5 -0.48 0.28 6 -0.73 0.26 6 -0.91 0.34 4
CANADA CAN 1.06 0.20 9 1.33 0.23 10 1.14 0.24 7 0.90 0.27 6
CAPE VERDE CPV 0.81 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
CAYMAN ISLANDS CYM 0.81 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF -1.87 0.39 2 -0.34 0.62 1 0.04 0.60 1 -0.28 0.65 1
CHAD TCD -1.78 0.39 2 -0.80 0.62 1 -1.36 0.50 2 -0.69 0.65 1
CHILE CHL 1.04 0.19 10 0.86 0.23 10 0.62 0.25 6 0.72 0.27 6
CHINA CHN 0.22 0.20 9 0.27 0.23 9 0.29 0.25 6 0.23 0.27 6
COLOMBIA COL -1.78 0.20 9 -1.64 0.23 10 -1.50 0.24 7 -0.97 0.27 6
COMOROS COM -0.19 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
CONGO COG -1.64 0.31 4 -1.84 0.44 3 -1.95 0.34 3 -0.66 0.53 2
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -2.42 0.26 5 -2.83 0.34 4 -2.79 0.31 3 -1.53 0.38 3
COSTA RICA CRI 1.06 0.21 8 1.21 0.26 7 0.97 0.26 6 0.79 0.31 5
CROATIA HRV 0.56 0.23 6 0.37 0.28 6 0.61 0.28 4 0.38 0.36 3
CUBA CUB 0.22 0.22 6 -0.03 0.27 5 0.16 0.28 4 0.11 0.34 4
CYPRUS CYP 0.36 0.22 6 0.53 0.29 4 0.49 0.28 4 0.50 0.34 4
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 1.02 0.21 8 0.85 0.23 9 0.95 0.24 7 0.95 0.27 6
DENMARK DNK 1.26 0.20 9 1.44 0.23 9 1.39 0.25 6 1.14 0.27 6
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.69 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
DOMINICA DMA 0.56 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM 0.18 0.23 6 0.17 0.27 7 -0.01 0.32 3 -0.08 0.43 3
ECUADOR ECU -0.70 0.21 8 -1.03 0.25 8 -0.59 0.25 6 -0.66 0.29 5
EGYPT EGY -0.35 0.21 7 0.05 0.24 8 -0.11 0.25 7 -0.25 0.27 6
EL SALVADOR SLV 0.35 0.25 6 0.59 0.31 6 0.13 0.30 4 -0.07 0.37 4
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ 0.31 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ERITREA ERI -0.25 0.34 3 0.16 0.51 2 0.98 0.60 1 0.14 0.65 1
ESTONIA EST 0.98 0.21 8 0.79 0.24 9 0.84 0.27 5 0.74 0.36 3
ETHIOPIA ETH -1.20 0.31 4 -0.80 0.43 4 0.18 0.36 3 -0.59 0.53 2
FIJI FJI 0.18 0.34 3 0.64 0.51 2 0.37 0.50 2 0.55 0.65 1
FINLAND FIN 1.63 0.21 8 1.72 0.23 9 1.60 0.25 6 1.32 0.27 6
FRANCE FRA 0.73 0.20 9 1.16 0.23 10 0.79 0.24 7 1.00 0.27 6
FRENCH GUIANA GUF 0.31 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..  
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TABLE C2: Political Stability (cont.)
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
GABON GAB 0.20 0.24 5 -0.42 0.27 5 -0.47 0.32 3 -0.25 0.43 3
GAMBIA GMB 0.55 0.31 4 0.71 0.51 2 0.65 0.37 2 0.13 0.53 2
GEORGIA GEO -1.90 0.28 4 -0.85 0.35 5 -0.75 0.38 3 -0.82 0.41 2
GERMANY DEU 1.06 0.20 9 1.27 0.23 10 1.42 0.24 7 1.19 0.27 6
GHANA GHA -0.11 0.22 6 -0.10 0.28 6 -0.07 0.26 6 -0.06 0.34 4
GREECE GRC 0.83 0.21 8 0.86 0.24 7 0.32 0.25 6 0.38 0.27 6
GRENADA GRD 0.56 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GUATEMALA GTM -0.43 0.23 7 -0.94 0.31 6 -0.89 0.30 4 -0.91 0.37 4
GUINEA GIN -1.78 0.35 3 -1.18 0.51 2 -0.99 0.34 3 -1.48 0.53 2
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -0.47 0.31 4 -1.05 0.44 3 -0.97 0.34 3 -0.66 0.53 2
GUYANA GUY -0.49 0.35 3 -0.47 0.44 3 -0.13 0.37 2 -0.02 0.53 2
HAITI HTI -1.34 0.29 5 -0.71 0.43 4 -1.52 0.37 2 -0.04 0.53 2
HONDURAS HND -0.14 0.23 7 0.38 0.31 6 -0.26 0.30 4 -0.38 0.37 4
HONG KONG HKG 1.03 0.22 6 1.16 0.27 6 0.98 0.27 5 0.28 0.33 4
HUNGARY HUN 1.08 0.20 9 0.80 0.23 10 1.27 0.24 7 0.67 0.27 6
ICELAND ISL 1.55 0.30 5 1.71 0.36 5 1.37 0.34 3 1.04 0.43 3
INDIA IND -0.84 0.20 9 -0.35 0.23 9 -0.34 0.24 7 -0.55 0.27 6
INDONESIA IDN -1.37 0.20 9 -1.85 0.23 9 -1.52 0.25 6 -0.34 0.27 6
IRAN IRN -0.62 0.21 7 -0.17 0.25 6 -0.14 0.26 5 -0.25 0.29 5
IRAQ IRQ -1.75 0.24 5 -1.90 0.27 5 -2.49 0.28 4 -2.72 0.34 4
IRELAND IRL 1.31 0.20 9 1.38 0.23 9 1.52 0.24 7 1.10 0.27 6
ISRAEL ISR -1.35 0.21 8 -0.47 0.24 7 -0.38 0.27 5 -0.36 0.27 6
ITALY ITA 0.81 0.21 8 0.81 0.23 10 1.18 0.24 7 0.68 0.27 6
IVORY COAST CIV -2.04 0.22 6 -0.88 0.29 5 -0.08 0.26 6 0.44 0.34 4
JAMAICA JAM -0.09 0.26 5 0.44 0.33 4 -0.16 0.30 4 0.52 0.43 3
JAPAN JPN 1.20 0.20 9 1.22 0.23 9 1.16 0.27 5 1.04 0.27 6
JORDAN JOR -0.44 0.23 6 0.25 0.27 6 0.05 0.26 6 0.36 0.31 5
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ 0.52 0.21 7 0.32 0.25 8 0.26 0.25 6 -0.03 0.31 4
KENYA KEN -0.86 0.22 6 -1.00 0.27 6 -1.07 0.26 6 -0.23 0.34 4
KOREA, NORTH PRK 0.80 0.31 4 -0.27 0.44 3 -0.41 0.37 2 -0.60 0.53 2
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.49 0.20 9 0.50 0.23 9 0.22 0.24 7 0.19 0.27 6
KUWAIT KWT 0.14 0.22 6 0.73 0.29 4 0.73 0.28 4 0.15 0.34 4
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -1.21 0.28 4 -0.03 0.39 3 0.73 0.38 3 0.67 0.41 2
LAOS LAO -0.12 0.39 2 0.40 0.51 2 0.98 0.60 1 0.96 0.65 1
LATVIA LVA 0.82 0.23 6 0.60 0.28 6 0.51 0.27 5 0.67 0.36 3
LEBANON LBN -0.59 0.24 5 -0.50 0.27 5 -0.31 0.28 4 -0.31 0.34 4
LESOTHO LSO -0.06 0.31 3 1.07 0.62 1 0.54 0.54 2 0.96 0.65 1
LIBERIA LBR -2.28 0.31 4 -1.36 0.44 3 -1.28 0.37 2 -2.10 0.53 2
LIBYA LBY -0.43 0.24 5 -0.49 0.29 4 -1.21 0.28 4 -1.55 0.34 4
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.31 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
LITHUANIA LTU 0.93 0.22 7 0.43 0.26 8 0.38 0.27 5 0.57 0.36 3
LUXEMBOURG LUX 1.54 0.32 4 1.64 0.39 4 1.50 0.34 3 1.23 0.43 3
MACAO MAC 0.56 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MACEDONIA MKD -0.93 0.25 4 -1.00 0.37 3 -0.31 0.39 3 -0.18 0.49 2
MADAGASCAR MDG 0.30 0.35 3 0.00 0.43 4 -0.48 0.34 3 0.16 0.53 2
MALAWI MWI 0.31 0.27 4 0.05 0.32 5 0.09 0.29 5 0.00 0.43 3
MALAYSIA MYS 0.51 0.20 9 0.33 0.23 10 0.55 0.24 7 0.92 0.27 6
MALDIVES MDV 1.31 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MALI MLI -0.10 0.31 4 0.45 0.44 3 0.09 0.34 3 0.32 0.53 2
MALTA MLT 1.50 0.37 2 1.11 0.66 1 1.40 0.43 1 0.78 0.67 1
MARTINIQUE MTQ 0.56 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MAURITANIA MRT 0.43 0.39 2 -0.45 0.51 2 0.51 0.60 1 0.55 0.65 1
MAURITIUS MUS 0.99 0.27 4 1.14 0.33 4 1.30 0.37 4 1.19 0.49 2
MEXICO MEX 0.22 0.19 10 -0.08 0.23 10 -0.53 0.24 7 -0.27 0.27 6
MOLDOVA MDA -0.12 0.24 5 -0.13 0.27 6 0.02 0.27 5 -0.25 0.36 3
MONGOLIA MNG 0.95 0.31 4 0.84 0.44 3 0.50 0.37 2 0.68 0.53 2
MOROCCO MAR -0.14 0.22 7 0.13 0.29 4 0.13 0.26 6 -0.36 0.29 5
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ 0.55 0.31 4 -0.27 0.44 3 -0.71 0.33 4 -0.22 0.53 2
MYANMAR MMR -1.38 0.22 6 -1.41 0.27 5 -1.05 0.28 4 -0.92 0.34 4
NAMIBIA NAM 0.46 0.22 7 -0.72 0.32 5 0.77 0.31 4 0.87 0.43 3
NEPAL NPL -1.63 0.34 3 -1.02 0.51 2 -0.43 0.60 1 0.14 0.65 1
NETHERLANDS NLD 1.37 0.21 8 1.59 0.23 9 1.57 0.25 6 1.39 0.27 6  
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TABLE C2: Political Stability (cont.)
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
NEW ZEALAND NZL 1.35 0.22 7 1.30 0.24 7 1.50 0.27 5 1.19 0.31 5
NICARAGUA NIC 0.15 0.23 7 0.16 0.31 6 -0.15 0.30 4 -0.57 0.37 4
NIGER NER -0.30 0.35 3 -0.14 0.44 3 -0.40 0.37 2 -0.03 0.53 2
NIGERIA NGA -1.49 0.22 7 -1.53 0.26 8 -1.10 0.26 6 -1.40 0.29 5
NORWAY NOR 1.49 0.21 8 1.42 0.23 8 1.51 0.25 6 1.33 0.27 6
OMAN OMN 0.98 0.22 6 1.01 0.27 5 0.93 0.28 4 0.75 0.34 4
PAKISTAN PAK -1.26 0.22 6 -0.56 0.26 7 -0.80 0.25 6 -1.01 0.29 5
PANAMA PAN 0.36 0.21 8 0.61 0.26 7 0.28 0.28 4 0.40 0.34 4
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -0.76 0.22 6 -0.56 0.27 5 -0.60 0.32 3 -1.24 0.43 3
PARAGUAY PRY -1.33 0.23 7 -0.87 0.33 5 -0.36 0.30 4 0.10 0.43 3
PERU PER -0.67 0.20 9 -0.45 0.24 9 -0.50 0.24 7 -0.72 0.27 6
PHILIPPINES PHL -0.49 0.20 9 -0.32 0.23 10 0.09 0.25 6 -0.05 0.27 6
POLAND POL 0.71 0.20 9 0.83 0.23 10 0.85 0.24 7 0.53 0.27 6
PORTUGAL PRT 1.43 0.21 8 1.44 0.23 8 1.41 0.24 7 1.22 0.27 6
PUERTO RICO PRI 0.64 0.33 2 0.90 0.46 1 0.83 0.50 1 0.74 0.47 1
QATAR QAT 0.82 0.24 4 1.46 0.29 4 1.45 0.30 3 0.84 0.37 3
ROMANIA ROM 0.42 0.22 7 0.01 0.26 8 0.20 0.28 4 0.54 0.34 4
RUSSIA RUS -0.40 0.20 9 -0.53 0.23 10 -0.49 0.24 7 -0.76 0.27 6
RWANDA RWA -1.35 0.34 3 -1.56 0.51 2 -1.84 0.60 1 -0.28 0.65 1
SAMOA SAM 0.81 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP 0.56 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
SAUDI ARABIA SAU 0.05 0.21 7 0.51 0.25 6 0.29 0.26 5 -0.24 0.29 5
SENEGAL SEN -0.36 0.25 5 -0.84 0.32 5 -1.11 0.30 4 -0.73 0.43 3
SEYCHELLES SYC 1.06 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
SIERRA LEONE SLE -1.47 0.31 4 -1.34 0.44 3 -1.91 0.37 2 -1.85 0.53 2
SINGAPORE SGP 1.28 0.21 8 1.53 0.23 9 1.40 0.24 7 1.29 0.27 6
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 1.01 0.22 7 0.69 0.25 8 0.87 0.26 6 0.44 0.31 5
SLOVENIA SVN 1.21 0.21 8 1.01 0.24 8 1.07 0.28 4 0.96 0.36 3
SOMALIA SOM -1.95 0.31 4 -1.12 0.44 3 -1.88 0.37 2 -1.92 0.53 2
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF -0.09 0.20 9 -0.11 0.23 10 -0.71 0.24 8 -0.74 0.27 6
SPAIN ESP 0.82 0.20 9 1.07 0.23 10 0.73 0.24 7 0.60 0.27 6
SRI LANKA LKA -0.90 0.22 7 -1.80 0.27 6 -1.77 0.28 4 -1.51 0.34 4
SUDAN SDN -1.94 0.22 6 -2.38 0.27 5 -2.03 0.32 3 -2.61 0.43 3
SURINAME SUR 0.45 0.37 2 0.11 0.66 1 -0.20 0.43 1 -0.06 0.67 1
SWAZILAND SWZ 0.24 0.31 3 0.60 0.62 1 -0.57 0.54 2 -0.28 0.65 1
SWEDEN SWE 1.43 0.20 9 1.49 0.23 10 1.50 0.25 6 1.28 0.27 6
SWITZERLAND CHE 1.61 0.21 8 1.73 0.23 9 1.77 0.24 7 1.45 0.27 6
SYRIA SYR -0.14 0.22 6 -0.40 0.27 5 -0.08 0.28 4 -0.48 0.34 4
TAIWAN TWN 0.71 0.20 9 0.71 0.23 9 0.97 0.25 6 0.87 0.27 6
TAJIKISTAN TJK -1.19 0.28 4 -1.63 0.36 3 -1.84 0.42 2 -2.84 0.41 2
TANZANIA TZA -0.25 0.22 6 -0.33 0.27 6 0.55 0.26 6 0.12 0.34 4
THAILAND THA 0.55 0.20 9 0.28 0.23 9 0.32 0.24 7 0.21 0.27 6
TIMOR, EAST TMP -0.94 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TOGO TGO 0.01 0.35 3 -0.63 0.51 2 -0.89 0.34 3 -0.65 0.53 2
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO 0.03 0.26 5 0.35 0.33 5 0.56 0.32 3 0.54 0.43 3
TUNISIA TUN 0.24 0.22 7 0.86 0.27 6 0.61 0.27 5 0.28 0.34 4
TURKEY TUR -0.61 0.20 9 -0.99 0.23 10 -1.06 0.24 7 -1.03 0.27 6
TURKMENISTAN TKM -0.14 0.31 3 0.13 0.40 2 0.21 0.42 2 0.34 0.41 2
UGANDA UGA -1.46 0.22 6 -1.35 0.27 6 -0.92 0.26 6 -1.11 0.34 4
UKRAINE UKR 0.14 0.20 8 -0.51 0.25 8 -0.13 0.24 7 -0.25 0.28 5
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE 0.95 0.24 5 1.20 0.29 4 0.87 0.28 4 0.83 0.34 4
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 0.81 0.20 9 1.17 0.23 10 0.97 0.24 7 0.97 0.27 6
UNITED STATES USA 0.34 0.21 8 1.26 0.23 9 1.13 0.24 7 0.92 0.27 6
URUGUAY URY 0.91 0.22 7 1.09 0.27 7 0.47 0.28 4 0.69 0.34 4
UZBEKISTAN UZB -0.94 0.23 5 -1.14 0.29 5 -0.31 0.32 4 -0.01 0.36 3
VENEZUELA VEN -1.20 0.19 10 -0.48 0.23 8 -0.37 0.24 7 -0.39 0.27 6
VIETNAM VNM 0.49 0.20 8 0.43 0.25 7 0.61 0.25 6 0.38 0.27 6
WEST BANK WBG -1.69 0.43 1 -0.44 0.89 1 0.16 0.66 1 .. .. ..
YEMEN YEM -1.36 0.25 5 -1.19 0.32 4 -1.53 0.32 3 -1.04 0.43 3
YUGOSLAVIA YUG -0.90 0.24 5 -1.03 0.35 3 -1.64 0.32 3 -1.21 0.43 3
ZAMBIA ZMB -0.02 0.22 6 -0.48 0.27 6 -0.04 0.26 6 -0.39 0.34 4
ZIMBABWE ZWE -1.62 0.23 6 -1.18 0.28 6 -0.39 0.26 6 -0.03 0.31 5  
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TABLE C3: Government Effectiveness
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -1.39 0.25 3 -1.30 0.43 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
ALBANIA ALB -0.47 0.17 6 -0.74 0.22 6 -0.55 0.24 5 -0.37 0.21 4
ALGERIA DZA -0.59 0.17 6 -0.75 0.21 5 -0.95 0.26 4 -0.70 0.24 4
ANDORRA ADO 1.36 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ANGOLA AGO -1.16 0.17 6 -1.58 0.21 5 -1.63 0.21 6 -1.05 0.24 4
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ATG 0.56 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ARGENTINA ARG -0.49 0.15 10 0.30 0.17 11 0.47 0.21 7 0.27 0.20 8
ARMENIA ARM -0.42 0.17 6 -0.87 0.24 6 -0.47 0.24 5 -0.34 0.22 3
AUSTRALIA AUS 1.84 0.16 8 1.83 0.19 7 1.83 0.25 6 1.58 0.22 6
AUSTRIA AUT 1.79 0.16 7 1.75 0.20 7 1.55 0.23 7 1.55 0.22 6
AZERBAIJAN AZE -0.96 0.14 8 -0.89 0.19 7 -0.71 0.21 6 -0.94 0.19 4
BAHAMAS BHS 1.40 0.30 2 1.23 0.53 1 0.64 0.79 1 0.54 0.57 1
BAHRAIN BHR 0.78 0.18 5 0.76 0.24 4 0.40 0.31 3 0.31 0.28 3
BANGLADESH BGD -0.53 0.16 7 -0.45 0.21 6 -0.35 0.26 4 -0.57 0.24 4
BARBADOS BRB 1.36 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BELARUS BLR -1.03 0.17 7 -0.97 0.22 7 -0.86 0.24 5 -1.05 0.22 3
BELGIUM BEL 1.85 0.16 7 1.51 0.20 7 1.17 0.25 6 1.44 0.22 6
BELIZE BLZ -0.06 0.29 2 -0.31 0.39 2 -0.44 0.40 1 -0.56 0.41 1
BENIN BEN -0.62 0.26 3 -0.06 0.35 2 -0.18 0.35 2 -0.13 0.41 1
BERMUDA BMU 1.09 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BHUTAN BTN 0.93 0.29 2 0.96 0.42 1 0.27 0.40 1 0.19 0.41 1
BOLIVIA BOL -0.53 0.17 7 -0.35 0.20 7 -0.09 0.22 6 -0.49 0.24 5
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.90 0.17 6 -0.54 0.30 4 -0.85 0.30 2 .. .. ..
BOTSWANA BWA 0.87 0.16 8 1.02 0.21 6 0.54 0.22 5 0.26 0.24 4
BRAZIL BRA -0.22 0.15 10 -0.19 0.17 10 -0.16 0.20 8 -0.19 0.20 8
BRUNEI BRN 0.96 0.30 2 1.05 0.53 1 0.13 0.79 1 1.01 0.57 1
BULGARIA BGR -0.06 0.14 9 -0.13 0.18 9 -0.97 0.21 6 -0.44 0.18 5
BURKINA FASO BFA -0.69 0.26 3 -0.09 0.30 3 -0.09 0.26 4 -0.75 0.35 2
BURUNDI BDI -1.46 0.29 2 -1.20 0.29 3 -1.04 0.40 1 -0.82 0.41 1
CAMBODIA KHM -0.56 0.29 2 -0.27 0.39 2 -1.04 0.40 1 -0.69 0.41 1
CAMEROON CMR -0.62 0.18 5 -0.46 0.22 6 -0.60 0.21 6 -0.94 0.24 4
CANADA CAN 1.88 0.16 8 1.98 0.19 9 2.15 0.23 7 1.55 0.22 6
CAPE VERDE CPV -0.20 0.29 2 0.18 0.42 1 0.27 0.40 1 -0.07 0.41 1
CAYMAN ISLANDS CYM 1.89 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF -1.43 0.29 2 -0.99 0.42 1 -0.92 0.33 2 -0.81 0.41 1
CHAD TCD -0.75 0.29 2 -0.21 0.42 1 -0.33 0.35 2 -0.69 0.41 1
CHILE CHL 1.19 0.15 10 1.35 0.17 11 1.40 0.21 7 0.95 0.20 8
CHINA CHN 0.18 0.15 9 0.24 0.17 10 0.18 0.21 7 0.11 0.20 7
COLOMBIA COL -0.39 0.16 9 -0.32 0.17 11 0.10 0.20 8 0.02 0.20 8
COMOROS COM -0.84 0.29 2 -0.99 0.42 1 -1.15 0.40 1 -0.69 0.41 1
CONGO COG -1.25 0.24 4 -1.62 0.30 3 -0.89 0.29 4 -1.17 0.35 2
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -1.60 0.22 5 -1.63 0.26 4 -2.07 0.33 3 -1.78 0.30 3
COSTA RICA CRI 0.37 0.16 8 0.77 0.19 7 0.47 0.24 5 0.02 0.22 6
CROATIA HRV 0.19 0.14 8 0.16 0.20 7 0.29 0.22 5 -0.22 0.19 4
CUBA CUB -0.26 0.18 5 -0.18 0.24 4 -0.48 0.31 3 -0.41 0.28 3
CYPRUS CYP 1.00 0.18 5 1.08 0.26 3 1.34 0.31 3 1.05 0.28 3
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 0.70 0.14 10 0.71 0.17 11 0.72 0.19 9 0.60 0.16 8
DENMARK DNK 1.99 0.16 8 1.87 0.19 8 2.13 0.25 6 1.65 0.22 6
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.88 0.29 2 -0.86 0.42 1 -0.94 0.40 1 -1.26 0.41 1
DOMINICA DMA 0.32 0.29 2 -0.86 0.42 1 -0.84 0.40 1 -0.75 0.41 1
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM -0.41 0.17 6 -0.09 0.20 7 -0.78 0.28 3 -0.31 0.26 3
ECUADOR ECU -0.96 0.16 8 -1.06 0.18 9 -0.74 0.23 6 -0.66 0.22 6
EGYPT EGY -0.32 0.16 8 0.35 0.18 9 0.01 0.20 7 -0.36 0.21 6
EL SALVADOR SLV -0.53 0.18 6 -0.09 0.21 6 -0.03 0.28 3 -0.41 0.24 5
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ -1.37 0.29 2 -1.90 0.42 1 -1.55 0.40 1 -1.44 0.41 1
ERITREA ERI -0.44 0.26 3 -0.21 0.42 1 0.47 0.40 1 -0.32 0.41 1
ESTONIA EST 0.78 0.14 10 1.02 0.17 10 0.42 0.21 6 0.45 0.19 4
ETHIOPIA ETH -0.89 0.24 4 -0.87 0.29 4 0.01 0.26 4 -0.46 0.35 2
FIJI FJI 0.06 0.26 3 -0.28 0.35 2 0.07 0.35 2 -0.13 0.41 1
FINLAND FIN 2.01 0.16 7 1.93 0.19 8 2.02 0.25 6 1.52 0.22 6
FRANCE FRA 1.67 0.16 8 1.45 0.19 8 1.64 0.23 7 1.41 0.22 6
FRENCH GUIANA GUF 0.82 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GABON GAB -0.45 0.18 5 -0.53 0.21 5 -0.85 0.28 3 -0.82 0.26 3
GAMBIA GMB -0.81 0.24 4 0.25 0.35 2 -0.14 0.39 2 -0.13 0.35 2
GEORGIA GEO -0.77 0.17 6 -0.65 0.23 6 -0.36 0.25 4 -0.40 0.22 3  
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TABLE C3: Government Effectiveness (cont.)
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
GERMANY DEU 1.76 0.16 8 1.93 0.19 8 1.78 0.23 7 1.55 0.22 6
GHANA GHA 0.01 0.17 7 0.08 0.22 6 -0.13 0.20 7 -0.15 0.24 4
GREECE GRC 0.79 0.16 7 0.79 0.20 7 0.77 0.25 6 0.57 0.22 6
GRENADA GRD 0.38 0.29 2 0.05 0.42 1 -0.14 0.40 1 -0.63 0.41 1
GUATEMALA GTM -0.61 0.17 7 -0.47 0.20 7 -0.14 0.28 3 -0.56 0.24 5
GUINEA GIN -0.78 0.26 3 0.08 0.35 2 -0.34 0.34 3 -1.07 0.35 2
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -1.35 0.24 4 -1.49 0.30 3 -0.35 0.34 3 -0.82 0.35 2
GUYANA GUY -0.32 0.26 3 -0.13 0.30 3 -0.11 0.39 2 -0.30 0.35 2
HAITI HTI -1.56 0.22 5 -1.45 0.29 4 -1.08 0.39 2 -1.32 0.35 2
HONDURAS HND -0.73 0.17 7 -0.42 0.21 6 -0.33 0.28 3 -0.88 0.24 5
HONG KONG HKG 1.44 0.17 6 1.29 0.21 7 1.61 0.24 6 1.44 0.24 5
HUNGARY HUN 0.78 0.13 11 0.83 0.16 12 0.78 0.19 9 0.45 0.16 8
ICELAND ISL 1.98 0.24 4 2.22 0.33 4 1.86 0.41 3 1.19 0.37 3
INDIA IND -0.13 0.15 9 -0.05 0.17 10 -0.13 0.20 8 -0.16 0.20 7
INDONESIA IDN -0.56 0.15 9 -0.49 0.17 10 -0.58 0.21 7 0.08 0.20 7
IRAN IRN -0.46 0.16 7 -0.16 0.22 5 -0.32 0.28 4 -0.31 0.25 4
IRAQ IRQ -1.64 0.19 4 -1.50 0.24 4 -2.14 0.31 3 -1.23 0.28 3
IRELAND IRL 1.62 0.16 8 2.07 0.19 8 1.72 0.23 7 1.45 0.22 6
ISRAEL ISR 1.02 0.17 7 1.04 0.20 7 0.92 0.26 5 1.05 0.22 6
ITALY ITA 0.91 0.16 7 0.82 0.18 10 1.05 0.23 7 0.68 0.22 6
IVORY COAST CIV -0.89 0.17 6 -0.85 0.22 5 -0.11 0.21 6 -0.18 0.24 4
JAMAICA JAM -0.07 0.18 5 -0.22 0.23 4 -0.57 0.26 4 -0.43 0.26 3
JAPAN JPN 1.07 0.16 8 1.11 0.19 9 1.13 0.31 5 1.09 0.22 6
JORDAN JOR 0.36 0.17 6 0.43 0.20 6 0.63 0.22 6 0.09 0.22 5
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ -0.80 0.14 9 -0.53 0.18 9 -0.69 0.20 7 -0.78 0.18 5
KENYA KEN -0.85 0.17 6 -0.71 0.20 7 -0.88 0.20 7 -0.50 0.24 4
KIRIBATI KIR 0.06 0.48 1 -0.08 0.42 1 -0.44 0.40 1 -0.32 0.41 1
KOREA, NORTH PRK -1.78 0.27 3 -1.10 0.40 2 -0.12 0.79 1 -1.16 0.57 1
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.84 0.15 9 0.62 0.17 10 0.48 0.20 8 0.48 0.22 6
KUWAIT KWT 0.16 0.17 6 0.22 0.26 3 -0.01 0.31 3 0.20 0.28 3
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -0.81 0.17 6 -0.69 0.26 4 -0.30 0.25 4 -0.44 0.22 3
LAOS LAO -0.80 0.29 2 -0.67 0.35 2 -0.34 0.40 1 -0.13 0.41 1
LATVIA LVA 0.67 0.14 8 0.35 0.19 7 0.18 0.21 6 -0.02 0.19 4
LEBANON LBN -0.41 0.17 6 -0.21 0.21 5 0.28 0.26 4 -0.19 0.24 4
LESOTHO LSO -0.26 0.24 4 0.05 0.42 1 -0.21 0.27 3 0.19 0.41 1
LIBERIA LBR -1.51 0.27 3 -1.41 0.30 3 -1.82 0.39 2 -1.88 0.35 2
LIBYA LBY -0.87 0.19 4 -1.18 0.26 3 -1.49 0.31 3 -0.88 0.28 3
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.63 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
LITHUANIA LTU 0.61 0.14 9 0.38 0.17 10 0.17 0.21 6 0.05 0.19 4
LUXEMBOURG LUX 2.13 0.27 3 2.13 0.41 3 2.11 0.41 3 1.90 0.37 3
MACAO MAC 0.82 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MACEDONIA MKD -0.39 0.15 6 -0.49 0.24 4 -0.40 0.23 4 -0.22 0.20 3
MADAGASCAR MDG -0.38 0.26 3 -0.30 0.29 4 -0.44 0.29 4 -0.76 0.35 2
MALAWI MWI -0.68 0.19 5 -0.67 0.23 5 -0.56 0.21 6 -0.69 0.26 3
MALAYSIA MYS 0.92 0.15 9 0.68 0.18 10 0.77 0.20 8 0.81 0.20 7
MALDIVES MDV 0.78 0.29 2 0.70 0.42 1 0.67 0.40 1 0.00 0.41 1
MALI MLI -0.84 0.23 5 -1.06 0.30 3 -0.06 0.34 3 -0.76 0.35 2
MALTA MLT 1.16 0.30 2 0.88 0.53 1 0.89 0.79 1 1.01 0.57 1
MARSHALL ISLANDS MHL -0.41 0.48 1 -0.47 0.42 1 -0.64 0.40 1 .. .. ..
MARTINIQUE MTQ 0.82 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MAURITANIA MRT -0.16 0.29 2 -0.36 0.35 2 -0.24 0.40 1 0.00 0.41 1
MAURITIUS MUS 0.53 0.19 4 0.86 0.23 4 0.34 0.23 4 0.52 0.28 2
MEXICO MEX 0.15 0.15 10 0.38 0.17 11 0.27 0.20 8 -0.22 0.20 8
MICRONESIA FSM -0.29 0.48 1 -0.34 0.42 1 -0.54 0.40 1 .. .. ..
MOLDOVA MDA -0.63 0.15 7 -1.06 0.19 7 -0.51 0.21 6 -0.49 0.19 4
MONGOLIA MNG -0.18 0.24 4 0.11 0.30 3 0.02 0.29 3 -0.27 0.35 2
MOROCCO MAR 0.07 0.16 7 0.08 0.22 4 0.29 0.20 7 -0.10 0.22 5
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ -0.41 0.24 4 -0.26 0.30 3 -0.18 0.24 5 -0.60 0.35 2
MYANMAR MMR -1.29 0.18 5 -1.31 0.24 4 -1.64 0.31 3 -0.91 0.28 3
NAMIBIA NAM 0.18 0.16 8 0.61 0.23 5 0.22 0.22 5 0.32 0.26 3
NEPAL NPL -0.51 0.26 3 -0.72 0.35 2 -0.94 0.40 1 -0.32 0.41 1
NETHERLANDS NLD 2.14 0.16 7 2.11 0.19 8 2.52 0.25 6 1.88 0.22 6
NEW ZEALAND NZL 1.97 0.17 6 1.48 0.21 6 1.96 0.26 5 1.88 0.24 5
NICARAGUA NIC -0.87 0.17 7 -0.74 0.21 6 -0.57 0.28 3 -0.47 0.24 5
NIGER NER -0.79 0.26 3 -1.02 0.30 3 -0.84 0.39 2 -0.86 0.35 2  
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TABLE C3: Government Effectiveness (cont.)
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
NIGERIA NGA -1.12 0.16 8 -1.09 0.19 8 -1.39 0.20 7 -1.05 0.22 5
NORWAY NOR 1.84 0.16 7 1.58 0.20 7 2.07 0.25 6 1.77 0.22 6
OMAN OMN 0.69 0.17 6 1.01 0.24 4 1.20 0.31 3 0.60 0.28 3
PAKISTAN PAK -0.50 0.17 6 -0.48 0.20 7 -0.69 0.22 6 -0.39 0.22 5
PANAMA PAN -0.14 0.16 8 -0.03 0.19 7 0.00 0.26 4 -0.56 0.24 5
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -0.78 0.17 6 -0.75 0.21 5 -0.62 0.28 3 -0.38 0.26 3
PARAGUAY PRY -1.29 0.17 7 -1.22 0.23 5 -1.08 0.26 4 -0.67 0.26 4
PERU PER -0.47 0.16 9 -0.29 0.18 10 0.27 0.21 7 -0.24 0.21 7
PHILIPPINES PHL -0.06 0.15 9 0.10 0.18 10 0.22 0.21 7 0.09 0.20 7
POLAND POL 0.61 0.13 11 0.39 0.16 12 0.86 0.19 9 0.47 0.16 8
PORTUGAL PRT 1.03 0.16 7 1.08 0.20 7 1.49 0.23 7 0.87 0.22 6
PUERTO RICO PRI 1.17 0.28 2 1.61 0.43 1 1.60 0.53 1 1.25 0.49 1
QATAR QAT 0.69 0.18 5 0.98 0.24 4 0.69 0.31 3 0.53 0.28 3
ROMANIA ROM -0.33 0.14 9 -0.58 0.17 10 -0.63 0.22 5 -0.53 0.18 5
RUSSIA RUS -0.40 0.13 11 -0.61 0.16 12 -0.59 0.19 9 -0.48 0.16 8
RWANDA RWA -0.82 0.26 3 -0.21 0.42 1 -0.84 0.40 1 -1.00 0.41 1
SAMOA SAM 0.23 0.29 2 -0.08 0.42 1 -0.14 0.40 1 -0.32 0.41 1
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP -0.64 0.29 2 -0.86 0.42 1 -0.94 0.40 1 -0.57 0.41 1
SAUDI ARABIA SAU -0.05 0.16 7 0.07 0.22 5 -0.30 0.28 4 -0.15 0.25 4
SENEGAL SEN -0.18 0.18 5 0.24 0.23 5 0.18 0.24 5 -0.41 0.26 3
SEYCHELLES SYC 0.00 0.29 2 -0.99 0.42 1 -0.74 0.40 1 -0.69 0.41 1
SIERRA LEONE SLE -1.54 0.24 4 -1.57 0.30 3 -0.47 0.39 2 -0.28 0.35 2
SINGAPORE SGP 2.26 0.16 7 2.48 0.19 9 2.59 0.23 7 2.04 0.22 6
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 0.40 0.14 9 0.28 0.18 9 0.07 0.20 7 0.18 0.18 6
SLOVENIA SVN 0.82 0.14 10 0.83 0.17 9 0.64 0.22 5 0.43 0.19 4
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB -1.34 0.48 1 -0.73 0.42 1 -0.84 0.40 1 -0.94 0.41 1
SOMALIA SOM -1.97 0.27 3 -2.58 0.30 3 -2.12 0.39 2 -1.88 0.35 2
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0.52 0.15 10 0.37 0.17 11 0.14 0.19 9 0.23 0.20 7
SPAIN ESP 1.53 0.16 8 1.81 0.19 9 2.04 0.23 7 1.27 0.22 6
SRI LANKA LKA 0.03 0.16 7 -0.37 0.20 6 -0.46 0.26 4 -0.30 0.24 4
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS KNA -0.06 0.48 1 0.18 0.42 1 -0.14 0.40 1 -0.19 0.41 1
ST. LUCIA LCA -0.06 0.48 1 0.18 0.42 1 -0.14 0.40 1 0.31 0.41 1
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES VCT -0.06 0.48 1 -0.08 0.42 1 -0.24 0.40 1 0.00 0.41 1
SUDAN SDN -1.11 0.17 6 -1.34 0.21 5 -1.75 0.28 3 -1.34 0.26 3
SURINAME SUR -0.16 0.30 2 0.18 0.53 1 -0.12 0.79 1 -0.41 0.57 1
SWAZILAND SWZ -0.44 0.25 3 -0.47 0.42 1 -0.57 0.27 3 -0.19 0.41 1
SWEDEN SWE 1.84 0.16 8 1.75 0.19 9 1.97 0.25 6 1.60 0.22 6
SWITZERLAND CHE 2.26 0.16 7 2.21 0.19 8 2.47 0.23 7 1.98 0.22 6
SYRIA SYR -0.57 0.18 5 -0.83 0.24 4 -1.36 0.31 3 -0.43 0.28 3
TAIWAN TWN 1.00 0.16 8 1.08 0.19 9 1.68 0.25 6 1.12 0.22 6
TAJIKISTAN TJK -1.23 0.17 6 -1.38 0.24 4 -1.33 0.27 3 -1.30 0.22 3
TANZANIA TZA -0.51 0.17 7 -0.32 0.21 6 -0.40 0.20 7 -1.04 0.24 4
THAILAND THA 0.28 0.15 9 0.21 0.18 10 0.11 0.20 8 0.31 0.20 7
TIMOR, EAST TMP -0.78 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TOGO TGO -1.17 0.26 3 -1.48 0.35 2 -0.44 0.34 3 -0.72 0.35 2
TONGA TON -0.64 0.48 1 -0.60 0.42 1 -0.54 0.40 1 -0.19 0.41 1
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO 0.47 0.18 5 0.67 0.22 5 0.52 0.28 3 0.00 0.26 3
TUNISIA TUN 0.65 0.16 7 1.32 0.21 6 0.85 0.21 6 0.39 0.24 4
TURKEY TUR -0.20 0.15 10 -0.06 0.17 11 -0.34 0.20 8 -0.06 0.20 7
TURKMENISTAN TKM -1.47 0.18 4 -1.38 0.26 3 -1.47 0.27 3 -1.21 0.22 3
UGANDA UGA -0.41 0.17 7 -0.15 0.21 6 -0.06 0.20 7 -0.33 0.24 4
UKRAINE UKR -0.74 0.13 10 -0.78 0.18 9 -1.00 0.19 8 -0.59 0.17 6
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE 0.83 0.18 5 0.74 0.26 3 0.27 0.31 3 0.50 0.28 3
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 2.03 0.16 8 2.04 0.18 10 2.47 0.23 7 1.68 0.22 6
UNITED STATES USA 1.70 0.16 7 1.83 0.19 9 1.73 0.23 7 1.64 0.22 6
URUGUAY URY 0.51 0.17 7 0.74 0.19 8 0.67 0.26 4 0.46 0.24 5
UZBEKISTAN UZB -1.10 0.15 7 -0.94 0.20 6 -1.28 0.21 5 -0.79 0.19 4
VANUATU VUT -0.64 0.48 1 -0.47 0.42 1 -0.44 0.40 1 -0.25 0.41 1
VENEZUELA VEN -1.14 0.15 10 -0.82 0.18 9 -0.90 0.20 8 -0.69 0.20 8
VIETNAM VNM -0.27 0.16 8 -0.27 0.19 7 -0.23 0.22 6 -0.18 0.21 6
WEST BANK WBG -1.04 0.34 1 0.49 0.70 1 0.01 0.56 1 .. .. ..
YEMEN YEM -0.87 0.18 5 -0.65 0.23 4 -0.41 0.28 3 -0.59 0.26 3
YUGOSLAVIA YUG -0.73 0.15 7 -1.00 0.25 3 -1.02 0.28 3 -0.57 0.32 2
ZAMBIA ZMB -0.93 0.17 7 -0.79 0.21 6 -0.39 0.20 7 -0.81 0.24 4
ZIMBABWE ZWE -0.80 0.17 7 -1.19 0.20 6 -1.11 0.20 7 -0.23 0.22 5  
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TABLE C4: Regulatory Quality
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -1.82 0.29 2 -3.57 0.46 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
ALBANIA ALB -0.37 0.20 7 -0.06 0.29 6 -0.58 0.24 6 0.08 0.31 5
ALGERIA DZA -0.54 0.19 6 -0.80 0.31 4 -1.20 0.33 4 -0.65 0.27 5
ANDORRA ADO 1.44 0.30 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ANGOLA AGO -1.33 0.20 5 -1.96 0.31 4 -1.19 0.26 5 -1.45 0.27 5
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ATG 0.70 0.30 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ARGENTINA ARG -0.84 0.17 8 0.44 0.24 8 0.87 0.21 6 0.66 0.21 7
ARMENIA ARM 0.13 0.20 7 -0.39 0.29 6 -0.47 0.24 6 -0.70 0.33 4
AUSTRALIA AUS 1.64 0.18 7 1.48 0.29 5 1.28 0.23 5 1.15 0.22 6
AUSTRIA AUT 1.67 0.18 7 1.50 0.29 5 1.21 0.23 6 1.27 0.22 6
AZERBAIJAN AZE -0.82 0.18 8 -0.30 0.29 6 -1.10 0.24 6 -1.11 0.26 5
BAHAMAS BHS 1.35 0.25 3 0.93 0.54 2 1.17 0.52 2 0.54 0.49 2
BAHRAIN BHR 0.96 0.19 6 1.00 0.37 3 1.01 0.40 3 0.48 0.29 4
BANGLADESH BGD -1.05 0.18 7 -0.02 0.31 5 -0.08 0.33 4 -0.53 0.27 5
BARBADOS BRB 1.14 0.27 2 0.52 0.64 1 0.84 0.60 1 0.26 0.54 1
BELARUS BLR -1.67 0.20 7 -2.65 0.31 5 -2.01 0.24 6 -0.99 0.33 4
BELGIUM BEL 1.40 0.18 7 0.75 0.28 6 1.07 0.23 5 1.10 0.22 6
BELIZE BLZ 0.13 0.25 3 -0.16 0.41 3 0.17 0.42 2 0.05 0.43 2
BENIN BEN -0.56 0.25 3 0.15 0.41 2 -0.07 0.42 3 0.09 0.43 2
BERMUDA BMU 1.44 0.30 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BHUTAN BTN -0.58 0.27 2 -0.39 0.48 1 -0.18 0.51 1 0.02 0.59 1
BOLIVIA BOL -0.11 0.18 7 0.65 0.29 6 0.90 0.33 5 0.66 0.27 5
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.93 0.22 6 -0.72 0.38 4 -1.30 0.27 3 -1.88 0.60 1
BOTSWANA BWA 0.81 0.18 7 0.93 0.31 5 0.69 0.26 5 0.55 0.27 5
BRAZIL BRA 0.26 0.17 8 0.36 0.24 8 0.29 0.21 7 0.13 0.21 7
BRUNEI BRN 1.05 0.27 2 0.27 0.71 1 -0.06 0.72 1 2.20 0.75 1
BULGARIA BGR 0.62 0.17 9 0.21 0.28 7 0.47 0.24 6 -0.12 0.25 6
BURKINA FASO BFA -0.21 0.23 4 -0.04 0.38 3 -0.23 0.29 4 -0.29 0.40 3
BURUNDI BDI -1.25 0.27 2 -0.77 0.37 3 -1.27 0.42 2 -1.20 0.59 1
CAMBODIA KHM -0.43 0.25 3 0.04 0.41 3 -0.22 0.42 2 -0.30 0.59 1
CAMEROON CMR -0.88 0.19 6 0.12 0.31 5 -0.15 0.26 6 -0.77 0.27 5
CANADA CAN 1.63 0.18 7 1.35 0.29 6 1.17 0.23 6 1.14 0.22 6
CAPE VERDE CPV -0.22 0.25 3 0.10 0.41 2 -0.57 0.42 2 -0.54 0.43 2
CAYMAN ISLANDS CYM 1.44 0.30 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF -0.76 0.25 3 -0.66 0.48 1 -0.57 0.51 1 -0.30 0.59 1
CHAD TCD -1.11 0.25 3 -0.28 0.41 2 -0.67 0.42 3 -0.04 0.59 1
CHILE CHL 1.50 0.17 8 1.35 0.24 8 1.22 0.21 6 1.28 0.21 7
CHINA CHN -0.41 0.17 8 -0.20 0.24 8 -0.07 0.21 6 -0.10 0.21 7
COLOMBIA COL -0.04 0.17 8 0.12 0.24 8 0.51 0.21 7 0.37 0.21 7
COMOROS COM -1.01 0.27 2 -0.79 0.48 1 -0.70 0.51 1 -0.69 0.59 1
CONGO COG -1.00 0.23 4 -1.05 0.38 3 -0.96 0.39 4 -0.67 0.40 3
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -1.77 0.24 4 -2.87 0.31 4 -2.78 0.33 4 -2.13 0.35 4
COSTA RICA CRI 0.74 0.18 7 0.90 0.29 6 1.00 0.33 5 0.54 0.24 6
CROATIA HRV 0.19 0.17 9 0.30 0.29 6 0.34 0.24 5 -0.12 0.26 5
CUBA CUB -1.21 0.20 5 -1.47 0.37 3 -1.06 0.40 3 -0.72 0.29 4
CYPRUS CYP 1.24 0.20 5 1.06 0.37 3 1.13 0.40 3 0.63 0.29 4
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 1.12 0.16 10 0.66 0.24 9 0.78 0.18 8 0.98 0.20 8
DENMARK DNK 1.74 0.18 7 1.38 0.29 5 1.40 0.23 5 1.38 0.22 6
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.76 0.25 3 -0.40 0.41 2 -0.79 0.42 2 -0.05 0.59 1
DOMINICA DMA 0.77 0.27 2 -0.13 0.48 1 -0.57 0.51 1 -0.24 0.59 1
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM -0.17 0.18 7 0.51 0.29 6 0.23 0.39 3 0.07 0.29 4
ECUADOR ECU -0.60 0.18 7 -0.19 0.27 7 0.19 0.33 5 -0.10 0.27 5
EGYPT EGY -0.45 0.18 7 0.10 0.27 7 0.16 0.22 6 -0.18 0.24 6
EL SALVADOR SLV 0.04 0.19 6 1.12 0.34 5 1.42 0.39 3 0.58 0.26 5
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ -1.45 0.25 3 -1.54 0.41 2 -2.11 0.42 2 -0.88 0.59 1
ERITREA ERI -1.17 0.27 2 -0.52 0.48 1 0.08 0.51 1 -0.17 0.59 1
ESTONIA EST 1.35 0.16 10 1.30 0.25 8 1.06 0.24 6 1.18 0.26 5
ETHIOPIA ETH -1.00 0.23 4 -0.85 0.38 4 -0.14 0.29 4 -0.69 0.40 3
FIJI FJI -0.10 0.25 3 -0.80 0.41 2 -0.61 0.42 3 -0.50 0.43 2
FINLAND FIN 1.93 0.18 7 1.77 0.29 5 1.51 0.23 5 1.26 0.22 6
FRANCE FRA 1.25 0.18 7 0.77 0.29 6 0.97 0.23 6 0.98 0.22 6
FRENCH GUIANA GUF 0.95 0.30 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GABON GAB -0.19 0.19 6 -0.13 0.31 4 0.10 0.39 3 -0.50 0.29 4
GAMBIA GMB -0.55 0.23 4 -0.08 0.38 3 -0.34 0.39 3 -1.17 0.52 2
GEORGIA GEO -0.82 0.22 6 -0.55 0.31 5 -0.79 0.25 5 -0.78 0.33 4  
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TABLE C4: Regulatory Quality (cont.)
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
GERMANY DEU 1.59 0.18 7 1.36 0.29 6 1.19 0.23 6 1.29 0.22 6
GHANA GHA -0.29 0.19 6 0.11 0.31 5 0.21 0.26 6 -0.17 0.27 5
GREECE GRC 1.13 0.18 7 0.91 0.27 6 0.83 0.23 5 0.65 0.22 6
GRENADA GRD 0.41 0.27 2 0.27 0.48 1 0.21 0.51 1 -0.17 0.59 1
GUATEMALA GTM -0.09 0.19 6 0.45 0.32 6 0.85 0.39 3 -0.03 0.26 5
GUINEA GIN -0.83 0.23 4 0.03 0.38 3 0.14 0.39 4 -0.04 0.40 3
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -0.86 0.23 4 -1.14 0.38 3 -1.30 0.39 4 -0.10 0.52 2
GUYANA GUY -0.38 0.23 4 -0.04 0.38 3 0.31 0.39 3 0.14 0.40 3
HAITI HTI -0.95 0.22 5 -1.13 0.38 4 -0.99 0.39 3 -1.13 0.40 3
HONDURAS HND -0.37 0.19 6 0.31 0.34 5 0.58 0.39 3 -0.30 0.26 5
HONG KONG HKG 1.50 0.18 7 1.80 0.27 6 1.60 0.23 6 1.75 0.22 6
HUNGARY HUN 1.21 0.16 10 1.09 0.24 9 1.15 0.18 8 0.47 0.20 8
ICELAND ISL 1.55 0.22 5 1.36 0.35 4 0.84 0.25 4 0.41 0.31 3
INDIA IND -0.34 0.17 8 -0.16 0.24 8 -0.08 0.21 7 -0.13 0.21 7
INDONESIA IDN -0.68 0.17 8 -0.43 0.24 8 0.10 0.21 6 0.19 0.21 7
IRAN IRN -1.28 0.19 6 -1.27 0.37 3 -1.56 0.40 3 -1.47 0.29 4
IRAQ IRQ -2.31 0.20 5 -3.36 0.37 3 -3.99 0.40 3 -2.03 0.29 4
IRELAND IRL 1.64 0.18 7 1.67 0.29 5 1.54 0.23 6 1.33 0.22 6
ISRAEL ISR 1.03 0.18 7 0.93 0.27 6 0.73 0.23 5 1.03 0.22 6
ITALY ITA 1.15 0.18 7 0.76 0.27 7 0.81 0.23 6 0.70 0.22 6
IVORY COAST CIV -0.36 0.19 6 -0.18 0.31 5 0.18 0.26 6 -0.19 0.27 5
JAMAICA JAM 0.32 0.19 6 0.40 0.35 4 0.63 0.39 4 0.42 0.29 4
JAPAN JPN 0.97 0.18 7 0.82 0.27 6 0.55 0.23 5 0.68 0.22 6
JORDAN JOR 0.10 0.18 7 0.67 0.29 5 0.59 0.25 6 0.00 0.24 6
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ -0.74 0.18 8 -0.47 0.29 6 -0.35 0.24 6 -0.29 0.28 4
KENYA KEN -0.50 0.19 6 -0.11 0.29 6 -0.18 0.26 6 -0.48 0.27 5
KIRIBATI KIR -1.12 0.53 1 -0.92 0.48 1 -0.96 0.51 1 -0.37 0.59 1
KOREA, NORTH PRK -1.91 0.25 3 -1.66 0.54 2 -1.75 0.52 2 -2.17 0.49 2
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.86 0.17 8 0.46 0.24 7 0.30 0.21 7 0.55 0.22 6
KUWAIT KWT 0.30 0.19 6 -0.13 0.37 3 -0.07 0.40 3 0.09 0.29 4
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -0.46 0.22 6 -0.45 0.31 5 -0.72 0.25 5 -0.19 0.38 3
LAOS LAO -1.24 0.25 3 -1.18 0.41 2 -1.18 0.42 2 -1.07 0.43 2
LATVIA LVA 0.86 0.17 9 0.52 0.28 6 0.72 0.24 6 0.41 0.26 5
LEBANON LBN -0.47 0.18 7 0.28 0.31 4 0.53 0.33 4 0.14 0.27 5
LESOTHO LSO -0.48 0.24 4 -0.17 0.41 2 0.05 0.30 3 -0.67 0.43 2
LIBERIA LBR -1.43 0.27 2 -1.66 0.43 2 -2.35 0.46 2 -2.60 0.52 2
LIBYA LBY -1.59 0.20 5 -1.98 0.37 3 -3.00 0.40 3 -1.77 0.29 4
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.69 0.30 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
LITHUANIA LTU 0.98 0.17 9 0.51 0.26 8 0.21 0.24 6 0.27 0.26 5
LUXEMBOURG LUX 1.83 0.22 4 1.86 0.38 3 1.27 0.25 4 1.26 0.28 4
MACAO MAC 0.70 0.30 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MACEDONIA MKD -0.10 0.19 7 0.13 0.44 2 -0.16 0.29 3 -0.19 0.31 3
MADAGASCAR MDG -0.26 0.23 4 -0.10 0.38 4 -0.46 0.39 4 -0.11 0.40 3
MALAWI MWI -0.36 0.19 5 0.02 0.38 4 0.10 0.29 5 -0.43 0.29 4
MALAYSIA MYS 0.58 0.17 8 0.35 0.25 7 0.57 0.21 7 0.70 0.21 7
MALDIVES MDV 0.80 0.27 2 0.14 0.48 1 0.21 0.51 1 0.15 0.59 1
MALI MLI -0.49 0.23 4 0.10 0.38 3 0.13 0.39 4 0.09 0.40 3
MALTA MLT 1.11 0.25 3 0.44 0.54 2 0.55 0.52 2 0.14 0.49 2
MARSHALL ISLANDS MHL -0.56 0.53 1 -0.52 0.48 1 -0.83 0.51 1 .. .. ..
MARTINIQUE MTQ 0.95 0.30 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MAURITANIA MRT 0.01 0.25 3 -0.18 0.41 2 -0.47 0.42 2 -0.62 0.43 2
MAURITIUS MUS 0.46 0.20 5 0.68 0.37 3 0.45 0.30 4 0.09 0.35 2
MEXICO MEX 0.49 0.17 8 0.66 0.24 8 0.78 0.21 7 0.46 0.21 7
MICRONESIA FSM -0.70 0.53 1 -0.79 0.48 1 -0.70 0.51 1 .. .. ..
MOLDOVA MDA -0.17 0.18 8 -1.09 0.29 6 -0.39 0.24 6 0.01 0.26 5
MONGOLIA MNG -0.18 0.23 4 0.12 0.38 3 0.27 0.39 3 -0.55 0.40 3
MOROCCO MAR 0.02 0.18 7 0.42 0.31 4 0.25 0.26 6 -0.06 0.27 5
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ -0.64 0.23 4 -0.14 0.38 3 -0.29 0.29 5 -0.91 0.40 3
MYANMAR MMR -1.86 0.20 5 -1.37 0.37 3 -1.25 0.40 3 -1.03 0.29 4
NAMIBIA NAM 0.26 0.18 7 0.52 0.38 4 0.40 0.29 4 0.18 0.33 3
NEPAL NPL -0.50 0.25 3 -0.30 0.41 2 -0.34 0.42 2 -0.24 0.43 2
NETHERLANDS NLD 1.87 0.18 7 1.87 0.29 5 1.51 0.23 5 1.50 0.22 6
NEW ZEALAND NZL 1.69 0.18 7 1.42 0.29 5 1.60 0.23 5 1.67 0.22 6
NICARAGUA NIC -0.41 0.19 6 0.31 0.34 5 0.45 0.39 3 -0.24 0.26 5
NIGER NER -0.68 0.23 4 -0.25 0.38 3 -0.47 0.39 3 -0.79 0.40 3  
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TABLE C4: Regulatory Quality (cont.)
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
NIGERIA NGA -1.18 0.18 7 -0.42 0.29 6 -0.48 0.26 6 -0.90 0.27 5
NORWAY NOR 1.52 0.18 7 0.93 0.29 5 1.25 0.23 5 1.29 0.22 6
OMAN OMN 0.62 0.19 6 0.77 0.37 3 0.44 0.40 3 0.48 0.29 4
PAKISTAN PAK -0.77 0.19 6 -0.40 0.29 6 -0.15 0.25 5 -0.56 0.27 5
PANAMA PAN 0.49 0.18 7 0.98 0.29 6 1.23 0.33 4 0.51 0.27 5
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -0.44 0.20 5 -0.57 0.31 4 -0.48 0.39 3 -0.73 0.33 3
PARAGUAY PRY -0.56 0.19 6 -0.78 0.35 4 -0.26 0.39 4 0.45 0.29 4
PERU PER 0.24 0.18 7 0.58 0.27 7 0.89 0.25 6 0.51 0.24 6
PHILIPPINES PHL 0.10 0.17 8 0.35 0.25 7 0.71 0.21 6 0.34 0.21 7
POLAND POL 0.67 0.16 10 0.60 0.24 9 0.83 0.18 8 0.34 0.20 8
PORTUGAL PRT 1.47 0.18 7 1.03 0.29 6 1.19 0.23 6 1.22 0.22 6
PUERTO RICO PRI 1.23 0.29 2 1.18 0.46 1 1.13 0.52 1 0.79 0.56 1
QATAR QAT 0.15 0.19 6 0.51 0.37 3 0.47 0.40 3 0.10 0.33 3
ROMANIA ROM 0.04 0.17 9 -0.27 0.26 8 0.30 0.24 5 -0.43 0.25 6
RUSSIA RUS -0.30 0.16 10 -1.55 0.24 9 -0.37 0.18 8 -0.41 0.20 8
RWANDA RWA -0.94 0.25 3 -0.47 0.41 2 -0.94 0.42 2 -1.01 0.59 1
SAMOA SAM -0.07 0.27 2 0.03 0.41 2 -0.70 0.51 1 -0.24 0.59 1
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP -0.34 0.27 2 -0.39 0.48 1 -0.96 0.51 1 -0.37 0.59 1
SAUDI ARABIA SAU 0.08 0.19 6 -0.10 0.37 3 -0.14 0.40 3 0.01 0.29 4
SENEGAL SEN -0.22 0.19 5 -0.14 0.38 4 -0.26 0.39 4 -0.45 0.29 4
SEYCHELLES SYC -0.23 0.27 2 -1.32 0.48 1 -1.22 0.51 1 -1.07 0.59 1
SIERRA LEONE SLE -1.31 0.24 3 -1.07 0.38 3 -1.41 0.39 3 -0.45 0.40 3
SINGAPORE SGP 1.89 0.18 7 2.27 0.27 7 1.65 0.23 6 1.95 0.22 6
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 0.76 0.16 10 0.36 0.25 8 0.29 0.20 7 0.18 0.23 7
SLOVENIA SVN 0.81 0.16 10 0.64 0.25 8 0.74 0.24 5 0.38 0.26 5
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB -1.26 0.53 1 -0.92 0.48 1 -1.09 0.51 1 -1.14 0.59 1
SOMALIA SOM -2.04 0.27 2 -2.36 0.38 3 -2.52 0.39 3 -2.60 0.52 2
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0.60 0.17 8 0.13 0.24 8 0.33 0.19 8 0.18 0.21 7
SPAIN ESP 1.41 0.18 7 1.36 0.29 6 1.16 0.23 6 0.96 0.22 6
SRI LANKA LKA 0.12 0.18 7 0.46 0.29 5 0.72 0.33 4 0.24 0.27 5
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS KNA 0.14 0.53 1 0.27 0.48 1 0.47 0.51 1 -0.17 0.59 1
ST. LUCIA LCA 0.14 0.53 1 0.27 0.48 1 0.47 0.51 1 -0.17 0.59 1
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES VCT 0.14 0.53 1 0.27 0.48 1 0.34 0.51 1 -0.24 0.59 1
SUDAN SDN -1.17 0.20 5 -0.76 0.31 4 -1.14 0.39 3 -1.51 0.29 4
SURINAME SUR -0.62 0.25 3 -0.96 0.54 2 -0.70 0.52 2 -0.80 0.49 2
SWAZILAND SWZ -0.25 0.24 4 -0.16 0.41 2 0.21 0.30 3 -0.04 0.43 2
SWEDEN SWE 1.70 0.18 7 1.36 0.29 6 1.14 0.23 5 1.22 0.22 6
SWITZERLAND CHE 1.62 0.18 7 1.52 0.29 5 1.18 0.23 6 1.18 0.22 6
SYRIA SYR -0.97 0.20 5 -0.77 0.37 3 -1.13 0.40 3 -0.96 0.29 4
TAIWAN TWN 1.06 0.18 7 0.93 0.27 6 1.11 0.23 5 0.97 0.22 6
TAJIKISTAN TJK -1.29 0.22 6 -1.52 0.31 4 -1.71 0.25 4 -1.70 0.38 3
TANZANIA TZA -0.55 0.19 6 0.06 0.31 5 0.21 0.26 6 -0.51 0.27 5
THAILAND THA 0.34 0.17 8 0.68 0.24 8 0.27 0.21 7 0.38 0.21 7
TIMOR, EAST TMP -1.26 0.30 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TOGO TGO -0.63 0.23 4 -0.59 0.38 3 -0.64 0.39 4 0.15 0.52 2
TONGA TON -0.84 0.53 1 -0.66 0.48 1 -1.09 0.51 1 -0.17 0.59 1
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO 0.66 0.19 6 0.79 0.34 5 0.82 0.39 3 0.33 0.29 4
TUNISIA TUN -0.02 0.18 7 0.65 0.31 5 0.50 0.26 5 -0.01 0.27 5
TURKEY TUR 0.08 0.17 9 0.24 0.24 8 0.86 0.21 7 0.39 0.21 7
TURKMENISTAN TKM -1.95 0.22 5 -2.14 0.31 4 -2.45 0.25 4 -2.40 0.38 3
UGANDA UGA -0.01 0.19 6 0.18 0.31 5 0.42 0.26 6 0.03 0.27 5
UKRAINE UKR -0.62 0.17 9 -1.19 0.28 7 -0.89 0.20 7 -0.57 0.23 6
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE 0.97 0.19 6 0.52 0.37 3 0.43 0.40 3 0.84 0.29 4
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 1.75 0.18 7 1.66 0.27 7 1.60 0.23 6 1.54 0.22 6
UNITED STATES USA 1.51 0.18 7 1.50 0.27 7 1.51 0.23 6 1.31 0.22 6
URUGUAY URY 0.48 0.18 7 1.03 0.27 7 1.02 0.33 4 0.80 0.27 5
UZBEKISTAN UZB -1.44 0.19 7 -1.61 0.31 5 -1.82 0.25 5 -1.31 0.28 4
VANUATU VUT -0.84 0.53 1 -0.26 0.48 1 -0.31 0.51 1 -0.11 0.59 1
VENEZUELA VEN -0.54 0.17 8 -0.54 0.24 8 0.13 0.21 7 -0.12 0.21 7
VIETNAM VNM -0.69 0.18 7 -0.61 0.29 5 -0.58 0.25 5 -0.54 0.24 6
WEST BANK WBG -1.02 0.30 1 0.64 0.96 1 -0.16 0.98 1 .. .. ..
YEMEN YEM -0.60 0.19 5 -0.42 0.38 3 -0.39 0.39 3 -0.68 0.29 4
YUGOSLAVIA YUG -0.60 0.18 8 -0.82 0.71 1 -1.93 0.72 1 -1.09 0.33 3
ZAMBIA ZMB -0.60 0.19 6 0.43 0.31 5 0.32 0.26 6 0.18 0.27 5
ZIMBABWE ZWE -1.61 0.18 7 -1.82 0.29 6 -0.35 0.22 7 -0.81 0.24 6  
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TABLE C5: Rule of Law
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -1.61 0.24 4 -2.31 0.40 2 -1.13 0.72 1 -1.13 0.74 1
ALBANIA ALB -0.92 0.17 8 -0.75 0.17 8 -0.93 0.21 7 -0.30 0.25 5
ALGERIA DZA -0.54 0.14 9 -0.79 0.19 8 -0.79 0.21 7 -0.59 0.18 6
ANDORRA ADO 1.55 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ANGOLA AGO -1.56 0.15 8 -1.37 0.19 8 -1.45 0.21 8 -1.36 0.18 6
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ATG 1.02 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ARGENTINA ARG -0.73 0.13 13 0.18 0.14 14 0.24 0.18 10 0.27 0.15 10
ARMENIA ARM -0.44 0.16 9 -0.51 0.16 9 -0.35 0.19 8 -0.44 0.22 5
AUSTRALIA AUS 1.85 0.13 11 2.00 0.16 10 1.99 0.19 9 1.79 0.15 9
AUSTRIA AUT 1.91 0.13 11 2.10 0.16 10 2.10 0.18 10 1.88 0.15 9
AZERBAIJAN AZE -0.79 0.13 11 -0.98 0.15 10 -0.81 0.18 9 -0.81 0.16 6
BAHAMAS BHS 1.34 0.25 3 1.10 0.39 2 0.99 0.41 2 0.76 0.44 2
BAHRAIN BHR 0.92 0.14 8 0.78 0.21 7 1.03 0.24 6 0.70 0.18 6
BANGLADESH BGD -0.78 0.14 10 -0.68 0.18 9 -0.72 0.21 7 -0.65 0.18 6
BARBADOS BRB 1.43 0.26 2 1.36 0.45 1 0.55 0.48 1 -0.27 0.52 1
BELARUS BLR -1.12 0.16 9 -0.99 0.17 9 -1.08 0.21 7 -0.96 0.26 4
BELGIUM BEL 1.45 0.13 10 1.64 0.16 10 1.29 0.19 9 1.57 0.15 9
BELIZE BLZ 0.05 0.23 4 0.39 0.28 4 0.03 0.32 3 0.66 0.47 2
BENIN BEN -0.42 0.22 5 -0.48 0.28 4 -0.38 0.29 4 -0.01 0.47 2
BERMUDA BMU 1.28 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BHUTAN BTN 0.10 0.28 3 -0.58 0.37 2 -0.07 0.39 2 -1.13 0.74 1
BOLIVIA BOL -0.60 0.14 10 -0.51 0.16 11 -0.33 0.20 8 -0.62 0.18 7
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.88 0.16 9 -0.83 0.19 6 -1.04 0.24 4 -0.18 0.74 1
BOTSWANA BWA 0.72 0.14 9 0.84 0.21 8 0.66 0.24 7 0.76 0.20 5
BRAZIL BRA -0.30 0.13 13 -0.15 0.14 13 -0.09 0.17 11 -0.24 0.15 10
BRUNEI BRN 0.64 0.31 3 0.94 0.54 2 0.91 0.54 2 0.67 0.56 2
BULGARIA BGR 0.05 0.13 13 -0.11 0.14 12 -0.22 0.18 9 -0.09 0.16 7
BURKINA FASO BFA -0.55 0.22 5 -0.64 0.26 5 -0.42 0.29 5 -0.71 0.41 3
BURUNDI BDI -1.49 0.28 3 -0.95 0.22 5 -0.85 0.32 3 -0.18 0.74 1
CAMBODIA KHM -0.86 0.21 5 -0.74 0.23 5 -0.73 0.26 4 -0.86 0.37 2
CAMEROON CMR -1.28 0.16 8 -1.08 0.21 8 -0.92 0.23 8 -1.12 0.20 5
CANADA CAN 1.79 0.13 12 2.01 0.15 12 1.98 0.18 10 1.77 0.15 9
CAPE VERDE CPV 0.19 0.24 3 0.57 0.31 2 0.67 0.33 2 0.08 0.52 1
CAYMAN ISLANDS CYM 1.55 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF -0.88 0.23 4 -0.62 0.37 2 -0.87 0.39 2 -0.18 0.74 1
CHAD TCD -0.93 0.23 4 -0.82 0.30 3 -0.98 0.29 4 -0.18 0.74 1
CHILE CHL 1.30 0.13 12 1.33 0.14 14 1.26 0.18 10 1.19 0.15 10
CHINA CHN -0.22 0.13 12 -0.32 0.14 12 -0.22 0.18 10 -0.43 0.15 9
COLOMBIA COL -0.75 0.13 12 -0.64 0.14 14 -0.67 0.17 11 -0.44 0.15 10
COMOROS COM -0.84 0.29 2 -1.02 0.39 1 -0.97 0.42 1 .. .. ..
CONGO COG -1.22 0.19 7 -1.13 0.22 6 -1.23 0.23 6 -1.20 0.30 4
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -1.79 0.19 7 -1.79 0.20 7 -1.97 0.23 6 -1.73 0.28 5
COSTA RICA CRI 0.67 0.14 11 0.79 0.16 11 0.88 0.19 9 0.61 0.17 8
CROATIA HRV 0.11 0.13 12 0.15 0.15 10 -0.04 0.18 8 -0.50 0.16 6
CUBA CUB -0.94 0.15 8 -0.62 0.21 7 -0.50 0.24 6 -0.70 0.18 6
CYPRUS CYP 0.83 0.15 8 1.01 0.21 6 0.88 0.24 6 0.58 0.18 6
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 0.74 0.12 13 0.60 0.13 13 0.62 0.15 12 0.61 0.14 10
DENMARK DNK 1.97 0.13 12 1.97 0.16 11 1.99 0.19 9 1.92 0.15 9
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.51 0.24 3 -0.50 0.31 2 -0.32 0.33 2 .. .. ..
DOMINICA DMA 0.67 0.29 2 -0.31 0.39 1 -0.33 0.42 1 .. .. ..
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM -0.43 0.14 10 -0.19 0.16 10 -0.06 0.22 6 -0.49 0.19 5
ECUADOR ECU -0.60 0.13 10 -0.66 0.15 12 -0.65 0.19 9 -0.38 0.17 8
EGYPT EGY 0.09 0.13 11 0.23 0.15 11 0.17 0.18 10 0.22 0.16 8
EL SALVADOR SLV -0.46 0.16 7 -0.44 0.19 9 -0.20 0.23 6 -0.45 0.19 6
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ -1.19 0.24 3 -1.26 0.31 2 -1.69 0.33 2 .. .. ..
ERITREA ERI -0.51 0.26 4 -0.12 0.33 3 -0.05 0.39 2 -0.18 0.74 1
ESTONIA EST 0.80 0.12 13 0.73 0.13 13 0.54 0.18 9 0.33 0.16 6
ETHIOPIA ETH -0.44 0.21 6 -0.46 0.25 6 -0.23 0.29 5 -0.26 0.41 3
FIJI FJI -0.39 0.22 5 -0.68 0.30 3 -0.40 0.29 4 0.09 0.47 2
FINLAND FIN 1.99 0.13 11 2.13 0.16 11 2.06 0.19 9 1.97 0.15 9
FRANCE FRA 1.33 0.13 11 1.49 0.15 12 1.44 0.18 10 1.56 0.15 9
FRENCH GUIANA GUF 1.02 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GABON GAB -0.27 0.15 8 -0.54 0.19 8 -0.48 0.22 6 -0.29 0.19 5
GAMBIA GMB -0.50 0.21 6 -0.25 0.28 4 -0.29 0.29 4 0.23 0.56 2
GEORGIA GEO -1.17 0.15 10 -0.56 0.16 9 -0.73 0.19 7 -0.80 0.22 5  
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TABLE C5: Rule of Law (cont.)
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
GERMANY DEU 1.73 0.13 12 1.91 0.15 12 1.90 0.18 10 1.79 0.15 9
GHANA GHA -0.15 0.14 9 -0.16 0.19 9 -0.06 0.20 9 -0.11 0.18 6
GREECE GRC 0.79 0.13 10 0.75 0.16 9 0.66 0.19 9 0.74 0.15 9
GRENADA GRD 0.28 0.29 2 0.40 0.39 1 0.30 0.42 1 .. .. ..
GUATEMALA GTM -0.84 0.14 10 -0.76 0.17 10 -0.71 0.20 7 -0.61 0.18 7
GUINEA GIN -0.75 0.22 5 -0.82 0.28 4 -0.89 0.27 5 -1.02 0.41 3
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -1.00 0.21 6 -1.36 0.26 5 -1.24 0.27 5 -1.50 0.56 2
GUYANA GUY -0.43 0.22 5 -0.13 0.26 5 0.06 0.29 4 0.01 0.41 3
HAITI HTI -1.76 0.19 7 -1.49 0.25 6 -0.99 0.29 4 -1.17 0.41 3
HONDURAS HND -0.79 0.15 9 -0.88 0.17 10 -0.62 0.20 7 -0.81 0.18 7
HONG KONG HKG 1.30 0.14 9 1.66 0.17 8 1.73 0.20 8 1.62 0.16 7
HUNGARY HUN 0.90 0.12 14 0.85 0.13 14 0.78 0.15 12 0.62 0.14 10
ICELAND ISL 2.00 0.18 7 2.08 0.19 7 1.90 0.23 6 1.61 0.24 5
INDIA IND 0.07 0.13 13 0.23 0.14 12 0.21 0.17 11 -0.01 0.15 9
INDONESIA IDN -0.80 0.13 13 -0.90 0.14 12 -0.97 0.18 10 -0.34 0.15 9
IRAN IRN -0.58 0.14 10 -0.43 0.19 8 -0.49 0.22 7 -0.73 0.17 7
IRAQ IRQ -1.70 0.15 7 -1.49 0.21 7 -1.68 0.24 6 -1.48 0.18 6
IRELAND IRL 1.72 0.13 12 1.86 0.16 11 1.81 0.18 10 1.67 0.15 9
ISRAEL ISR 0.97 0.13 11 1.08 0.17 9 1.09 0.20 8 1.11 0.15 9
ITALY ITA 0.82 0.13 11 0.94 0.15 12 1.07 0.18 10 0.84 0.15 9
IVORY COAST CIV -1.21 0.15 8 -0.53 0.21 7 -0.52 0.23 8 -0.65 0.20 5
JAMAICA JAM -0.38 0.15 8 -0.14 0.18 7 -0.24 0.21 7 -0.20 0.19 5
JAPAN JPN 1.41 0.13 12 1.82 0.16 11 1.72 0.20 8 1.51 0.15 9
JORDAN JOR 0.33 0.14 9 0.57 0.16 9 0.60 0.19 9 0.19 0.17 7
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ -0.90 0.13 12 -0.76 0.14 12 -0.80 0.17 10 -0.69 0.16 6
KENYA KEN -1.04 0.14 9 -1.02 0.18 9 -1.02 0.20 9 -0.73 0.18 6
KIRIBATI KIR -0.32 0.49 1 -0.31 0.39 1 -0.65 0.42 1 .. .. ..
KOREA, NORTH PRK -1.00 0.23 5 -1.08 0.34 4 -1.21 0.38 3 -0.98 0.41 3
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.88 0.13 13 0.65 0.15 12 0.82 0.17 11 0.77 0.15 9
KUWAIT KWT 0.81 0.14 9 1.19 0.21 6 1.16 0.24 6 0.61 0.18 6
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -0.83 0.16 9 -0.90 0.16 7 -0.67 0.19 7 -0.65 0.24 4
LAOS LAO -1.05 0.21 5 -1.02 0.22 5 -1.07 0.26 4 -1.29 0.32 3
LATVIA LVA 0.46 0.13 11 0.25 0.14 10 0.08 0.18 9 0.18 0.16 6
LEBANON LBN -0.27 0.14 9 -0.09 0.19 8 0.16 0.21 7 -0.26 0.18 6
LESOTHO LSO -0.01 0.20 5 -0.08 0.30 3 -0.13 0.31 4 -0.29 0.47 2
LIBERIA LBR -1.42 0.28 4 -1.52 0.31 4 -1.79 0.35 3 -2.04 0.56 2
LIBYA LBY -0.91 0.15 7 -0.90 0.21 6 -1.11 0.24 6 -0.94 0.18 6
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.55 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
LITHUANIA LTU 0.48 0.13 12 0.27 0.14 12 0.19 0.18 9 -0.14 0.16 6
LUXEMBOURG LUX 2.00 0.21 6 2.09 0.29 5 1.92 0.27 5 1.69 0.26 5
MACAO MAC 0.75 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MACEDONIA MKD -0.41 0.14 9 -0.30 0.20 5 -0.33 0.23 5 -0.53 0.19 3
MADAGASCAR MDG -0.19 0.22 5 -0.65 0.25 6 -1.01 0.27 5 -0.80 0.41 3
MALAWI MWI -0.34 0.16 7 -0.51 0.20 8 -0.51 0.21 8 -0.19 0.19 5
MALAYSIA MYS 0.58 0.13 13 0.55 0.14 13 0.82 0.17 11 0.80 0.15 9
MALDIVES MDV 0.44 0.29 2 -0.66 0.39 1 -0.65 0.42 1 .. .. ..
MALI MLI -0.54 0.21 6 -0.69 0.26 5 -0.57 0.27 5 -0.73 0.41 3
MALTA MLT 1.08 0.25 3 0.75 0.39 2 0.69 0.41 2 0.04 0.44 2
MARSHALL ISLANDS MHL -0.32 0.49 1 -0.66 0.39 1 -0.33 0.42 1 .. .. ..
MARTINIQUE MTQ 1.28 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MAURITANIA MRT -0.33 0.23 4 -0.48 0.28 4 -0.48 0.32 3 -0.58 0.47 2
MAURITIUS MUS 0.89 0.15 7 0.86 0.18 7 0.96 0.22 7 0.68 0.20 3
MEXICO MEX -0.22 0.13 13 -0.37 0.14 14 -0.38 0.17 11 -0.11 0.15 10
MICRONESIA FSM -0.64 0.49 1 -0.66 0.39 1 -0.33 0.42 1 .. .. ..
MOLDOVA MDA -0.49 0.13 10 -0.54 0.15 10 -0.13 0.18 9 -0.19 0.16 6
MONGOLIA MNG 0.36 0.21 6 0.22 0.26 5 0.02 0.23 5 0.45 0.41 3
MOROCCO MAR 0.11 0.14 10 0.33 0.19 7 0.54 0.20 9 0.18 0.17 7
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ -0.65 0.19 7 -0.73 0.22 6 -1.02 0.23 7 -1.17 0.30 4
MYANMAR MMR -1.62 0.16 7 -1.14 0.25 6 -1.06 0.28 5 -1.25 0.20 5
NAMIBIA NAM 0.45 0.14 9 1.21 0.23 7 1.14 0.26 6 0.34 0.22 3
NEPAL NPL -0.50 0.20 6 -0.31 0.22 5 -0.25 0.26 4 -0.34 0.32 3
NETHERLANDS NLD 1.83 0.13 11 1.97 0.16 11 2.02 0.19 9 1.84 0.15 9
NEW ZEALAND NZL 1.91 0.14 9 1.99 0.17 9 2.17 0.20 8 1.97 0.16 8
NICARAGUA NIC -0.63 0.16 8 -0.90 0.19 9 -0.81 0.23 6 -0.66 0.19 6
NIGER NER -0.78 0.22 5 -0.83 0.26 5 -0.70 0.29 4 -1.19 0.41 3  
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TABLE C5: Rule of Law (cont.)
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
NIGERIA NGA -1.35 0.14 11 -1.06 0.16 11 -1.30 0.20 9 -1.14 0.17 7
NORWAY NOR 1.96 0.13 11 2.01 0.16 10 2.21 0.19 9 1.99 0.15 9
OMAN OMN 0.83 0.14 9 1.25 0.21 7 1.27 0.24 6 1.06 0.18 6
PAKISTAN PAK -0.70 0.14 10 -0.62 0.17 10 -0.71 0.18 9 -0.41 0.17 7
PANAMA PAN 0.00 0.14 11 -0.02 0.16 11 -0.03 0.21 7 0.25 0.18 7
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -0.82 0.15 8 -0.33 0.19 8 -0.32 0.22 6 -0.32 0.20 4
PARAGUAY PRY -1.12 0.15 9 -0.82 0.18 9 -0.78 0.21 7 -0.48 0.19 6
PERU PER -0.44 0.13 12 -0.52 0.15 13 -0.44 0.18 10 -0.33 0.16 9
PHILIPPINES PHL -0.50 0.13 12 -0.50 0.14 13 -0.04 0.18 10 -0.11 0.15 9
POLAND POL 0.65 0.12 15 0.64 0.13 14 0.57 0.15 12 0.44 0.14 10
PORTUGAL PRT 1.30 0.13 11 1.16 0.16 10 1.31 0.18 10 1.28 0.15 9
PUERTO RICO PRI 1.15 0.26 2 1.09 0.43 1 0.89 0.54 1 0.71 0.60 1
QATAR QAT 0.84 0.15 6 1.11 0.25 5 1.39 0.29 4 0.90 0.22 3
ROMANIA ROM -0.12 0.13 13 -0.21 0.14 12 -0.25 0.18 8 -0.27 0.16 7
RUSSIA RUS -0.78 0.12 15 -0.86 0.13 14 -0.78 0.15 12 -0.80 0.14 10
RWANDA RWA -1.01 0.22 5 -0.83 0.28 4 -1.20 0.32 3 -0.18 0.74 1
SAMOA SAM 0.94 0.29 2 -0.14 0.31 2 -0.97 0.42 1 .. .. ..
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP -0.45 0.29 2 -0.66 0.39 1 -0.97 0.42 1 .. .. ..
SAUDI ARABIA SAU 0.44 0.14 10 0.63 0.19 8 0.89 0.22 7 0.71 0.17 7
SENEGAL SEN -0.20 0.16 8 -0.28 0.20 8 -0.26 0.21 7 -0.16 0.19 5
SEYCHELLES SYC 0.52 0.29 2 -0.31 0.39 1 -0.33 0.42 1 .. .. ..
SIERRA LEONE SLE -1.25 0.25 5 -0.77 0.26 5 -0.72 0.29 4 -0.97 0.41 3
SINGAPORE SGP 1.75 0.13 10 2.12 0.16 11 2.24 0.18 10 2.01 0.15 9
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 0.40 0.12 12 0.32 0.13 12 0.13 0.17 10 0.11 0.15 8
SLOVENIA SVN 1.09 0.12 13 0.89 0.13 12 0.91 0.18 8 0.49 0.16 6
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB -0.64 0.49 1 -1.02 0.39 1 -0.65 0.42 1 .. .. ..
SOMALIA SOM -2.05 0.28 4 -1.71 0.26 5 -1.80 0.29 4 -1.60 0.56 2
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0.19 0.13 13 0.30 0.14 13 0.21 0.17 12 0.34 0.15 9
SPAIN ESP 1.15 0.13 12 1.38 0.15 12 1.35 0.18 10 1.16 0.15 9
SRI LANKA LKA 0.23 0.14 10 -0.17 0.16 9 -0.11 0.21 7 0.27 0.18 6
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS KNA 0.33 0.49 1 0.40 0.39 1 -0.33 0.42 1 .. .. ..
ST. LUCIA LCA 0.33 0.49 1 0.40 0.39 1 -0.33 0.42 1 .. .. ..
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES VCT 0.66 0.49 1 0.40 0.39 1 -0.33 0.42 1 .. .. ..
SUDAN SDN -1.36 0.17 7 -1.13 0.21 7 -1.31 0.26 5 -1.38 0.21 4
SURINAME SUR -0.33 0.25 3 -0.61 0.39 2 -0.73 0.41 2 -0.78 0.44 2
SWAZILAND SWZ -0.67 0.20 5 -0.11 0.30 3 -0.17 0.31 4 0.38 0.47 2
SWEDEN SWE 1.92 0.13 12 1.98 0.15 12 1.95 0.19 9 1.92 0.15 9
SWITZERLAND CHE 2.03 0.13 11 2.22 0.16 11 2.36 0.18 10 2.05 0.15 9
SYRIA SYR -0.41 0.15 8 -0.31 0.21 7 -0.25 0.24 6 -0.50 0.18 6
TAIWAN TWN 0.95 0.13 11 0.87 0.16 11 1.17 0.19 9 0.96 0.15 9
TAJIKISTAN TJK -1.27 0.17 8 -1.25 0.18 6 -1.42 0.23 5 -1.34 0.29 3
TANZANIA TZA -0.49 0.14 9 -0.23 0.18 9 -0.28 0.20 9 -0.66 0.18 6
THAILAND THA 0.30 0.13 12 0.43 0.15 12 0.40 0.17 11 0.46 0.15 9
TIMOR, EAST TMP -1.11 0.34 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TOGO TGO -0.67 0.22 5 -0.79 0.28 4 -0.83 0.27 5 -1.17 0.56 2
TONGA TON -0.64 0.49 1 -0.66 0.39 1 -0.65 0.42 1 .. .. ..
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO 0.34 0.15 8 0.48 0.18 8 0.38 0.22 6 0.34 0.19 5
TUNISIA TUN 0.27 0.14 10 0.48 0.18 9 0.44 0.21 8 0.06 0.18 6
TURKEY TUR 0.00 0.13 14 0.07 0.14 13 0.19 0.17 11 0.02 0.15 9
TURKMENISTAN TKM -1.16 0.16 7 -1.12 0.16 6 -1.19 0.20 6 -1.13 0.24 4
UGANDA UGA -0.84 0.14 9 -0.63 0.18 9 -0.11 0.20 9 -0.83 0.18 6
UKRAINE UKR -0.79 0.12 13 -0.71 0.13 12 -0.76 0.16 11 -0.64 0.15 8
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE 0.95 0.14 8 1.43 0.21 6 1.27 0.24 6 0.74 0.18 6
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 1.81 0.13 12 1.93 0.15 12 2.05 0.18 10 1.84 0.15 9
UNITED STATES USA 1.70 0.13 11 1.92 0.16 11 1.77 0.18 10 1.70 0.15 9
URUGUAY URY 0.56 0.14 9 0.66 0.16 11 0.49 0.21 7 0.49 0.18 7
UZBEKISTAN UZB -1.16 0.13 10 -0.92 0.15 9 -1.04 0.18 8 -0.97 0.17 5
VANUATU VUT -0.32 0.49 1 -0.31 0.39 1 -0.65 0.42 1 .. .. ..
VENEZUELA VEN -1.04 0.13 12 -0.81 0.15 12 -0.62 0.17 11 -0.62 0.15 10
VIETNAM VNM -0.39 0.13 11 -0.74 0.15 10 -0.81 0.18 9 -0.47 0.16 8
WEST BANK WBG -0.31 0.34 1 0.34 0.67 1 1.38 0.56 1 .. .. ..
YEMEN YEM -1.23 0.16 8 -0.89 0.20 7 -0.68 0.22 6 -0.99 0.19 5
YUGOSLAVIA YUG -0.95 0.14 9 -0.97 0.22 4 -0.91 0.27 4 -1.14 0.22 3
ZAMBIA ZMB -0.52 0.14 9 -0.47 0.18 9 -0.34 0.20 9 -0.33 0.18 6
ZIMBABWE ZWE -1.33 0.14 9 -0.73 0.16 9 0.00 0.19 10 -0.22 0.17 7  
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TABLE C6: Control of Corruption
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
AFGHANISTAN AFG -1.35 0.27 3 -1.59 0.44 1 .. .. .. .. .. ..
ALBANIA ALB -0.85 0.18 6 -0.63 0.18 7 -0.92 0.20 5 0.05 0.42 2
ALGERIA DZA -0.70 0.17 7 -0.65 0.20 6 -0.70 0.21 5 -0.31 0.24 4
ANDORRA ADO 1.29 0.38 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ANGOLA AGO -1.12 0.17 7 -1.38 0.20 6 -1.05 0.18 6 -0.93 0.24 4
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA ATG 0.84 0.38 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
ARGENTINA ARG -0.77 0.14 11 -0.36 0.15 13 -0.17 0.17 9 -0.11 0.17 7
ARMENIA ARM -0.72 0.16 7 -0.76 0.18 7 -0.71 0.18 6 -0.60 0.37 2
AUSTRALIA AUS 1.91 0.15 9 2.05 0.18 8 2.20 0.19 7 1.73 0.17 7
AUSTRIA AUT 1.85 0.16 8 1.93 0.19 8 2.02 0.17 9 1.55 0.17 7
AZERBAIJAN AZE -1.07 0.14 9 -1.13 0.15 9 -1.01 0.17 7 -0.90 0.25 3
BAHAMAS BHS 1.41 0.33 2 0.84 0.66 1 0.66 0.76 1 0.34 0.61 1
BAHRAIN BHR 0.95 0.17 6 0.36 0.22 5 0.40 0.26 4 0.08 0.24 4
BANGLADESH BGD -1.12 0.16 8 -0.64 0.19 7 -0.40 0.21 5 -0.43 0.24 4
BARBADOS BRB 1.29 0.38 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BELARUS BLR -0.78 0.17 7 -0.07 0.18 7 -0.60 0.19 6 -0.86 0.50 1
BELGIUM BEL 1.57 0.16 8 1.36 0.19 8 1.23 0.18 8 1.05 0.17 7
BELIZE BLZ -0.25 0.30 2 0.16 0.36 2 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
BENIN BEN -0.61 0.27 3 -0.22 0.46 1 -0.76 0.31 2 .. .. ..
BERMUDA BMU 1.29 0.38 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
BHUTAN BTN 0.91 0.30 2 1.33 0.46 1 0.46 0.37 1 .. .. ..
BOLIVIA BOL -0.82 0.16 8 -0.68 0.17 9 -0.45 0.19 7 -0.81 0.24 4
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BIH -0.60 0.17 6 -0.50 0.22 4 -0.35 0.23 2 .. .. ..
BOTSWANA BWA 0.76 0.17 8 1.04 0.21 6 0.53 0.19 5 0.37 0.27 3
BRAZIL BRA -0.05 0.14 11 0.01 0.15 12 0.11 0.16 10 -0.10 0.17 7
BRUNEI BRN 0.32 0.33 2 -0.15 0.66 1 0.06 0.76 1 0.34 0.61 1
BULGARIA BGR -0.17 0.14 10 -0.15 0.14 11 -0.50 0.16 8 -0.62 0.24 4
BURKINA FASO BFA -0.04 0.27 3 -0.72 0.32 3 -0.51 0.23 3 -0.29 0.61 1
BURUNDI BDI -1.02 0.30 2 -1.36 0.28 3 -0.80 0.37 1 .. .. ..
CAMBODIA KHM -0.90 0.23 3 -0.57 0.28 3 -1.27 0.27 2 -0.87 0.47 1
CAMEROON CMR -1.10 0.20 5 -1.10 0.22 6 -1.11 0.18 6 -1.02 0.27 3
CANADA CAN 2.03 0.15 9 2.30 0.17 10 2.50 0.18 8 2.00 0.17 7
CAPE VERDE CPV 0.33 0.30 2 0.17 0.46 1 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
CAYMAN ISLANDS CYM 1.29 0.38 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CAF -1.02 0.30 2 -0.99 0.46 1 -0.55 0.37 1 .. .. ..
CHAD TCD -1.02 0.30 2 -0.61 0.46 1 -0.84 0.31 2 .. .. ..
CHILE CHL 1.55 0.14 11 1.54 0.15 13 1.18 0.17 9 1.19 0.17 7
CHINA CHN -0.41 0.15 10 -0.34 0.16 11 -0.20 0.17 8 -0.01 0.17 7
COLOMBIA COL -0.47 0.15 10 -0.43 0.15 13 -0.59 0.16 10 -0.40 0.17 7
COMOROS COM -0.73 0.30 2 -0.61 0.46 1 -0.80 0.37 1 .. .. ..
CONGO COG -0.94 0.21 5 -0.93 0.26 4 -0.99 0.24 4 -0.76 0.40 2
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire) ZAR -1.42 0.19 6 -1.40 0.23 5 -1.58 0.24 4 -1.85 0.33 3
COSTA RICA CRI 0.88 0.15 9 1.03 0.16 9 0.74 0.17 8 0.71 0.22 5
CROATIA HRV 0.23 0.14 9 0.02 0.16 9 -0.33 0.17 6 -0.45 0.25 3
CUBA CUB -0.13 0.18 6 -0.34 0.22 5 -0.29 0.26 4 0.01 0.24 4
CYPRUS CYP 0.89 0.18 6 1.09 0.24 4 1.38 0.26 4 1.47 0.24 4
CZECH REPUBLIC CZE 0.38 0.13 11 0.38 0.14 13 0.35 0.14 10 0.55 0.17 7
DENMARK DNK 2.26 0.15 9 2.36 0.18 9 2.57 0.18 8 2.09 0.17 7
DJIBOUTI DJI -0.73 0.30 2 -0.99 0.46 1 -0.80 0.37 1 .. .. ..
DOMINICA DMA 0.52 0.30 2 -0.22 0.46 1 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DOM -0.39 0.16 7 -0.33 0.18 8 -0.53 0.23 4 -0.31 0.26 3
ECUADOR ECU -1.02 0.15 9 -0.99 0.16 11 -0.77 0.20 7 -0.70 0.23 5
EGYPT EGY -0.29 0.16 9 -0.19 0.17 10 -0.25 0.16 8 0.11 0.22 6
EL SALVADOR SLV -0.54 0.18 6 -0.19 0.19 7 -0.31 0.22 4 -0.70 0.27 3
EQUATORIAL GUINEA GNQ -1.89 0.30 2 -1.76 0.46 1 -0.80 0.37 1 .. .. ..
ERITREA ERI 0.04 0.27 3 -0.05 0.35 2 0.46 0.37 1 .. .. ..
ESTONIA EST 0.66 0.13 11 0.76 0.14 12 0.49 0.16 8 0.05 0.25 3
ETHIOPIA ETH -0.35 0.25 4 -0.09 0.28 4 -0.25 0.23 3 -0.92 0.61 1
FIJI FJI 0.12 0.27 3 0.51 0.35 2 0.20 0.31 2 .. .. ..
FINLAND FIN 2.39 0.16 8 2.54 0.18 9 2.55 0.18 8 2.08 0.17 7
FRANCE FRA 1.45 0.15 9 1.46 0.17 9 1.75 0.18 8 1.30 0.17 7
FRENCH GUIANA GUF 0.84 0.38 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
GABON GAB -0.55 0.17 6 -0.71 0.20 6 -0.90 0.23 4 -1.15 0.26 3
GAMBIA GMB -0.83 0.25 4 -0.11 0.41 2 -0.49 0.35 2 0.34 0.61 1
GEORGIA GEO -1.03 0.16 7 -0.73 0.16 8 -0.64 0.18 5 -0.98 0.37 2  
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TABLE C6: Control of Corruption (cont.)
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
GERMANY DEU 1.82 0.15 9 1.72 0.17 9 2.20 0.17 9 1.64 0.17 7
GHANA GHA -0.40 0.16 8 -0.41 0.20 7 -0.44 0.17 7 -0.44 0.24 4
GREECE GRC 0.58 0.16 8 0.80 0.18 8 0.85 0.18 8 0.35 0.17 7
GRENADA GRD 0.71 0.30 2 0.17 0.46 1 -0.04 0.37 1 .. .. ..
GUATEMALA GTM -0.71 0.16 8 -0.66 0.17 9 -0.71 0.20 5 -0.90 0.24 4
GUINEA GIN -0.58 0.27 3 -0.41 0.41 2 -0.82 0.30 3 0.34 0.61 1
GUINEA-BISSAU GNB -0.61 0.25 4 -0.40 0.32 3 -0.57 0.30 3 -0.92 0.61 1
GUYANA GUY -0.50 0.27 3 -0.39 0.32 3 -0.26 0.35 2 -0.29 0.61 1
HAITI HTI -1.70 0.22 5 -1.02 0.28 4 -0.85 0.35 2 -0.92 0.61 1
HONDURAS HND -0.78 0.16 8 -0.67 0.18 8 -0.72 0.20 5 -0.90 0.24 4
HONG KONG HKG 1.52 0.16 7 1.44 0.18 8 1.66 0.18 8 1.40 0.17 6
HUNGARY HUN 0.60 0.13 12 0.76 0.13 14 0.69 0.14 11 0.59 0.17 7
ICELAND ISL 2.19 0.20 5 2.47 0.24 5 2.32 0.23 4 1.65 0.22 4
INDIA IND -0.25 0.15 10 -0.21 0.16 11 -0.17 0.16 10 -0.29 0.17 7
INDONESIA IDN -1.16 0.15 10 -1.09 0.16 11 -0.99 0.17 8 -0.44 0.17 7
IRAN IRN -0.38 0.17 8 -0.62 0.22 6 -0.63 0.25 5 -0.77 0.23 5
IRAQ IRQ -1.43 0.19 5 -1.20 0.22 5 -1.36 0.26 4 -1.27 0.24 4
IRELAND IRL 1.67 0.15 9 1.55 0.18 9 2.15 0.17 9 1.72 0.17 7
ISRAEL ISR 1.08 0.16 8 1.25 0.17 8 1.40 0.19 7 1.38 0.17 7
ITALY ITA 0.80 0.16 8 0.89 0.16 11 1.00 0.17 9 0.43 0.17 7
IVORY COAST CIV -0.86 0.19 6 -0.63 0.23 5 -0.35 0.18 6 0.38 0.27 3
JAMAICA JAM -0.46 0.17 6 -0.20 0.22 5 -0.26 0.21 5 -0.31 0.26 3
JAPAN JPN 1.20 0.15 9 1.38 0.17 10 1.32 0.18 8 1.14 0.17 7
JORDAN JOR 0.00 0.16 7 0.13 0.19 7 0.20 0.18 7 -0.09 0.22 5
KAZAKHSTAN KAZ -1.05 0.14 10 -0.87 0.16 10 -0.86 0.16 8 -0.79 0.24 4
KENYA KEN -1.05 0.17 7 -1.08 0.18 8 -0.92 0.17 7 -0.98 0.24 4
KIRIBATI KIR -0.44 0.44 1 -0.61 0.46 1 -0.55 0.37 1 .. .. ..
KOREA, NORTH PRK -1.18 0.29 3 -0.96 0.41 2 -0.55 0.76 1 -0.29 0.61 1
KOREA, SOUTH KOR 0.33 0.15 9 0.45 0.16 11 0.18 0.16 10 0.51 0.17 7
KUWAIT KWT 1.06 0.17 7 0.88 0.24 4 1.07 0.26 4 0.59 0.24 4
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC KGZ -0.84 0.16 7 -0.86 0.18 6 -0.69 0.18 5 -0.73 0.37 2
LAOS LAO -1.25 0.23 3 -0.91 0.27 3 -0.70 0.27 2 -0.87 0.47 1
LATVIA LVA 0.09 0.14 9 0.01 0.15 9 -0.10 0.16 8 -0.52 0.25 3
LEBANON LBN -0.34 0.16 7 -0.53 0.20 6 -0.32 0.21 5 -0.17 0.24 4
LESOTHO LSO -0.28 0.24 4 0.17 0.46 1 0.03 0.24 2 .. .. ..
LIBERIA LBR -0.98 0.29 3 -1.24 0.32 3 -1.43 0.35 2 -1.54 0.61 1
LIBYA LBY -0.82 0.19 5 -0.94 0.24 4 -0.91 0.26 4 -0.84 0.24 4
LIECHTENSTEIN LIE 1.29 0.38 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
LITHUANIA LTU 0.25 0.14 10 0.27 0.14 12 0.07 0.17 7 -0.12 0.25 3
LUXEMBOURG LUX 2.00 0.26 3 2.05 0.36 3 2.16 0.26 4 1.68 0.24 3
MACAO MAC -0.07 0.38 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MACEDONIA MKD -0.73 0.16 6 -0.48 0.21 4 -0.30 0.20 4 -0.93 0.33 1
MADAGASCAR MDG 0.14 0.27 3 -0.80 0.28 4 -0.80 0.30 3 0.34 0.61 1
MALAWI MWI -0.91 0.18 6 -0.22 0.21 6 -0.50 0.18 6 -0.92 0.26 3
MALAYSIA MYS 0.38 0.15 10 0.18 0.17 10 0.75 0.16 9 0.48 0.17 7
MALDIVES MDV 0.04 0.30 2 -0.61 0.46 1 -0.55 0.37 1 .. .. ..
MALI MLI -0.32 0.24 5 -0.56 0.32 3 -0.58 0.30 3 -0.29 0.61 1
MALTA MLT 0.80 0.33 2 0.18 0.66 1 0.66 0.76 1 0.34 0.61 1
MARSHALL ISLANDS MHL -0.02 0.44 1 0.17 0.46 1 -0.55 0.37 1 .. .. ..
MARTINIQUE MTQ 0.84 0.38 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
MAURITANIA MRT 0.23 0.30 2 -0.70 0.35 2 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
MAURITIUS MUS 0.53 0.18 5 0.52 0.21 5 0.20 0.18 5 0.45 0.28 2
MEXICO MEX -0.19 0.14 11 -0.39 0.15 13 -0.46 0.16 9 -0.31 0.17 7
MICRONESIA FSM -0.44 0.44 1 -0.22 0.46 1 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
MOLDOVA MDA -0.89 0.14 8 -0.87 0.15 9 -0.51 0.17 7 -0.19 0.25 3
MONGOLIA MNG -0.14 0.25 4 -0.40 0.32 3 -0.28 0.23 3 0.34 0.61 1
MOROCCO MAR -0.04 0.16 7 0.36 0.22 5 -0.10 0.17 7 0.21 0.23 5
MOZAMBIQUE MOZ -1.01 0.21 5 -0.43 0.26 4 -0.77 0.19 5 -0.48 0.40 2
MYANMAR MMR -1.37 0.20 5 -1.25 0.25 4 -1.30 0.32 3 -1.09 0.27 3
NAMIBIA NAM 0.21 0.17 8 1.16 0.23 5 0.24 0.21 4 0.72 0.30 2
NEPAL NPL -0.30 0.22 4 -0.42 0.27 3 -0.59 0.27 2 -0.26 0.47 1
NETHERLANDS NLD 2.15 0.16 8 2.34 0.18 9 2.48 0.18 8 1.99 0.17 7
NEW ZEALAND NZL 2.28 0.16 7 2.36 0.18 7 2.54 0.19 7 2.08 0.17 6
NICARAGUA NIC -0.44 0.18 7 -0.91 0.19 7 -0.70 0.22 4 -0.14 0.27 3
NIGER NER -1.10 0.27 3 -0.92 0.41 2 -0.88 0.35 2 -0.29 0.61 1  
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TABLE C6: Control of Corruption (cont.)
2002 2000 1998 1996
Country Code Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N. Estimate S.E. N.
NIGERIA NGA -1.35 0.16 9 -1.12 0.17 9 -1.00 0.16 8 -1.12 0.23 5
NORWAY NOR 2.00 0.16 8 2.11 0.19 8 2.34 0.18 8 1.88 0.17 7
OMAN OMN 1.03 0.17 7 0.72 0.22 5 0.89 0.26 4 0.12 0.24 4
PAKISTAN PAK -0.73 0.17 7 -0.70 0.19 8 -0.75 0.18 8 -0.91 0.23 5
PANAMA PAN -0.24 0.15 9 -0.36 0.16 9 -0.28 0.21 5 -0.47 0.24 4
PAPUA NEW GUINEA PNG -0.90 0.17 7 -1.10 0.20 6 -0.70 0.23 4 -0.25 0.26 3
PARAGUAY PRY -1.22 0.16 8 -1.03 0.19 7 -0.95 0.21 5 -0.46 0.26 3
PERU PER -0.20 0.15 10 -0.10 0.16 12 -0.19 0.17 8 -0.09 0.22 6
PHILIPPINES PHL -0.52 0.15 10 -0.49 0.16 11 -0.35 0.17 8 -0.37 0.17 7
POLAND POL 0.39 0.13 12 0.47 0.13 14 0.49 0.14 10 0.38 0.17 7
PORTUGAL PRT 1.33 0.16 8 1.41 0.18 8 1.55 0.17 9 1.14 0.17 7
PUERTO RICO PRI 1.19 0.30 2 1.38 0.44 1 1.46 0.48 1 1.10 0.50 1
QATAR QAT 0.92 0.20 5 0.72 0.25 4 0.81 0.32 3 -0.06 0.27 3
ROMANIA ROM -0.34 0.14 10 -0.48 0.14 12 -0.38 0.17 7 -0.17 0.24 4
RUSSIA RUS -0.90 0.13 12 -1.05 0.13 14 -0.69 0.14 11 -0.69 0.17 7
RWANDA RWA -0.58 0.27 3 0.11 0.35 2 -0.55 0.37 1 .. .. ..
SAMOA SAM -0.06 0.30 2 0.17 0.46 1 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE STP -0.25 0.30 2 0.17 0.46 1 -0.80 0.37 1 .. .. ..
SAUDI ARABIA SAU 0.57 0.17 8 0.08 0.22 6 0.34 0.25 5 -0.30 0.23 5
SENEGAL SEN -0.17 0.18 6 -0.40 0.21 6 -0.45 0.21 5 -0.36 0.26 3
SEYCHELLES SYC 0.52 0.30 2 0.17 0.46 1 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
SIERRA LEONE SLE -0.82 0.25 4 -0.77 0.32 3 -0.72 0.35 2 -1.54 0.61 1
SINGAPORE SGP 2.30 0.16 8 2.50 0.17 10 2.52 0.18 8 2.04 0.17 7
SLOVAK REPUBLIC SVK 0.28 0.13 10 0.25 0.14 11 -0.08 0.15 8 0.39 0.22 5
SLOVENIA SVN 0.89 0.13 11 1.08 0.14 11 0.83 0.17 6 0.98 0.25 3
SOLOMON ISLANDS SLB -0.86 0.44 1 -0.22 0.46 1 -0.55 0.37 1 .. .. ..
SOMALIA SOM -1.19 0.29 3 -1.63 0.32 3 -1.43 0.35 2 -1.54 0.61 1
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0.36 0.15 11 0.50 0.16 12 0.41 0.14 11 0.59 0.17 7
SPAIN ESP 1.46 0.15 9 1.66 0.17 10 1.58 0.17 9 0.72 0.17 7
SRI LANKA LKA -0.14 0.16 8 -0.05 0.19 7 -0.24 0.21 5 -0.21 0.24 4
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS KNA 0.40 0.44 1 0.17 0.46 1 -0.04 0.37 1 .. .. ..
ST. LUCIA LCA 0.40 0.44 1 0.55 0.46 1 -0.04 0.37 1 .. .. ..
ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES VCT 0.40 0.44 1 0.17 0.46 1 -0.04 0.37 1 .. .. ..
SUDAN SDN -1.09 0.19 6 -1.13 0.23 5 -0.75 0.28 3 -1.01 0.30 2
SURINAME SUR 0.19 0.33 2 0.18 0.66 1 0.06 0.76 1 -0.29 0.61 1
SWAZILAND SWZ -0.26 0.25 3 -0.22 0.46 1 -0.19 0.24 2 .. .. ..
SWEDEN SWE 2.25 0.15 9 2.48 0.17 10 2.54 0.18 8 2.04 0.17 7
SWITZERLAND CHE 2.17 0.16 8 2.22 0.18 9 2.58 0.17 9 1.97 0.17 7
SYRIA SYR -0.29 0.18 6 -0.75 0.22 5 -0.58 0.26 4 -0.66 0.24 4
TAIWAN TWN 0.81 0.15 9 0.72 0.17 10 0.91 0.18 8 0.69 0.17 7
TAJIKISTAN TJK -1.07 0.17 6 -1.15 0.20 4 -1.12 0.21 3 -1.53 0.50 1
TANZANIA TZA -1.00 0.16 8 -1.01 0.19 7 -0.95 0.17 7 -0.96 0.24 4
THAILAND THA -0.15 0.15 10 -0.34 0.16 11 -0.12 0.16 9 -0.30 0.17 7
TIMOR, EAST TMP -0.53 0.38 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
TOGO TGO -0.68 0.27 3 -0.66 0.41 2 -0.45 0.30 3 -0.92 0.61 1
TONGA TON -0.44 0.44 1 -0.22 0.46 1 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO TTO -0.04 0.17 6 0.36 0.20 6 0.13 0.23 4 0.31 0.26 3
TUNISIA TUN 0.35 0.16 8 0.70 0.19 7 0.11 0.18 6 -0.04 0.24 4
TURKEY TUR -0.38 0.15 11 -0.30 0.16 12 -0.01 0.16 10 0.08 0.17 7
TURKMENISTAN TKM -1.21 0.16 5 -1.14 0.20 4 -1.13 0.19 4 -1.34 0.37 2
UGANDA UGA -0.92 0.16 8 -0.90 0.19 7 -0.62 0.17 7 -0.48 0.24 4
UKRAINE UKR -0.96 0.13 11 -0.98 0.15 11 -0.89 0.15 10 -0.69 0.22 5
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES ARE 1.19 0.17 6 0.66 0.24 4 0.78 0.26 4 0.18 0.24 4
UNITED KINGDOM GBR 1.97 0.15 9 2.17 0.16 11 2.32 0.17 9 1.78 0.17 7
UNITED STATES USA 1.77 0.16 8 1.77 0.17 10 1.95 0.18 8 1.60 0.17 7
URUGUAY URY 0.79 0.16 8 0.73 0.16 10 0.42 0.20 6 0.42 0.24 4
UZBEKISTAN UZB -1.03 0.14 8 -0.79 0.16 7 -0.98 0.17 6 -0.92 0.25 3
VANUATU VUT -0.44 0.44 1 -0.22 0.46 1 -0.29 0.37 1 .. .. ..
VENEZUELA VEN -0.94 0.14 11 -0.64 0.16 11 -0.73 0.16 9 -0.67 0.17 7
VIETNAM VNM -0.68 0.16 9 -0.75 0.18 8 -0.62 0.18 7 -0.60 0.22 6
WEST BANK WBG -0.99 0.38 1 0.76 0.49 1 0.49 0.49 1 .. .. ..
YEMEN YEM -0.69 0.18 6 -0.70 0.22 5 -0.57 0.23 4 -0.23 0.26 3
YUGOSLAVIA YUG -0.80 0.16 7 -1.08 0.23 3 -0.97 0.23 4 -0.85 0.30 2
ZAMBIA ZMB -0.97 0.16 8 -0.85 0.19 7 -0.56 0.17 7 -0.91 0.24 4
ZIMBABWE ZWE -1.17 0.16 8 -0.93 0.19 7 -0.13 0.15 9 -0.11 0.22 5  
 